

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THE ANTI-SCIENCE POSITION: THE THESES AGAINST POSITIVIST POLITICAL SCIENCE IN SOME CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL WRITINGS

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School of
The Florida State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved:

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Dean of the Graduate School

March, 1968

To My Father and Mother,

The Parents *Par Excellence*

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I am indebted to a number of persons to whom specific reference cannot be made. I am indebted to the positivist political scientists who have taught me, directly and indirectly, and who have concretized my conviction as to the lacunae of their approach. I am indebted also to the anti-positivist political scientists who have solidified my feeling that something is amiss in positivist political science. Specifically, however, I wish to mention Professor Marian D. Irish, now at American University, who exerted a profound influence upon my intellectual growth.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE

As an academic discipline, political science in America has undergone certain distinct phases in its path of development. From its birth at the end of the 19th century to the advent of World War I, American political science was under the dominant influence of Germanic Rational-Idealism. Belief in the basic rationality of man, belief in the essential harmony of interests among rational men, belief in the assured propagation of democratic practices, etc., were taken for granted by the Rational-Idealistic political science of this period. Consequently, with academic concerns being primarily oriented toward "first principles"--the best form of government, the ends of government, the proper means to realize them, etc.--the preoccupation of the discipline was predominantly legalistic, historical, institutional, and ethical. With the advent of World War I, however, optimism began to wane, and the experiences between the two world wars, such as the appearance of dictatorships, world depression, failure of the League of Nations, and, finally, the outbreak of World War II, further contributed to the doubt of the Rational-Idealistic assumptions. Event after event, empirical

actualities were found to differ radically from what had been postulated under the old maxims. As a consequence, all the grand theories of the speculative "first principles" became objects of intense suspicion. In place of the old, the disciplinary focus then shifted to the actualities, to detailed fact-finding and Inductive Empiricism. The techniques of case study and survey analysis were subjected to much methodological attention, and the material positivism of this period, which not at all accidentally coincided with the 'Reformist Era," was further characterized by the rise of public administration in the study of politics.

It seems that historical events are only rarely, if ever, disjunctive in toto. Much of political science in America today remains what it has been, devoted mainly to rather loose institutional descriptions and speculative generalizations. Some, too, continues the Progressive tradition of reformist evaluations. Many practitioners continue the material positivist piecemeal empiricism, with or without explicit statements of the assumptions upon which their works are predicated. The most significant developments in the discipline, however, would seem to be those that have pushed beyond the piecemeal empiricism of the previous era to the self-consciously more systematic approaches sometimes called "behavioral." Precisely what this label means is still disputable, but this new "realism with vision" has certain unmistakable hallmarks, for it is

fundamentally predicated upon the epistemological and methodological assumptions of Logical Positivism: insistence on the strict separation of statements of facts and statements of values; assumption that methods of the natural sciences are applicable to the materials of the social sciences; emphasis on systematic theory with ultimate reference to the empirical world; emphasis on precise units and concepts of analysis; etc. To be sure, these are admittedly more like goals than like the standards of present-day products, for little, if any, contemporary research meets the lofty criteria these assumptions necessarily imply. Nevertheless, the influences of the positivist reorientation in American political science are felt in almost all segments of the discipline: more systematic efforts at comparison of political systems; survey investigation and analysis of electoral behavior; infusion of organization theory, social psychology, and anthropological questions into public administration studies; quantitative analysis of judicial decisions; new questions put to old systems of political theory; etc., to list only a few examples.

It seems only fair to point out that those proponents and practitioners of positivist political science are no longer the "Young Turks" in the discipline, but rather constitute, if not the force majeure of a numerical majority, at least a highly significant component of the profession

in the academic prestige and weight they seem to carry. The successful conclusion of the rebellion was recorded by Robert A. Dahl, who, in 1961, inscribed an "epitaph for a monument to a successful protest,"[1] although he found it easier to pinpoint the meaning of "behavioral approach"--as a "mood" or the "Loch Ness monster"--more in terms of what it is not than what it is.

Behavioralism in political science has been subjected to criticism from various sources. To be sure, much of the criticism comes from those who feel uneasy in the presence of unfamiliarities; from those to whom the jargon sounds no less strange and threatening than the thieves' argot--from those in whom "standard deviations" instill only the fear of the unfamiliar. However, there are critical voices that succeed in penetrating mere appearance. Perceiving the positivist political science not as the "Loch Ness monster," but rather as a "Minotaur"[2] possessing distinctively identifiable features, these minority spokesmen impose upon

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[1]"The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for A Monument to A Successful Protest," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (December, 1961), pp. 763-772. The article was a paper presented at the Fifth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, September 26, 1961.

[2]I borrow this term from Alvin W. Gouldner, "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of A Value-Free Sociology," Social Problems, Vol. 9 (Winter, 1962), pp. 199-231. The article was a presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 28, 1961.

themselves the role of an intellectual Theseus intent upon slaying the monster.

This dissertation proposes to present the anti-Minotaur arguments in a systematic and critical way. Despite the extent of specialization today, we do not yet find anyone in our discipline whose sole professional function is to utter and promote anti- or pro-positivist political science. Consequently, the purpose of the dissertation is two-fold. The one is to compare--i.e., discover similarities and differences in--the writings of various theorists selected because of their common and specific anti-positivism in the study of politics. This will be the descriptive component of the dissertation. The second purpose is to present an integrated "theory" of anti-positivism in political science based upon critical analysis of the reasons or explanations[1] advanced by each of the writers in defense of his anti-positivist stand. This will constitute the analytic and synthetic components of the dissertation. After all the

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[1]It may be worthwhile to indicate that the giving of reasons is not the same as the giving of explanations. To give a reason for a belief is to make one or more statements which are intended as evidence for the belief, or, in other words, which are intended to make the belief more probable. To explain a belief, on the other hand, means to state why the person holds the belief, which may have nothing at all to do with evidence. Thus, if someone is asked why he believes in Marxism, for instance, he may cite statements as evidence in support of the belief, such as historical materialism, the functions of the state and the mode of production, etc. But the explanation for his holding the belief may have nothing to do with the evidences of "class struggle," etc.; he may simply wish to take a nonconformist stand in an overly conformist bourgeois democratic society.

relevant and irrelevant arguments are examined and categorized in an orderly fashion, it is hoped that the writer also will be able to make some original contributions to the "theory" of anti-positivist political science.

Insofar as a dissertation is partly descriptive, partly analytic, statements on "methodology"--in a technical sense--are usually redundant, for, as soon as the "issue" is raised as an object of inquiry, the "methodology" is already revealed or, at least, implicit. However, some general statements on the data and their utilization are warranted.

If we could talk about "orthodoxy" in the discipline of political science--which now seems to consist of more heterogeneous parts than any other social science--we would have to designate as orthodox the part that constitutes the force majeure, i.e., the positivists in the discipline. And, since the natural locality of an orthodoxy is on the "right," we could say in general that

> the political science profession contains a strong minority on the right, consisting of the strict adherents of the new political science or the "behavioralists," a small minority of the left, consisting of those who reject the new political science root and branch, and a center consisting of the old-fashioned political scientists.[1]

The selection of data is based on three more or less specific criteria. First, they are chosen among the "left" who reject "root and branch" positivism in political science in

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[1]Leo Strauss, "An Epilogue," in Herbert J. Storing (ed.), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 308.

particular and in related social sciences in general. Second, among the "left," only contemporary writers are chosen as data. This criterion constitutes the temporal limits of the dissertation. Third, among the contemporary "left," only those are chosen as relevant who have written extensively on other matters related to the anti-positivist position. This criterion, constituting the spatial limits of the dissertation, is deemed necessary for examining the ultimate assumptions of the anti-positivist stands. Although any datum that fulfills the three requirements is considered relevant, three authors are chosen for examination: Hans J. Morgenthau, representing the realist school; Leo Strauss, representing the idealist tradition; and C. Wright Mills, who is widely recognized as the initiator of the "new" or "critical" sociology.[1] While, needless to say, no claim for exhaustive treatment of the subject matter is advanced, the three authors selected are believed to represent a reasonably broad range of viewpoints on matters other than anti-positivism.

In utilizing the data thus selected, it will be necessary to develop, in the first place, certain broad

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[1]Irving Louis Horowitz, "Preface," in Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp. ix-xiii. Considering the decreasing sharpness of the disciplinary boundaries between political science and sociology, psychology, and anthropology, the fact that the issue of positivism is truly an inter-disciplinary issue--rather than the fact that Mills has written several political writings--renders justification for the inclusion of Mills in the dissertation.

analytic categories according to which the various authors' statements may be ordered. This will be done in attempt to discern distinct dimensions or levels of their arguments, such as the indictment of positivism as "unnecessary," "dangerous," "impossible," or "meaningless." In the second place, it will be necessary to develop common analytic categories on the different levels of arguments. The analytic categories are constructed in the next chapter.

It takes only slight historical knowledge to discover the fact that society reacts strongly to radically different perceptions of a world that is otherwise taken for granted. Galileo's famous "E pur si Muove!" is only one of many examples. A Galilean action requires, however, a very particular intellectual capacity that is something more than a technical competence: namely, an ability to detach oneself from the values and attitudes prevailing in a given society, in order to gain understanding that goes beyond conventional perspectives. What may be called a "system-transcending" capacity necessitates as a precondition a fundamental intelligence: a capacity to transcend the world of one's own experiences and to project oneself into life and institutions with which one does not in the ordinary course of events have direct experience. True intellectuals--defined in this fashion--are rare, and we can only regret that they do not multiply so easily as bacteria.

Perhaps, such a system-transcending capacity is manifest in the fact that the positivist orientation in political science has been almost a symbol of division in the discipline. With the insights provided by modern psychology and psychoanalysis, one could readily advance a plausible diagnosis on the frictions in the discipline. We are informed that each of us is endowed with something called "ego"; that ego is not infrequently the end-product of one's identity-establishment in a particular profession or belief; that ego demands indulgence rather than deprivation; that all experiences are either ego-syntonic, ego-alien, or ego-neutral. Thus, when the subjectively perceived values of one's profession or belief are overtly challenged--whether the challenge is presented in the form of an issue or is motivated by intellectual curiosity are immaterial here--such an event is likely to be experienced as an ego-alien trauma, rather than as an issue, for those who fail to transcend the psychic "system" and meet the challenge squarely. In short, one suspects that the issue of positivism in political science not infrequently perverts the issue into mere ego-involvement with the consequence that most arguments on the issue tend to lack capacity either to communicate or to convince.

Psychology, however, cannot be expected to settle the issue; psychologists proper are not even interested in the issue qua issue. When a partisan to the issue uses psychological weapons in an attack upon his opponents, he

is merely committing a logical fallacy; the fallacy that leads to such attributions as "Marx and Carbuncle" or "Rousseau and Constricted Bladder." He is evading the issue.

The dissertation proposes to tackle an issue qua issue. This is prompted by two considerations. The one is a subjective judgment that the issue is fundamental and, hence, significant. If the fundamental queries and skepticisms directed toward positivist political science are destined to be rejected by society and spurned by those members of the force majeure, it is not worth putting the positivist political science on trial, as the case is already closed. At present, however, such a conclusion does not seem warranted. The other consideration, consequently, is another subjective evaluation that the issue is not in any sense settled, and that going to the roots of the matter in order to gain a clearer understanding of the issue itself constitutes an important step toward insight into the fundamental nature of our discipline.

CHAPTER II

DIMENSIONS OF THE ARGUMENTS: A THEORETICAL SCHEME

The arguments against positivist political science are advanced in such a variety of ways that the resulting complexity is almost bewildering. A cursory glance at the literature is sufficient to discover that they range from uninhibited emotional outbursts to brilliant demonstrations of logic; from entertaining ridicule of ephemeral, marginal aspects of positivist political science, to powerful epistemic penetration into the core difficulties of the "science position." Even if those are eliminated which deliberately or half-deliberately evade argumentum ad rem,[1] the complexity of the arguments is only slightly reduced. The primary cause for this complexity is the multiplicity of dimensions of the arguments involved. First, there are the objects toward which the arguments are directed, such as

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[1]In Aristotle's logic, a "thesis"--form in which the arguments against positivist political science are presented in this dissertation--means (1) any proposition contrary to general opinion but capable of being supported by reasoning; (2) an undemonstrated proposition used as a premise in a syllogism, sometimes distinguished from "axiom" in that it may not be self-evident or intrinsically necessary. Therefore, a thesis is relevant--i.e., to the point--insofar as its assertions are supported by reasoning.

positivist political science as product, as process, and as concept. Second, there are the judgmental assertions regarding the alleged "science position," judgments as to its utility, adequacy, feasibility, meaningfulness, etc. Third, there are the grounds for the judgmental assertions regarding the "science position." All these multiple categories present obstacles to an integrated, systematic treatment of the data.[1]

Yet, formidable though it may be, systematic ordering of this apparently disjointed data is the relatively less difficult task of the project. If the primary objective were merely to expose the various arguments against positivist political science--fundamentally restatement, which some cynics pejoratively designate as "writing a book out of books"--the objective could be accomplished with relative ease by grouping together certain regularly recurring combinations of characteristics found in the data: i.e., by constructing a classification scheme tailored to fit the data at hand. The only problem in this case would be construction of a suitable classification scheme. However, exposition of the arguments against positivist political science is only one--though an important one--of the objectives of this dissertation. In addition to a systematic

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[1]The term "data" designates, throughout the dissertation, the selected arguments against positivist political science among the literature pertinent to the subject matter.

ordering of the data, the dissertation aims at a critical evaluation of the arguments, detection of logic behind the arguments, and of possible lacunae in the arguments, and, hopefully, amendment of the defects. The latter objectives require a more inclusive classification structure than a typology tailored to the data at hand. What is needed is a "theory,"[1] a conceptual determination a priori of the total dimensions of all the arguments against positivist political science, covering, ideally, every angle from which such arguments could be maintained. A theory as such will perform three specific functions. First, since the bases for determining "relevancy" of an argument to the issue has to be laid down unambiguously in the conceptual scheme, the theory will serve as an unwavering frame of reference for critically evaluating the arguments examined. Without such a frame of reference--a conceptual determination of the zones of relevancy and irrelevancy--all that can be accomplished, in evaluating the arguments, is determination of their consistency: we would be devoid of means to judge the

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[1]This much over-worked term in political science has many different meanings. Eugene J. Meehan, for example, feels it necessary to elaborate what the term does not mean, in his The Theory and Method of Political Science (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 145-150. However, Meehan's concept of "theory" is that of scientific theory, and it is one of the several meanings of the term employed by political scientists. Thus, Vernon Van Dyke enumerates five different designations of the term: Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 89-102. The term "theory" is used here in the sense of a "series of concepts which are interrelated in a series of propositions." Ibid., p. 96.

pertinency of the arguments to the given issue. Second, when the data are super-imposed upon the conceptual scheme, the "gaps"--or the lacunae of the arguments--will emerge clearly, thus enabling us to see and attempt to fill the gaps. Third, the theory, as a means for organizing the arguments against the "science position"--existing and not-yet-existing--will provide an avenue for further explorations of the subject matter. Construction of the following theoretical scheme is justified on the basis of the above considerations.

On the Object of Positivist Political Science

Physics is a science that deals with inanimate matter and energy and their interactions as they are manifested in the various fields, such as mechanics, accoustics, optics, magnetism, radiation, atomic structure, nuclear phenomena, etc. Similarly, biology is a science that deals with living organisms and vital processes. Any branch of knowledge has specific objects of inquiry, a class of phenomena with which it deals. Thus, inanimate matter and energy are objects of inquiry for physics; living organisms for biology; the chemical compounds and processes occurring in organism for biochemistry; etc. Even a branch of pseudo-knowledge, insofar as it engages in "inquiry," has delimited a class of things or state-of-affairs as its object of investigation. Alchemy, for instance, concerned itself with

a certain class of base materials that were believed transmutable into gold.

Political science, as a branch of knowledge, has, needless to say, certain objects for its inquiry. The very nature of the object of political inquiry, however, constitutes a major area in which the anti-scientists find--actually or potentially--targets for criticisms against positivist political science. The categories for the actual or potential criticisms in this area may be formulated as follows:

A. On the Object of Positivist Political Science
   1. The Proper Object for Political Investigation
      a. concept of political phenomenon
      b. definition of political science
   2. Positivist Treatment of the Object
      a. as epistemic assumption
      b. as methodology
      c. as technique

It is well known that a salient contemporary trend in the American political science has been self-criticism and debate over the proper method, or techniques, goals, and, above all, the subject matter itself of political science.[1] Underneath all the orgy of self-appraisal and

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[1]David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953); Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (New York: UNESCO, 1956); Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1958); Bernard Crick,

criticism seems to lie a fundamental dissension on the definition of political science, which in turn is predicated upon dissimilar concepts of what phenomena are political. The thesis underlying talk of "taking politics out of politics," of reducing politics to non-political terms, for instance, is based on a concept of what is a political phenomenon different from the behavioralist's notion of what constitutes a political phenomenon.[1] It is not difficult to understand why political science should be plagued with this primary predicament, of which all the natural sciences seem free. Again, using physics and biology in contrast, in the world of physical and biological entities, a phenomenon, a state-of-affairs, or a thing, is characterized by a set of defining characteristics, which a certain word designates.[2]

The American Science of Politics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959); Charles Hyneman, The Study of Politics (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1959); Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960); etc.

[1]One advocate of this thesis is Norman Jacobson, who expresses the behavioralist's concept of politics as "solely the formal manifestations of informal processes and attitudes." "The Unity of Political Theory: Science, Morals, and Politics," in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics, op. cit., p. 119.

[2]Words which stand for things have meaning. Words which have empirical content have meaning in two dimensions at once: denotation and designation. The characteristics which a word designates determine the particular things which the word denotes. If we know what a word designates, we know the conditions of applicability of the word: we know under what conditions we can apply the word to a given particular thing in the world. Everything in the world has an infinitely large number of characteristics. Usually, however, a definition comprises several defining

The defining characteristics are independent of human volition, emotion, or, indeed, the cognitive faculty man possesses that recognizes the presence of them. The presence or absence of physicists or biologists will not alter the phenomena of, for examples, magnetic field or osmosis; nor will disputes among the scientists over the natural phenomena affect the defining characteristics of magnetic field or osmosis. The defining characteristics are always there, entirely independent of men, and act as empirical arbiters, so to speak, rendering the ultimate decisions as to who is right or wrong in describing, explaining, or predicting the phenomena of magnetic field or osmosis.[1]

Political science seems deprived of a comparable empirical justice. As to why "the formal manifestations of informal processes and attitudes" can or cannot constitute a political phenomenon, or, for that matter, why they should constitute a political phenomenon, there seems to be

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characteristics: those characteristics without which the thing would not be labeled by a certain word. A sentence which lists the complete set of defining characteristics is the definition of the word.

[1]To be sure, shifts in defining characteristics through time occur in the natural sciences. Suppose, for instance, that the word "M" was once used to apply to anything having characteristics A, B, and C. Then it was "discovered" that those things denoted by "M" that had A, B, and C, also had another characteristic D. This would be added to the list of defining characteristics, and today nothing that was non-D would be called an "M."

no recourse to an impartial or empirical justice: a set of defining characteristics of a "political phenomenon," independent of human actions and speculations.[1]

When one dissents from the positivist concept of what is political--and, consequently, of political science--logic compels him to disconform also to the positivist treatment of the object of inquiry. The disagreement may occur in some or all dimensions in which the positivist treatment of the object manifests itself: as epistemic assumption, as methodology, and as technique for gaining political knowledge. Most generally stated, the epistemic assumption under consideration is that the object of political science is amenable to the systematic, ordered, predictive propositions we associate with "science." An "assumption," however, is a proposition which is taken or posed in order to draw inferences from it. The basis of an assumption is usually a belief in the truth, or possible truth, of the proposition assumed. As such, an assumption is <u>incomplete knowledge</u>. For to know p requires three essential conditions: (1) p is true; (2) we believe p to be true; and (3) there must be complete evidence that p is

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[1]To Anatol Rapoport, a proponent of the "science position," this problem appears a <u>definitional</u> one. "The problem of recognition, of definition is paramount in the behavioral sciences. The problem is not one of existence but one of consensus." "Various Meanings of 'Theory,'" <u>American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), p. 983.

true.[1] An assumption fulfills only the second condition: it is a belief in the truth of the proposition posed, with, at best, incomplete evidence for its support.

The terms "methodology" and "technique" are laden with ambiguity and confusion.[2] The term "methodology" in its original usage refers to the systematic study of the rational and experimental principles guiding scientific and philosophical investigations. As such, it is traditionally considered a branch of philosophy, more particularly, a branch of logic. And, the failure of philosophical methodology to answer many practical questions of social scientists is usually held responsible for the emergence of methodologists within the social disciplines.[3] However, in

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[1]In believing that p is true, we merely have a certain state of mind or attitude toward the statement we are believing; but when we know that p is true, a further condition must be fulfilled: p must really be true.

The second condition is essential because p may be true without our believing it. In this case we do not know p. The medieval people did not know that the earth was round, not because the statement that the earth is round was not true, but because they did not believe that it was.

The third condition is equally essential because we also must believe p to be true on the basis of evidence, not a wild guess. The evidence must be complete, for we cannot know that all the marbles in the bag are black until we have examined the entire stock: nine out of ten will not be sufficient for knowing that all the marbles are black.

[2]One might instance Vernon Van Dyke's usage of "method," "epistemological assumptions," and "techniques" as interchangeable concepts. Political Science, op. cit., pp. 114, 179.

[3]Perhaps, this is the reason methodology in the social sciences came to be seen by some as a "bent of mind" rather than an independent discipline. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (eds.), The Language of Social Research: A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962), p. 4.

the writings of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, et al., methodology is treated as a separate discipline studying the different methods of gaining scientific knowledge. In this definition of the term, methodology differs from other approaches to the study of science in that the actual processes involved in scientific research--as the psychology of cognition or the sociology of knowledge might do--do not fall within its purview. Instead, the proper task of a methodologist is supposed to be systematic and logical examination of the aptness of all research tools, varying from basic assumptions to special research techniques, for the scientific purpose. Within this concept of methodology, however, there are two distinct poles of emphasis: one being the more general, more philosophical pole, and the other the pole of special problems of actual investigation. Talcott Parsons, for one, assumes the former position, when he states that methodology does not refer "primarily to 'method' of empirical research such as statistics, case study, interview, and the like." Parsons adds:

> These latter it is preferable to call research techniques. Methodology is the consideration of the general grounds for the validity of scientific procedures and systems of them. It is as such neither a strictly scientific nor a strictly philosophical discipline.[1]

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[1]Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), pp. 23-24. A similar view is held by J. C. McKinney, "Methodology, Procedures, and Techniques in Sociology," in H. P. Becker and A. Boskoff (eds.), Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change (New York: Dryden, 1957), p. 187.

Compared to Parsons, McKinney, et al., there is a difference of emphasis in, for example, Lazarsfeld-Rosenberg's work:

> If our linguistic feeling is adequate, the term should convey a sense of tentativeness; the methodologist codifies ongoing research practices to bring out what is consistent about them and deserves to be taken into account the next time.[1]

Clearly, the emphasis here is on analysis of concrete research procedures and techniques, rather than, as with Parsons, on the basic, more general methodological problems.

Throughout this dissertation, the term "methodology" will be used in the sense of systematic and logical study of the principles guiding scientific investigation. Consequently, "methodology" is differentiated from substantive theory, since the former is interested only in the general grounds for the validity of theories, not in their content. "Methodology" is also differentiated from "research procedures" and "research techniques." "Research procedures" usually refers to the general modes of investigation, whereas "research techniques" usually refers to specific fact-finding or manipulating operations. Since the function of a methodology is to evaluate the ability of procedures and techniques to provide us with certain knowledge, "methodology" is differentiated from both "procedures" and "techniques." Since, however, there is no apparent need to separate "procedures" from "techniques" in this dissertation, the term "technique" will be employed in an

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[1]The Language of Social Research, op. cit., p. 4.

inclusive sense, designating the general mode of investigation as well as the specific fact-finding or data-manipulating operation.

On the Subject of Positivist Political Science

In developing the theoretical scheme thus far, the discussions have been on the object of positivist political science. Another major area in which the arguments against positivist political science find actually or potentially pertinent targets for criticism is that of the subject of positivist political science. The term "subject" means the person who performs political inquiries: i.e., the political scientist. The second part of the theoretical scheme is formulated as follows:

B. On the Subject of Positivist Political Science
    1. Value-Freedom of the Subject
        a. as epistemic assumption
        b. as methodology
        c. as technique
    2. The Subject-Object Detachment
        a. as epistemic assumption
        b. as methodology
        c. as technique

In modern usage, the term "science" denotes the systematic, objective study of empirical phenomena and resulting bodies of knowledge. It is believed by many

social scientists that their disciplines are sciences in this sense.[1] While most social scientists would tentatively agree with the definition of "science" given here, difficulties arise, of course, in relation to each of the qualifying adjectives: "systematic," "objective," and "empirical."

Science demands objectivity in the reporting and analysis of facts: the capacity of an observer to see the empirical world as it "actually" is. It is well known that in the social sciences there has been much controversy over "objectivity," primarily with respect to the ultimate value commitments of the scientists. There are, however, some irrelevant arguments involved in the controversy that certain positivist scientists falsely consider as the only, or the most important argumenta contra, and we will exclude them at the outset by briefly identifying them. Imputations of value are always present in any investigation, in any point of view. Any point of view involves certain value assumptions, and science--which is a point of view--is no exception. A scientist must assume the preference of "truth" to "falsehood," qualitative superiority of "facts"

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[1]Different concepts of "science" register dissenting voices even at this point. Eric Voegelin, one of the most pungent critics of positivist political science, states, for example: "Science is a search for truth concerning the nature of the various realms of being. Relevant in science is whatever contributes to the success of this search." The New Science of Politics: An Introductory Essay (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 4-5.

to all other available data, etc. Or, for that matter, a scientific investigator must assume that all "facts" are not born free and equal, so to speak. Choice of problems, criteria of importance or of relevance of certain empirical knowledge, etc., cannot be established by any "scientific" method. Obviously, the things valued here are valued as ends in themselves, and, as such, the value judgments involved are primary value judgments, for which no justification is felt required, and for which, perhaps, none can be offered. Generating more light than heat, much criticism against positivist political science has been directed toward such primary value judgments, which the indictees of the criticisms obviously do not deserve, for they do not deny making value judgments in the sense indicted.[1]

Science is "value-free." If science can treat observed expressions of value as data it cannot qua science, express a preference for one set of values over another. Again, it is irrelevant to state that scientists are inherently unconcerned with human values. Rather, the point is, of course, that human values have no place in the frame of reference that defines the scientific functions and activities. The more apposite, serious charges against positivist political science relate to this very point.

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[1]A confirmation of what is stated here can be found in Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 102-103.

It appears possible conceptually to differentiate two distinct types of criticism on the alleged "value-freedom" of positivist political science. The one consists of criticisms of the notion of "value-freedom" itself: the contentions that "value-freedom" in the social sciences in general is either impossible, difficult, or inadequate for obtaining scientifically valid knowledge.[1] The other type of criticism treats the claim of "value-freedom" as a false allegation. The argument here is that the positivist political scientists practice in fact, knowingly or unknowingly, the very opposite of what they claim to avoid with conscious effort: in the guise of "value-freedom," the positivist political scientists commit themselves to a system of values, consciously or otherwise, and, hence, their claim of "objectivity" is false at best, and hypocritical at worst.[2]

"Value-freedom" in positivist political science, however, constitutes only one aspect of the problems of the

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[1]It is rather well known that radical doubts about objectivity with respect to economic interest, and other social and psychological forces, have been raised by some of the more extreme forms of the sociology of knowledge. The role-conflict of political scientists--as citizens and as scientists--is sometimes advanced also as a reason for the difficulty of maintaining "objectivity" in the study of politics.

[2]Anyone who conceives of a society as a nearly closed system--with an established hierarchy of values--and who refuses to mitigate the significance of a scientist as a member within the system would most probably entertain such a view. A representative example is Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

scientific requirement of "objectivity." Objectivity entails problems that are qualitatively different from those of "value-freedom." These problems may be subsumed under the general conceptual category, "the subject-object detachment." The objective quality of any science requires that the subject of scientific investigation must be completely detached from the object of investigation, detached in the sense of an unparticipating outsider to the object, as a physicist is detached from the molecules he studies. Joseph Tussman, for one, has taken note of the fact that the theories of human behavior, with their focus on objective description, explanation and prediction, are invariably written from the standpoint of an outsider.[1] If Tussman is right, some pertinent questions must be posed. Can we understand the behavior of a human being in strictly "behavioral" terms? Is behavior the cause or effect, and not the expression of purpose and value? Is behavior a discrete event to be caught and studied while all else is held constant? Can the behavior be separated from the self-system of which it is a part without doing violence both to the system and to the part? If we purport to know the meaning of behavior, must we not know the meanings of the behavior? Is not the "simple observational level" to remain in the dark?

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[1]Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960), p. 13.

The first four questions were answered in the negative, and the last two in the affirmative, by Karl Mannheim, the sociologist of knowledge, in his methodological arguments against the behaviorally oriented social scientists. Since Mannheim's arguments are specifically related to the issue of the subject-object detachment, his basic methodological premise may briefly be noted here as an actual example of the methodological arguments against the subject-object detachment maintained by positivist political science. As forthrightly stated by Louis Wirth in his introduction to Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia,[1] the fundamental methodological premise rests on the distinction between the spheres of physical science and social science, and the corresponding modes of knowing the two distinct kinds of phenomena:

> The physical object can be known purely from the outside, while mental and social processes can be known only from the inside. . . . Hence insight may be regarded as the core of social knowledge. It is arrived at by being on the inside of the phenomenon to be observed. . . . It is the participation in an activity that generates interest, purpose, point of view, value, meaning, and intelligibility, as well as bias.[2]

Mannheim in effect appealed to social scientists to risk the possibility of bias and even dogmatism in their science, by an act of open commitment, of genuine participation in the stream of human activity they were concerned to describe and

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[1] Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963).

[2] Ibid., p. xx.

explain. Mannheim of course was far from seeking to disparage "objectivity" in the name of a romantically ineffable "subjectivity." Rather, he sought to redefine for social science the fundamental relationship between the subject and object which the standard canons of the field had ordained as one of absolute detachment. The main point of his argument was that, with respect to human phenomena, it is not detachment or disinterest that makes knowledge possible but its very opposite: without the factor of interest--in the primary sense of concern or attachment--there can be no recognition of the subject matter in its distinctive human character, and, hence, no real knowledge of its situation and no understanding of its behavior.[1]

The subject-object detachment in positivist political science entails other problems that can be analyzed in terms of scientific description, explanation, and prediction. These problems will be presented and discussed in more proper context. Put together, the "theoretical scheme" is reiterated as follows:

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[1]An exactly identical view--supplemented by authentic examples--can be found in the fourth chapter of Kenneth B. Clark's Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965). Some representative statements follow: "The tendency to discuss disturbing social issues . . . in detached, legal, political, socio-economic, or psychological terms as if these persistent problems did not involve the suffering of actual human beings is so contrary to empirical evidence that it must be interpreted as a protective device. . . . Feeling may twist judgment, but the lack of feeling may twist it even more." Pp. 75, 80.

A. On the Object of Positivist Political Science

1. The Proper Object for Political Investigation

a. concept of political phenomenon

b. definition of political science

2. Positivist Treatment of the Object

a. as epistemic assumption

b. as methodology

c. as technique

B. On the Subject of Positivist Political Science

1. Value-Freedom of the Subject

a. as epistemic assumption

b. as methodology

c. as technique

2. The Subject-Object Detachment

a. as epistemic assumption

b. as methodology

c. as technique

Judgmental Assertions on Positivist Political Science

An argument against positivist political science necessarily embodies certain judgmental assertions or, statements of evaluations as to certain attributes that are imputed to positivist political science. The contents of the judgmental assertions are qualitatively differentiated as follows: evaluations of positivist political science may be as to its

1. utility;
2. adequacy;
3. possibility;
4. meaningfulness; and
5. potential danger.

At the same time, a judgmental assertion, if the argument is to be relevant, must provide specific grounds for the evaluative statements. If, for instance, one advances an argument against positivist political science, questioning the utility of its technique, he must, in order for his argument to be relevant, provide reasons[1] for his belief. Otherwise, his argument is not a "thesis" and is taken to be irrelevant. On the other hand, if one accepts assumptions identical to those of positivist political science and, following all the rules of logic, arrives at different conclusions; and if the conclusions are given as reasons for maintaining his judgmental assertions on positivist political science, his argument will be called "logical" arguments. Otherwise, an argument will be termed "ideological." From the foregoing, it is conceptually possible to classify three major types of arguments against positivist political science: irrelevant-ideological, relevant-ideological, and relevant-logical. Only the latter two qualify as theses against positivist political science.

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[1]A distinction between giving reasons and giving explanations for a belief was stated in Chapter I.

CHAPTER III

A REALIST'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST POSITIVIST POLITICAL SCIENCE: HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Political Realism

It may perhaps be generalized that the hallmark of Christian political theology lies in an abiding sense of man's inherent limitations. The political theories of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Acquinas, and of Reinhold Niebuhr of the present day, all take a skeptical view of man's potentiality for understanding himself and the world in which he lives and to order his own social and political affairs. In skepticism as to what human rationality can accomplish on earth, in conviction that human perfection is unattainable by the rational faculty, and, consequently, in opposition to any temporal utopianism, conservative political theorists find a common ground with the theologians. As is well known, Burke's quarrel with the eighteenth-century rationalists involved not only their unconcern with empirical circumstances[1] but also the monistic character

[1]In attempt to substitute Aristotelian-Thomist "practical reason" for Hobbesian "speculative reason," Burke developed methodological arguments against the rational-deductive method which assumed a few universal

of their value system. In particular, Burke argued against those rationalists of the French Revolution who had enshrined abstract liberty as the sole political good and had prescribed constitutional systems solely with reference to that abstract and monistic value.[1] Hans J. Morgenthau joins the political theologians and Edmund Burke in the arguments against rationalism. The philosophical grounds for Morgenthau's anti-rationalist position are a set of assumptions about certain aspects of reality: his conception of "political realism."

According to Morgenthau, the history of modern political thought since Machiavelli is the story of an intellectual contest between two schools of thought which differ fundamentally in their conceptions of the nature of man, of society, and of politics:

> One believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now. It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature and attributes the failure of the social order to measure up to the rational standards to lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolete social institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups.[2]

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principles of human nature and from them deduced an entire descriptive and prescriptive politics.

[1]Modern applications of the eighteenth-century rational-deductive method are Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957) and William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalition (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1962). In both works, a monolithic value is posited as an axiom: maximization of power in the former, and victory in games in the latter.

[2]Hans J. Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics. Politics in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 80.

This school of thought Morgenthau summarily categorizes as the "utopian position." On the other hand,

> The other school believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature. . . . This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but at best approximation through the ever temporary balance of interests. . . . It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles and aims at achievement of the lesser evils rather than the absolute good.[1]

This is the "realist" position. Political realism--which in essence is as old as political thought--is an insight into the power and security dilemma in political matters: the irreconcilability of interests and policies and the inevitability of the struggle for power and security of men living in society. Consequently, political realism seems the inevitable outgrowth of the failure of repeated attempts at political reform, creation of a better world, or eviction of the evil men in power and their replacement with men better qualified, wiser, or activated by higher moral principles. Political realism has insisted that politics is fundamentally the struggle for power among individuals and groups for dominance over the respective units--state, class, tribe, etc.--and among the units themselves in what amounts to intertribal, interclass, international, or similar competition. In modern times, this view has been propounded with particular acuity by Hobbes and Machiavelli. In more recent

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[1]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 80.

times, political thought related to the general intellectual reaction against the philosophy of the enlightenment--particularly, with respect to its simplistic ideas on human nature and the nature of politics--added to the old basic realist position the insight into certain particular phenomena: the role which customs and traditions, established institutions and usages play in rendering social and political groups and institutions coherent; and the equally persevering function which the status quo order plays in rendering difficult the "rational" attempts of reformatory movement to replace the old order by a new one. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France is a seminal work in this regard; it articulated the functions and dysfunctions of customs and traditions in a given society.[1] Undoubtedly, Karl Marx is also a political realist, to the extent that he emphasizes and elaborates upon the role which economic domination and the related ideologies of economically ruling classes play in the acquisition or manipulation of power.

Laurence Berns has stated, in relating Hobbes' political theory to that of Machiavelli:

> Machiavelli's "realism" consists in a conscious lowering of the standards of political life, taking as goals of political life not the perfection of man but those lower

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[1]It may be pointed out in particular that Burke emphasized landed property, religion, and "prejudice"--the entire accumulation of untaught sentiments, or what contemporary sociologists would call "primitive beliefs"--as the primary institutions of social control.

> goals actually pursued by most men and most societies most of the time.[1]

From Berns' "utopian" point of view the same thing can be said of Morgenthau. But, needless to say, a utopian speaks of political realism in a vitiating tone because he entertains certain assumptions as to the nature of man, politics and society, assumptions which are at fundamental variance with the realists' conceptions of the nature of man, politics and society.

Political Phenomena

Nature of Man

Since the dawn of political life, man has contemplated, theorized, and philosophized upon the meaning of his political existence, his relationship to others around him, and, above all, his own meaning, i.e., the nature of man. Political theorists of first principles have invariably articulated their conceptions of what man is, or what he ought to be, as a foundation for a theoretical superstructure. Morgenthau is no exception.

Morgenthau's argument against the philosophy of rationalism starts by pointing out what he believes a basic

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[1]"Thomas Hobbes," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), p. 354. One important factor that separates Hobbes from Machiavelli is, of course, the former's elaboration of a code of natural law as a morally binding law, but the essential similarity between the two is that Hobbes, following Machiavelli's realism, separated his doctrine of the natural law from the idea of the perfection of man.

inadequacy in its concepts of the nature of man, of the social world, and of human reason:

> The philosophy of rationalism has misunderstood the nature of man, the nature of the social world, and the nature of reason itself. It does not see that man's nature has three dimensions: biological, rational, and spiritual. By neglecting the biological impulses and spiritual aspirations of man, it misconstrues the function reason fulfills within the whole human existence; it distorts the problem of ethics, especially in the political field; and it perverts the natural science into an instrument of social salvation for which neither their own nature nor the nature of the social world fits them.[1]

Man is a rational being. But rationality is only one aspect, or "dimension," of human nature. Man is endowed with biological impulses no less than with reason. Morgenthau's man is biologically characterized by inherent desires for self-aggrandizement. Self-aggrandizement is of two different types: "selfishness" and the "desire for power." The former is, in a biological sense, a fundamental desire for self-aggrandizement. The typical goals of "selfishness"--food, shelter, security, etc.--and the means by which they are obtained, have an objective relation to the essential needs of the individual. That is, "their attainment offers the best chances for survival under the particular natural and social conditions under which the

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[1]Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 5. The Thomist element in this capsule of Morgenthau's political theory is immediately evident. St. Thomas conceived of man as tripartite: man-the-substance, man-the-animal, and man-the-moral-agent.

individual lives."[1] The animus dominandi, on the other hand, is concerned not with the individual's survival but rather with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured. Consequently, Morgenthau states:

> The selfishness of man has limits; his will to power has none. For while man's vital needs are capable of satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God.[2]

Man is born to seek power, and there can be "no actual denial of the desire for power without denying the very conditions of human existence in this world."[3] Morgenthau's conception of the biological nature of man is both unconditional and axiomatic. The truth of human self-aggrandizement--particularly, the animus dominandi--is held neither contingent upon circumstances nor amenable to change. It is axiomatic, in that it is held, although implicitly, as a self-evident truth. It is because of this unconditional and axiomatic acceptance of the "lust for power" that, to Morgenthau, the coexistence of the "conditions of human existence" and the denial of the will to power appear a priori impossible, as a "circular triangle" is an a priori impossibility in Euclidean geometry. As Morgenthau states in one place:

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 193.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

> It is a priori impossible for political man to be at the same time a good politician--complying with the rules of political conduct--and to be a good Christian--complying with the demands of Christian ethics. In the measure that he tries to be one he must cease to be the other.[1]

Man is also a moral creature. No less than reason and biological impulses, man is endowed with the faculty to aspire for noble causes. In the words of Morgenthau:

> Not only does man try to know what the social world is about and to act according to his knowledge, he also reflects and renders judgments on its nature and value and on the nature and value of his social actions and of his existence in society. In brief, man is also a moral being.[2]

But, according to Morgenthau, one of the tragic incompatibilities in human existence is the coexistence of moral integrity and action--any sort of action at all. This coexistence constitutes a logical impossibility, in the identical sense that a "circular triangle" is an impossibility. Morgenthau contends that the very act of acting destroys our moral integrity and that:

> Whoever wants to retain his moral innocence must forsake action altogether and, following Hamlet's advice to Ophelia, "go . . . to a nunnery."[3]

This is particularly so with respect to political actions. Morgenthau finds the reasons for such belief in the "natural

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[1]Hans J. Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics. Politics in the Twentieth Century, Vol. III (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 15.

[2]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 168.

[3]Ibid., p. 189.

limitations" inherent in man. The human intellect, because of its inborn defects, is unable to calculate and control completely the results of any human action. Once the action is performed, it becomes an independent force creating changes, provoking others, and colliding with other forces, which the actor may or may not have foreseen and which he can control only to a small degree. These factors "which, lying beyond human foresight and influence, we call 'accidents' deflect the action from its intended goal and create evil results out of good intentions."[1] Good intention, in other words, is corrupted before it reaches its intended goal in the world of action. Good intention, moreover, cannot even leave the world of thought without corruption, Morgenthau contends, because the demands which life in society makes upon our moral intentions surpass our faculty to satisfy them all. Thus:

> While satisfying one, we must neglect others, and the satisfaction of one may even imply the positive violation of another. Thus the incompatibility, in the light of our own limitations, of the demands which morality makes upon us compels us to choose between different equally legitimate demands. Whatever choice we make, we must do evil while we try to do good; for we must abandon one moral end in favor of another.[2]

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 189.

[2] This is the root of the "moral dilemma of politics." There are three alternative solutions for the dilemma: strike a precarious balance which will waver between both, never completely satisfying either; abandon one completely in order fully to satisfy the other; or work out a "compromise which puts the struggle at rest without putting conscience at ease." The last is the typical Morgenthauist solution for the dilemmas of domestic as well as international politics.

Nature of Politics

To Aristotle man was a political animal, intended by nature to live in a polis. Morgenthau accepts the Aristotelian notion of man as a political animal as an *a priori* political truth.[1] For Aristotle, however, a state or a polis was an organism, an entity which was actually alive and each component part of which served a necessary function. Aristotle conceived of a polis as belonging to the class of things that exist by nature, and of man as an animal intended by nature to live in a polis, thus giving analytic priority to man's role as a social animal, and only secondarily regarding him as an autonomous individual. Morgenthau's notion of the political animal, on the other hand, is not based on an organic society, but on universality of the conflict of interests and lust for power in all societies. Morgenthau's man is a political animal, in the primary sense that he is "born to seek power," as well as to be "a slave to the power of others."[2] According to

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[1]"The Aristotelian truth that man is a political animal is true forever; the truths of the natural sciences are true only until other truths have supplanted them." Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 220.

[2]Morgenthau is diametrically opposed to Rousseau's idea of the basic goodness of the "Noble Savage." Hence the obvious twist of Rousseau's statement: "Man is born a slave, but everywhere he wants to be a master." Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 168. The famous opening statement of The Social Contract is: "Man is born free, but he is everywhere in chains."

Morgenthau, the social world--within which political phenomena occur--is nothing but man writ large: it is a projection of human nature onto the collective plane. Since society is simply a projection of human nature--characterized by inherently defective reasoning, inborn selfishness and the lust for power, and subject to the equally inherent dilemma between morality and action--man can understand and control society no more than he can himself. Consequently, Morgenthau's concept of politics and political phenomena is characterized by the lust for power, which is held common to all men. "Man's aspiration for power over other men," declares Morgenthau, "is of the very essence of politics."[1] The political actor seeks power, that is, "he seeks to reduce his fellow men to a means for his ends,"[2] and, consequently, "politics is a struggle for power over men,"[3] or it is a "conflict of interests decided through a struggle for power."[4] Power politics, therefore, which is rooted in the animus dominandi inherent in all men, is inseparable from social life itself, and the struggle for power is, for Morgenthau, the unquestionable and defining characteristic of "politics" and "political phenomena."[5]

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[1]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 319.

[2]Ibid., p. 13.

[3]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 195.

[4]The Restoration of American Politics, p. 90.

[5]It appears that this element of Morgenthau's theory of international politics has been largely responsible for

That Morgenthau regards the struggle for power as the defining characteristic of politics and political phenomena is evident also in his distinction between the "perennial" and the "ephemeral" problems of politics. The perennial problems of politics are fundamental and universal in all political activities, unbound by time and space:

> Why is it that all men lust for power; why is it that even their noblest aspirations are tainted by that lust? Why is it that the political act, in its concern with man's power over man and the concomitant denial of the other man's freedom, carries within itself an element of immorality and puts upon the actor the stigma of guilt? Why is it, finally, that in politics good intentions do not necessarily produce good results and well-conceived plans frequently lead to failure in action, and why is it, conversely, that evil men have sometimes done great good in politics and improvident ones have frequently been successful?[1]

These are perennial problems of politics. They are perennial because they do not grow out of temporary limitations of knowledge or temporary insufficiencies of technical achievement, but result from the perpetual conflicts in which the selfishness and the lust for power involve men. Time and place change outward manifestations of these problems but not their essence, which is today what it was at the beginning of historic time. At the same time, Morgenthau continues, the problems that these questions raise "are not

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the idealists' broadsides against him as a Machiavellian. Cf.: Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power versus the Coordinate State," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67 (June, 1952), pp. 173-197; Robert W. Tucker, "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 46 (March, 1952), pp. 214-224; etc.

[1]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 42.

scientific but philosophic in nature. Yet without the awareness of their legitimacy and relevance political science is precluded from even raising certain problems essential to the scientific understanding of politics."[1] Consequently, for Morgenthau the proper task of political science is separating "that which is historically conditioned from that which is true regardless of time and place" in matters political and reformulating "the perennial truths of politics, in the light of the contemporary experience."[2]

Positivist Treatment of Political Phenomena

Assumed Analogy between Physical and Social World

In assuming that man's aspiration for power is an all-pervasive fact of the very essence of the political matters, Morgenthau admittedly deviates from the mainstream of the Western political thought of recent times insofar as the concept of political life is concerned.[3] The *force majeure*, according to Morgenthau, instead of recognizing political domination and the lust for power as ubiquitous, tried to escape the recognition by several fundamental

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[1] *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, p. 42.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[3] Morgenthau has in mind Anglo-American liberalism as the main stream of Western political thought; he identifies that liberalism as the typical representative of post-enlightenment rationalism on the political scene.

devices, among which was "scientism."[1] In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Morgenthau maintains, the belief in science has been the main manifestation of the rationalistic mode of thought that the social and the physical worlds are intelligible through the same rational process, and that understanding in terms of this rational process is all that is needed for their control. This belief in science, according to Morgenthau, is the salient intellectual trait which separates our age from preceding periods of history, in that:

> Whatever different philosophic, economic, and political beliefs people may hold, they are united in the conviction that science is able, at least potentially, to solve all the problems of man.[2]

This is the belief in the capacity of science to solve all problems, social as well as physical: i.e., scientism. Morgenthau specifies what is meant by "scientism":

> It is the belief that the problems of social life are in essence similar to the problems of physical nature and that, in the same way in which one can understand the laws of nature and, by using this knowledge, dominate nature and harness it to one's own ends, one can understand the facts of society and, through this knowledge, create a gigantic social mechanism which is at the command of the scientific master.[3]

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[1]In addition to scientism, there are "the dual moral standard," "perfectionism," and "totalitarianism." These are not directly relevant to the subject matter at hand, and hence, they will not be dealt with.

[2]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 4.

[3]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 321. Usually, the term "scientism" is a pejorative term denoting the belief and action predicated on the belief of those whom it is used against that (1) science can solve all

Thus, in maintaining an essential identity between the problems of society and those of nature, and in assuming the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences to the social spheres, scientism establishes an epistemological as well as a methodological analogy between the natural and the social worlds. Morgenthau repudiates the analogy as mistaken, refuting what he calls "the method of the single cause" as a scientifically untenable theory of causation, as it is applied in the social phenomena, and recounting modern scientific thought, in an attempt to show that the very concept of physical nature as the paradigm of reason--regularity, controllability, predictability, certainty, etc.--is invalid, and that only in the positivist social sciences does it still lead "a ghostlike existence."

Morgenthau presents three reasons why scientism's conception of society is faulty:

> First of all, in the natural world we deal primarily with typical situations and typical phenomena as such. In the social world we deal primarily with individual events and individual phenomena as such. Furthermore, the social scientist is not a detached observer of social events as the natural scientist is a detached observer of the phenomena of nature. . . . Finally, the natural sciences deal with lifeless matter, and even where they deal with human beings or living matter

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problems of value and/or of value implementation in human life; (2) science can, on the basis of empirical observation, predict and control human behavior. However, Morgenthau, regarding scientism broadly as a "movement" of rationalistic philosophy, does not confine the term specifically to the social spheres. Hence, he renders due credit to the success of scientism in the natural sciences. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 124, 125.

> they deal with them as some sort of mechanism. They do not deal with man as a rational being or a moral being. On the other hand, the social scientist deals with human beings as such. . . . [1]

Physical nature as seen by natural scientists consists of a multitude of isolated sequences of causes and effects over which human action has complete control. The scientists know, for example, that water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit and, by exposing water to this temperature, they can make it boil at will: i.e., they can create cause and effect at will. All practical knowledge of physical nature and all control over it are, Morgenthau argues, essentially of this same kind, and scientism, believing that the same kind of knowledge and control hold true for the social world, emulates this model: the "method of the single cause."[2] This belief of scientism is false and the method is invalid, however, because the logical coherence of the natural sciences does not, in fact, apply in the social sphere. In the social sphere, first of all, there is no single cause by the creation of which one can create a

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[1] The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 312-313. The first and the third reasons relate to the nature of the object of social and political investigations, whereas the second is concerned with the value-freedom of the social and political investigators. The second reason, therefore, will be discussed in the next section, where the context is more appropriate.

[2] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 95-105. The phrase is apparently pejorative, denoting the practice of reducing what is in principle unreducible to a unity capable of rational formulation.

certain effect at will. For any single cause can entail an indefinite number of different effects and the same effect can originate from an indefinite number of different causes. Thus:

> It is impossible to foresee with any degree of certainty which effects will be brought about by this particular cause, nor is it possible to state in retrospect with any degree of certainty what particular cause has produced this effect.[1]

One may, for example, subject a group of people to a certain kind of propaganda, which in the past has induced this group of people to perform a certain type of action. Whether the social investigator will succeed in creating the same kind of reaction this time depends upon a great number of circumstances over which he has only remote or no control.

> First of all, the cause, that is, propaganda . . . is itself a product of social interaction--the composite of a multitude of individual actions and reactions, themselves subject to a multitude of physical and psychological causes of which we have no knowledge and over which we have no control. Two substantially identical causes, for instance, may produce different social results because of a difference in dynamic strength, which is neither detectable nor measurable except by the results.[2]

Social cause, in other words, is itself an indeterminate element which can never be reproduced identically and which we are never sure of reproducing with exactly those qualities relevant to the result. Furthermore, the object upon which the social cause exerts its influence is equally

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 127.

[2] Ibid., p. 128.

a social phenomenon, the exact nature of which at any given time is impossible to foresee or to determine by deliberate action. Thus:

> A certain group of people may react upon an identical cause in an identical or in a different way according to the physical or psychological conditions prevailing in the group, and according to the same conditions it may react upon different causes in an identical way.[1]

The natural events that are the object of inquiry for natural scientists are "typical," in that the cause for a given effect is specifiable and the association between cause and effect is regular and, hence, predictable. On the other hand, social events are "individual," in that the cause for a given effect is never specifiable, and the association between cause and effect is not regular and, hence, unpredictable. Hence, according to Morgenthau, the difference between the social and the natural sciences is fundamental in two respects. First, while the natural sciences deal with isolated causes operating upon motionless objects, the social sciences have to do with indeterminable chains of causes and effects, each of which, in reacting, is the cause of another reacting effect, and so on ad infinitum. Second,

> the natural sciences are in doubt as to whether or not certain causes will occur; but they foretell with a high degree of certainty that upon a certain typical cause a certain typical effect will follow. The social sciences, on the contrary, are in doubt as to the

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[1]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 129.

> occurrence not only of the causes but also of the effects, once a cause has taken place.[1]

It may be noted here that much of sociological theory on causation has been in terms of uni-causality; the idea that a single species of events alone is efficient in social life. Examples are to be found in certain techno-economic interpretations of Marxism, in theories that would make culture a function of the childhood experiences of social life and training, etc. Since such attempts to simplify social causation have never been found ultimately effective, however, sociological analysis seems to have tended to a plurality of causes.[2] An application of this theoretical orientation in political science can be found in Seymour Martin Lipset's idea of "multi-variate causation." Lipset states that his approach

> stresses the view that complex characteristics of a total system have multi-variate causation and consequences. . . . From this point of view, it would be difficult to identify any one factor crucially associated with, or "causing," any complex social characteristic. Rather, all such characteristics are considered to have multi-variate causation, and consequences.[3]

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[1]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 131.

[2]If E occurs whenever conditions 1, 2, and 3 are all fulfilled, but also whenever conditions 4, 5, and 6 are all fulfilled, E is said to have a plurality of causes. Also, there seems to be an attempt to escape by way of the idea of "function" from the whole concept of causation in the social sciences. See below, pp. 176-178.

[3]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960), p. 61. As the subsequent text indicates, however, Political Man is not a study conducted in terms of causation. Rather,

Although Morgenthau does not specify whether or not he is using the phrase "the method of the single cause" in the sense of the method of uni-causality, it is abundantly clear from his arguments that he considers the idea of the plurality of causes in social sciences an equally futile attempt to emulate the natural sciences. For Morgenthau maintains not only that a social event has a multiple causation, but also that the multiple causation is indefinite and indeterminate. For Lipset, it is possible to specify a "syndrome of conditions," 1, 2, 3, etc., each of which is definite and determinate, and relate them collectively as a causal factor to a given social event: i.e., the conditions act collectively as a "multi-variate causation" of democracy. By asserting the incalculability of social action at all, Morgenthau holds the very act of specifying the necessary or sufficient conditions for a social effect to be an impossibility.

Despite demonstrable experiences to the contrary, Morgenthau argues,

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it is a study in which an attempt is made to establish a measure of association between certain social conditions and the functioning of democracy. Far from being a study in causation, therefore, Lipset's work is rather an application of the methodological presuppositions of the statistical multi-variate correlations of individual behavior with various social characteristics formulated by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, et al.: "Interpretation of Statistical Relations as a Research Operation," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (eds.), The Language of Social Research, op. cit., pp. 115-125; Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis: Principles, Cases and Procedures (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 242-329.

> the social sciences continue to claim the ability to foresee the effects of social causes with a high degree of certainty, to plan social action correspondingly, and to bring about social changes according to plan.[1]

The persistence of such claims, according to Morgenthau, is due to a conception that the physical world is dominated by rational laws and therefore capable of complete rational determination. The modern age found this picture of the physical world in the natural sciences of the nineteenth century; the physical world, in this conception, is composed of matter, moving in time and space according to the law of gravitation and evolving in a continual development according to the law of causation.[2] It is this picture of the physical world--rational, calculable, predictable--that is emulated as a model in the social sciences. Morgenthau maintains that modern scientific thought has invalidated the nineteenth-century conception of the physical world, to the effect that:

> What scientist philosophy and, under its influence, nineteenth-century political thought and the social

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 131.

[2] An early theorist who attempted to extrapolate the mechanical view of the natural world into the sphere of political phenomena was Thomas Hobbes. Rejecting Aristotle's teleological view of nature, Hobbes placed primary emphasis on matter in motion, and on material causes as the sole way of explaining nature. The Hobbesian man was basically matter, having natural inertia (a principal desire for self-preservation) and equal with others in his natural right, that is, preservation of inertia.

> sciences refer to as their object of emulation is a ghost from which life has long since departed.[1]

There has been a funeral of "Dead Certainty," but the social sciences have not been present at this funeral. In fact, "they are not aware that it has taken place. For them certainty, in both the physical and the social world, is still very much live."[2] Morgenthau refers to two changes that have taken place in modern scientific thought. First, modern scientific theory has shown the complicated character of our everyday experience of nature, which belies the apparent simplicity and calculability of technological achievements. In this regard, Morgenthau invokes the authority of Arthur Stanley Eddington, a British physicist and leading exponent of the theory of relativity, who states:

> It has become doubtful whether it will ever be possible to construct a physical world solely out of the knowable--the guiding principle in our macroscopic theories. . . . If it is possible, it involves a great upheaval of the present foundations. It seems more likely that we must be content to admit a mixture of the knowable and unknowable. This means a denial of determinism, because the data required for a prediction will include the unknowable elements of the past. . . . The physicist now regards his own external world in a way which I can only describe as more mystical, though not less exact and practical, than that which prevailed some years ago, when it was taken for granted that nothing could be true unless an engineer could make a model of it.[3]

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 132.

[2] Ibid., p. 133.

[3] Ibid., p. 134.

Second, modern scientific theory has shown that science is unable to determine individual events as such with certainty. Certainty is possible only with respect to events that are taken not individually but as members of a large group of similar events. Thus, Morgenthau states:

> when there is certainty in our everyday experience of nature, this certainty has not an absolute, but only a statistical, quality. In other words, this certainty holds good for averages of large numbers of similar objects but not for individual objects as such.[1]

Morgenthau explains this uncertainty and indeterminacy in the natural sciences by quoting Eddington again:

> Human life is proverbially uncertain; few things are more certain than the solvency of a life-insurance company. The average law is so trustworthy that it may be considered predestined that half of the children now born will survive the age of x years. But that does not tell us whether the span of life of young A. McB. is already written in the book of fate, or whether there is still time to alter it by teaching him not to run in front of motor-buses. . . . The quantum physicist does not fill the atom with gadgets for directing its future behavior, as the classical physicist would have done; he fills it with gadgets determining the odds on its future behavior.[2]

The natural sciences, in other words, can make no certain statement with regard to individual events as such, and the inevitable emphasis upon individuality as such--which distinguishes the social from the natural sciences--extends the uncertainty immeasurably for the social sciences. Consequently, according to Morgenthau, the best "social

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 135.

[2] Ibid., pp. 135-136.

laws" can do is exactly the best "natural laws" can do: that is, indicate certain trends and state the conditions under which one of those trends is most likely to materialize. However, neither the natural or the social sciences can foretell which of the possible conditions will actually occur and thus help a particular trend to materialize. Nor can they foretell with more than a high degree of probability that in the presence of certain conditions a certain trend will materialize. Yet, in the words of Morgenthau,

> Many political writers and political scientists . . . claim that they can do more than that, and they seem to be actually able to predict social events with a high degree of certainty.[1]

In fact, however, such political scientists and their public are, Morgenthau argues, the victims of one of two delusions. Since the situations in which most predictions are made entail a limited number of possible trends--victory or defeat in election, success or failure in policy, etc.--the prediction, made in a more or less qualified fashion, is bound to have been right at least once, or in a certain measure all the time, since one of the trends under discussion is bound to materialize. On the other hand, many writers convey the idea of historical necessity and are in reality prophecies after the event. The seeming proof that

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[1]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 137.

what happened was "bound to happen" argues post hoc propter hoc and, hence, has no scientific value.[1]

The Methodology of Positivist Political Science: An Escape from Politics

Positivist political science, taking its cue from the natural sciences--or what it thinks the natural sciences to be--tries to develop rigorous methods of quantitative verification which are expected in time to attain the precision in discovery of uniformities and in prediction to which the natural sciences owe their theoretical and practical success. Aside from the arguments as to whether or not politics is amenable to scientific treatment, it must be pointed out that the scientific requirements of the positivist methodology[2] often operate to narrow the field of inquiry itself and to justify an avoidance of troublesome areas where issues of consequences are being decided--i.e., where values are in conflict and human passions are likely

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[1]A scientific explanation requires two conditions: the statement of the phenomenon to be explained must be logically deducible from the statements which give the explanation; the explanation must have predictive value. The former calls for a universal "law," and the latter "typicality" of events. Hence, for Morgenthau, there can be no scientific explanation of social events. For a discussion of scientific explanation, see below, pp. 166-168.

[2]That doubts as to the utility of the method exist is indicated by the fact that the methodology has been dubbed, pejoratively, "methodological asceticism," "methodological inhibition," and "methodolatry," by Karl Mannheim, C. Wright Mills, and Floyd W. Matson, respectively.

to be involved, The same criteria, in other words, which guide the "team of technicians"[1] to the fashionable margins of research militate against the selection of those subjects which are "perennial," in a Morgenthau's sense of the term. Thus, for example, in an authoritative text on research methods in the social sciences, Pauline V. Young advises:

> We should also consider the degree of accuracy or approximation essential for the demands of science . . . potential data likely to be strongly colored by emotions may lead to distortions and inaccuracies. International relations, strikes and lockouts, poverty and riches are examples of topics heavily weighted with emotion and should, therefore, be carefully considered both from the standpoint of feasibility of obtaining accurate and reliable facts and methods of approach.[2]

What this advice seems to mean is that social scientists whose concern is properly with scientific rigor and accuracy, with measurable certainty and unambiguous prediction, should hang their clothes on a safely dead limb and avoid the water.[3] Under these circumstances, as Morgenthau subsequently points out, there would appear three separate approaches to the study of politics available to the value-free positivist political science--each of which, it can be

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[1]For the positivists' usage of this phrase, see, for example: Bernard Berelson, "The Study of Public Opinion," in Leonard D. White (ed.), The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 305.

[2]Pauline V. Young, Scientific Social Survey and Research (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 123.

[3]This point is directly relevant to Morgenthau's arguments against the alleged value-freedom in positivist political science, which will be dealt with in the next section.

argued, is in fact a retreat from politics. First of all, it may choose to concentrate upon those mechanical and peripheral--or "ephemeral," to use Morgenthau's term--details of the political process which can be readily manipulated by the quantitative methods of sampling, scaling, testing and content-analyzing--such matters as electoral statistics and mass media studies. Thus, Morgenthau states:

> The inadequacy of the quantitative method to the subject matter of political science is demonstrated by the limitation of its success to those types of political behavior which by their very nature lend themselves to a certain measure of quantification, such as voting. . . . [1]

Second, the positivist political science may take up its measuring rods and push into the central areas of politics, ignoring their ambiguity and trivializing their contents. Thus, in the words of Morgenthau:

> Once quantification has left that narrow sphere where it can contribute to relevant knowledge, two roads are open to it. Either it can try to quantify phenomena which in their aspects relevant to political science are not susceptible to quantification, and by doing so obscure and distort what political science ought to know; thus much of quantitative political science has become a pretentious collection of trivialities. Or, dimly aware of this inadequacy, quantification may shun contact with the empirical phenomena of political life altogether and try to find out instead what the correct way of quantifying is.[2]

Third, positivist political science may abandon political

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[1] The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 27.

[2] Ibid.

realities altogether and retire to the height of pure method. According to Morgenthau, this divorce of methodology from empirical investigation not only points to the inadequacy of the quantitative method for the understanding of much of the subject matter of political science but also illustrates a tendency to retreat from contact with the empirical world into a realm of "self-sufficient abstractions," common both to methodological endeavors in the social sciences and to general philosophy:

> The new scholastic dissolves the substance of knowledge into the processes of knowing; he tends to think about how to think and to conceptualize about concepts, regressing ever further from empirical reality until he finds the logical consummation of his endeavors in mathematical symbols and other formal relations.[1]

Morgenthau identifies Lassell's and Kaplan's Power and Society[2] as a prominent example of the "new scholasticism" in political science. What vitiates this work as a major contribution to political theory is the authors' "thorough misunderstanding of the nature of political theory and of its relationship to empirical research." The authors are unaware "that a political science inclosed in nothing but an empirical framework is a contradiction in terms. . . . "[3] All observers of politics of necessity bring to their field

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[1]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 28.

[2]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950).

[3]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 31.

of inquiry a framework of political philosophy, however inarticulate and fragmentary it may be. The authors are no exception, for their philosophy is that of "democracy." Yet, what separates the great political thinkers of the past from Lasswell and Kaplan--and "many academic political scientists of the day"--is the fact that

> The latter take the democratic values of freedom for granted and do not ask themselves what the content of those values and what the relations among those values and between them and other values of a non-democratic character must be under the conditions of the contemporary world. Nor are they aware--and they cannot be, in view of their preconceptions--of the necessary relationship between those questions of political philosophy and the framework and content of empirical political inquiry.[1]

Value-Freedom in Positivist Political Science

The political scientist is a product of the society which he seeks to understand. He is also an active member of that society, frequently seeking to play a leading part. As a professional, the political scientist is committed to discovery and publication of the truth about the society; as a participant citizen, he is committed to the society as a functioning system. Revelation as well as pursuance of the whole truth about the society can be detrimental to the continued functioning of the society. Herein lies, in brief, the ultimate moral ambivalence, if not the paradox, of the political scientist in a given society.

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[1]*The Decline of Democratic Politics*, p. 31.

To be faithful to his commitment to the truth, Morgenthau maintains, the political scientist has to overcome two inherent limitations: the "limitation of origin," and the "limitation of purpose." The former determines the perspective from which he looks at society, and the latter conditions him to wish to remain a member in good standing of that society. These two limitations, in the final analysis, render value-freedom in political science impossible. As a product of society, the mind of the political scientist is conditioned by the society which he observes. His outlook, intellectual interests, and mode of thinking are molded by the civilization, the national community, as well as all the social, economic, political and religious sub-groups of which he is a member. Therefore, Morgenthau argues:

> The truth which a mind thus socially conditioned is able to grasp is likewise socially conditioned. The perspective of the observer determines what can be known and how it is to be understood. In consequence, the truth of political science is of necessity a partial truth.[1]

The truth of political science, on the other hand, is the truth "about power, its manifestations, its configurations, its limitations, its implications, its laws." At the same time, however:

> one of the main purposes of society is to conceal these truths from its members. That concealment, that elaborate and subtle and purposeful misunderstanding of the

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[1]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 36.

> nature of political man and of political society is one of the cornerstones upon which all societies are founded.[1]

Consequently, therefore, society exerts its pressures and influences upon a mind which by its very nature is unable to see more than part of the truth. In his search for truth, Morgenthau argues, the political scientist is hedged in by society in three different ways; with regard to the object, with regard to the results, and with regard to the methods of his inquiry. In all societies certain problems cannot be investigated at all, or can be investigated only at grave risk to the investigator. Thus, the basic philosophic assumptions by which a society lives--e.g., Marxism in Russia; the profit motivation and free enterprise in capitalistic countries--are usually beyond the ken of the social sciences. Similarly, in all societies certain results are beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. Thus, for example, no Russian economist is likely to conclude publicly that capitalism is superior to communism; nor an American economist likely to maintain the reverse position.

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[1] The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 37. One may detect here a hint of Burkean "prejudice"--the entire accumulation of untaught sentiments--as an institution of social control for the preservation of stratified order. Some contemporary sociologists of "functionalism" appear to be saying the same thing--but with different implications--when they formulate a "shared cognitive orientation," "shared set of goals," etc. as functional prerequisities of a society. Cf., for example, D. F. Aberle, et al., "The Functional Prerequisities of A Society," in Roy C. Macridis, et al. (eds.), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1961), pp. 67-79.

What is true of the results of scientific investigation is also true with regard to methods of inquiry. Thus, for example, in a religiously-ordained society, experimental and quantitative methods in general will be at a disadvantage, and the same fate will befall the methods of philosophic and metaphysical inquiry in a scientifically-ordained society.[1]

The irrationality of these social forces enters into a contest with the irrationality of the social personality of the political scientist. And, from this contest emerges a decision as to what his political science will be. In the words of Morgenthau:

> It is this decision which manifests itself in the conscience of the scientists as a moral choice between two extreme alternatives: the sacrifice of truth to the pressure of society, or the risk of earthly goods for the sake of searching for, and telling, the whole truth.[2]

One may decide to put his moral commitment to truth above social convenience and ambition, and this is the case of a political scientist who is "mistreated and persecuted." Very few will in fact choose this alternative, however, because:

> Only rare individuals have achieved the Socratic distinction of unpopularity, social ostracism, and criminal

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[1]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 162-163; The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 37-38. The dispute between Lysenko and Western geneticists is, I believe, still a valid example in this regard.

[2]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 165.

> penalties, which are the reward of constant dedication to the relevant truth in matters political.[1]

Or, one may choose the opposite extreme and decide to sacrifice truth to the pressures of society. This is the case of a political scientist who is "respected," on account of his service

> to cover political relations with the veil of ideologies which mollify the conscience of society; by justifying the existing power relations, it reassures the powers-that-be in their possession of power; it illuminates certain aspects of the existing power relations; and it contributes to the improvement of the technical operations of government. The relevance of this political science does not lie primarily in the discovery of truth about politics but in its contribution to the stability of society.[2]

According to Morgenthau, however, most political scientists take neither of the two alternatives. Instead, they choose to satisfy society and scientific conscience at the same time, by remaining within the limits of scientific endeavor which society has marked as safe. This is the case of a political science that is "neither hated nor respected," but treated with indifference as innocuous pastime:

> The retreat into the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely

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[1] The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 39. Since political science is "of necessity based upon, and permeated by, a total world view," value-freedom--in the sense of an objectivity in which the investigator's normative values do not interfere with the object of inquiry--is an impossibility.

[2] Ibid., pp. 39-40. Since the major function which a political scientist of this position performs is that of an ideologue of society, the claim of value-freedom in this case would be double-talk and "dangerous."

> historical--in short the politically irrelevant--is the unmistakable sign of a "non-controversial" political science. . . .[1]

In Morgenthau's argument, the question as to whether value-freedom is attainable in the social sciences in general, or in political science in particular, boils down to whether the exercise of pure reason is possible in social and political investigations. Morgenthau's answer to this question is in the negative:

> Reason is like a light which by its own inner force can move nowhere. It must be carried in order to move. It is carried by the irrational forces of interest and emotion to where those forces want it to move, regardless of what the inner logic of abstract reason would require. To trust in reason pure and simple is to leave the field to the stronger irrational forces which reason will serve.[2]

Those interests and emotions are already determined when a political scientist starts using his reasoning power in the political sphere; and only within the framework of this determination is he able to use the power of reasoning at all. It is for this reason that the ultimate decision which confronts the scientific mind is not intellectual but moral in nature. A system of morally determined scientific knowledge presents a picture of the world the knowledge of which is significant and the orientation to which is

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[1]The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 40. Since a political science of this position is concerned with the irrelevant, his claim of value-freedom would be equally irrelevant: i.e., meaningless.

[2]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 155.

necessary. Scientific knowledge, therefore, carries with it a moral evaluation to which it owes its very existence. It is for the same reason, Morgenthau argues, that the presupposition of universality which the positivist social sciences borrow from the natural sciences does not enhance but impairs their scientific character. That presupposition does not enhance their scientific character, because the irrational determination of the social sciences is incompatible with their universality; the presupposition is actually detrimental to their scientific attainment, because it obliterates the social and moral determination by which all social sciences are qualified:

> It is only through the recognition of this social and moral determination that social science is possible at all. A social science which refuses to recognize this determination and clings to the illusion of universality destroys through this very attitude its only chance for scientific achievement.[1]

In consequence, according to Morgenthau, political science is true only under the particular perspective of the investigator, and yet under this perspective it is true. And this is the only kind of truth that can be had in political science:

> Whoever seeks more will get less. For without awareness of their social and moral determination, reason and science become empty ideological justification which any social agent may invoke in his own behalf.[2]

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 167.

[2] Ibid.

Subject-Object Detachment in Positivist Political Science

Morgenthau also examines, although rather briefly, the positivist claim of objectivity in the investigator's detachment from the object of his inquiry. Morgenthau's basic assertion in this regard--which he supports by the findings of modern physics--is that the human mind mirrors the physical world and determines human action within and with respect to it. Consequently, the physical world, as we are able to know it, bears the imprint of the human mind in a dual sense. First:

> We are able to know [the physical world] only within the limits of our cognitive faculties; that is, we know it only in so far as the structure of our mind corresponds to the structure of the physical world.[1]

On the other hand:

> the relationship between mind and nature is not exclusively cognitive even when the human mind confronts nature only for the purpose of perception. It cannot do so without intervening in its course and thus disturbing it.[2]

It may be pointed out that the concept of determinism--which Morgenthau is trying to repudiate here--is closely bound up with the concept of what may be called an "isolated system." An isolated system in physics, chemistry or astronomy is a body the components of which are supposed to interact in some respect only with one another. It is an isolated

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[1] *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, p. 141.

[2] *Ibid.*

system in that it is a system which an observer can observe accurately at some initial time and which can then be observed infinitely without any appreciable disturbance to its motions or behavior from interactions with the observer himself or with the rest of the universe. It is now clear that the concept of an isolated system runs into difficulties when it is extrapolated to the world of particles and atoms.[1] In physics, the difficulties with isolation have shown up in two famous problems, that of the "Maxwell Demon" and that of Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy" or "uncertainty principle."[2] Heisenberg's uncertainty principle asserts, in brief, that the more accurately you try to observe the position of an atom or particle such as an electron, the more the light ray you use will disturb its velocity, and vice versa, so that you cannot make any deterministic statements, but can make only probability statements, about its future motions.

Morgenthau, subscribing to this view, maintains that nature cannot be explored in a detached way; we can explore it only by tramping over it and thus disturbing it.

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[1]It stands to reason, at the same time, that similar difficulties will be confronted when the concept is extended to domains where either the initial non-interference observation or specification of the state of the system becomes impossible in principle, or where the system cannot be regarded as isolated because of its strong interactions with the rest of the world.

[2]Morgenthau refers to the latter on several occasions, but not to the former.

Therefore, to Morgenthau, nature as the object of human knowledge is somehow the product of human action; human action exerts "creative influence" upon nature as the object of human knowledge. The creative influence is strongest when intervention and disturbance are not mere by-products of a cognitive purpose but the goals of purposeful action itself. Thus, inasmuch as nature is subject to human action, it is the human mind which actually creates it, and the creation, of necessity, bears witness to the quality of the creator. Morgenthau again supports his argument with the words of Eddington:

> A complete determinism of the material universe cannot be divorced from determinism of the mind. . . . There can be no fully deterministic control of inorganic phenomena unless the determinism governs mind itself.[1]

The creative influence which the human mind fulfills for the inorganic world is not, of course, confined to the physical phenomena. The same creative influence operates, and even more strongly, in the events of social phenomena. Thus, according to Morgenthau, social scientists as such are never fully detached from the events which are the objects of their inquiry. The social scientist stands in the stream of social causation as an acting and reacting agent, and, consequently:

> What he sees and what he does not see are determined by his position in those streams; and by revealing what he sees in terms of his science he directly intervenes in

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[1]Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 142.

> the social process. Mr. Gallup, by forecasting the result of an election, transcends the function of theoretical analysis and becomes an active agent intervening in the social processes which determine the election returns.[1]

On the basis of these arguments, Morgenthau attempts to close the circle of his contentions against the positivist political science, which he began with anti-rationalistic conceptions of man and reason. Since, Morgenthau maintains, there exists a necessary correspondence between the quality of mind and the quality of the physical and social world as we know it, the irrationality of human action cannot but be reflected in nature and society and in our knowledge of them:

> Thus, it is in the quality of the human mind itself that the rationalistic analogy between physical and social world--the very mainstay of our "science of politics"--finds its final repudiation.[2]

The Age of Reason was convinced that the rationality of nature corresponded to the rationality of the human mind and vice versa; the nineteenth and twentieth centuries believed that the rationality of nature could be achieved by the human mind in the social world, by transplanting the rational methods of the natural sciences to society. Yet, in the same way that this belief was rooted and found confirmation in the physics of Newton and Descartes, the new physics of quantum and relativity is becoming the point of

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 142-143.

[2] Ibid., p. 144.

departure for a thorough revision of this obsolete belief:

> The new physics shows, indeed, that there exists a close correspondence between the human mind, on the one hand, and nature and society, on the other. Modern scientific thought re-establishes the unity of the physical and social world to which the modern age aspired in vain. However, the common element of which mind, nature, and society partake is no longer reason pure and simple but reason surrounded, interspersed, and underlaid with unreason, an island precariously placed in the midst of an obscure and stormy ocean.[1]

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[1] Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 144-145.

CHAPTER IV

AN IDEALIST'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST POSITIVIST POLITICAL SCIENCE: LEO STRAUSS

Platonic Idealism

The attacks on positivist political science have come not only from Thomist-Burkeans such as Morgenthau, but also, among other categories, from non-Catholic Christian theists like Eric Voegelin and John H. Hallowell[1] and from classical natural-law scholars like Harry V. Jaffa[2] and Leo Strauss. Among contemporary classical natural-law scholars, professor Strauss is perhaps the most influential, as well as the most militant, warrior in the battle against positivist political science.[3] Strauss' barrage against positivist political science has prompted William T. Bluhm

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[1]Voegelin's representative work in this regard is The New Science of Politics: An Introductory Essay (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952) and Hallowell's is The Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954).

[2]Jaffa's works include Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965).

[3]"Influential" in the sense of evoking a "following." Lee Cameron McDonald, Western Political Theory: The Modern Age (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 384.

to observe that:

> Professor Strauss does not wage a defensive battle but prefers to carry the attack into the enemy camp. The enemy in this case are the behavioralists, whom he assaults in the same terms and with the same vigor as Plato did the Sophists.[1]

In his assault upon the modern Sophists, Strauss grounds his arguments primarily upon the philosophical assumptions of Platonic Idealism, as he has made his intellectual position clear in most of his writings. Natural Right and History[2] and What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies[3] stand out as exemplary polemics against positivist political science from the standpoint of Platonic Idealism.

Broadly, the term "idealism" refers to any theoretical or practical view emphasizing mind--soul, spirit, life--or what is characteristically of pre-eminent value or significance to mind. Since the term "idealism" shares the unavoidable expansion of such words as "ideas," "mind," "spirit," and even "person," it refers, as employed in the histories of philosophy, to rather widely divergent types of philosophical doctrine--to Platonic Idealism, Personal

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[1]William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 99.

[2](Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953). The Phoenix Edition of 1965 is cited in this dissertation.

[3](Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959).

Idealism, Objective Idealism, Moral Idealism, etc. Among these various types, however, there is a characteristic that distinguishes all types of idealism from its philosophical opposite commonly known as "materialism." That common characteristic is the thesis that ideas and ideals alike are in last analysis fundamental for philosophical construction and not, as materialism maintains, derivative and of only secondary significance.[1] As the philosophical alternative to materialism, idealism emphasizes the supra-spatial, non-pictorial, incorporeal, supra-sensuous, normative or valuational, and teleological; materialism stresses the spatial, pictorial, corporeal, sensuous, non-valuational, factual, and mechanistic. In the history of Western political thought, it was Plato who for the first time made the idealist assumption that the eidos, Form or Idea, is the only lasting reality, and the only thing that can be known, for it is permanent and unchanging, whereas the world of sense is incessant flux. This idealist assumption was later adopted by many political theorists. In asserting that reality lies in the realm of supra-sensuous spirit, mind, or idea and that ideas have an existence of their own, independent of the men who voice or heed

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[1]It is from different interpretations of this fundamental thesis--which arise out of different conceptions of the nature and context of ideas and ideals--that the various types of idealism seem to emerge.

them, Rousseau's General Will and Hegel's Idea, among others, are in the tradition of idealism.

The Platonic theory of knowledge, which provides the fundamental ground upon which Strauss constructs his theses against positivist political science, can hardly be discussed apart from Plato's idealist conception of reality. Through sense perception, Plato held, man comes to know the changeable world of bodies. This is the realm of doxa, "opinion" or "belief." Such cognition may be more or less clear but it never rises to the level of true knowledge,[1] for its objects are impermanent and too unstable to provide foundation for science. Plato maintained that it is through rational or intellectual cognition that man discovers the world of immutable essence, intelligible realities, Ideas or Forms. This is the realm of episteme, "science" or "knowledge." Plato thought that genuine knowledge is reached in mathematics and especially philosophy.[2] The world of intelligible Ideas contains, therefore, the ultimate realities from which the world of sensible things has been patterned. Each type or class of being is represented by its perfect Form in the sphere of Ideas: there is an ideal Form of man, dog, willow tree, of every kind of

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[1]"Opinion is darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance; it is an intermediate between them." Republic, V, 478 A.

[2]Republic, VI, 510 A-B.

natural object and even of artificial things like beds.[1] Hierarchically above these Ideas, there are higher Ideas such as "wisdom," "temperance," "courage," "justice," etc.--which are the major Platonic virtues--and mathematical terms and relations like "equality," "likeness," "proportion," etc. At the top of the hierarchy, however, is the Idea of the Good,[2] which dominates the other Ideas and in which they participate. Beauty, truth and symmetry are also high-ranking Ideas which, at times, are placed almost on a par with the Good.[3] Thus, according to Platonic Idealism, there exist philosophic Forms which are the Ideas of Justice, Truth, Beauty, etc. And, "opinion" is of just, truthful, or beautiful things; "knowledge" is of justice, truth, or beauty themselves. Consequently, since the Form is the ultimate reality, the man who does not know the Form does not live in the world of reality.[4]

In identifying timeless Ideas as the archetypes and the dynamic causes of existent, material things, and in identifying these Ideas also as the archetypes of rational thought, Platonic Idealism is characterized by a partial

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[1]Republic, X, 596 B.

[2]Republic, VII, passim.

[3]Philebus, 65 A-E; Symposium and Phaedrus, passim.

[4]The conjunction of power and knowledge--Plato's notion of the philosopher-king--is derived directly from this theory of knowledge: power to be legitimate must be based on knowledge.

contempt for sense knowledge and empirical study, by a frankly spiritualistic view of life, by a longing for another and better world, and, above all, by an unswerving faith in the capacity of the human mind to attain absolute truth and to utilize this truth in the rational direction of human life and affairs.

Political Phenomena

Nature of Man

Following the tradition of classic political thought, Leo Strauss believes reason the one salient quality which characterizes and separates man from other living organisms. As indicated in the previous chapter, Morgenthau also recognizes that man is endowed with reason. To Morgenthau, however, the power of human reason is innately so defective that any attempt to found a utopia on earth by rational calculations is wild-eyed fanaticism, a not only impossible but also dangerous dream of rationalism. On the other hand, Strauss and Morgenthau agree in recognizing that man is endowed with certain irrational, or "lower" impulses.[1] To Morgenthau, however, the irrational impulses are a Sisiphean fate with which man is by nature cursed: man can never completely overcome them, and, hence, wisdom lies in seeking

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[1]Natural Right and History, pp. 132-133. Since not all "natures" are "good natures," and, since men are unequal in their attainment to human perfection, the classics did not entertain an equalitarian position. Ibid., pp. 134-135.

lesser evil rather than attempting to abolish evil. Strauss, along with the classics, departs from Morgenthau et al. on this fundamental point.

To Strauss, the phenomenon of human existence is not merely an empirical matter: man is not merely an empirical entity whose "nature" can be observed and described as a biologist may observe and describe a dissected frog. In the words of Strauss:

> Whatever the significance of modern natural science may be, it cannot affect our understanding of what is human in man. To understand man in the light of the whole means for modern natural science to understand man in the light of the sub-human. But in that light man as man is wholly unintelligible.[1]

It is a fundamental assumption of Strauss that man is above all a teleological entity. "What is human in man" is given by nature,[2] and, among the natural human attributes, the most essential is the purposes, goals, or telos of man's existence. As an empirical entity, "human nature" can be defined only in terms of the past and the present, in the light of observed and observable processes, as distinguished from not-yet-actualized purposes, goals, or telos. As a teleological entity, however, the attributes of humanity must be defined in terms of the future and within the

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[1]What is Political Philosophy? p. 38.

[2]Hobbes' rejection of this assumption led him to "deny all moral or juridical significance to the right of nature, and to contend that there is no natural law prior to the establishment of civil society." Ibid., p. 175.

framework of the completion of man's immanent telos: i.e., in the light of the whole of the human existence. This is why, to Strauss, "the very question of the nature of man points to the question of the nature of the whole."[1]

Since man is by nature a teleological entity, he can be understood only in the framework of his natural telos. Teleological understanding of man, as opposed to mechanistic understanding of man, means understanding the past and the present of human things in terms of the future of human things, while mechanistic understanding means just the opposite: understanding the present and the future in terms of the past.[2] The mechanistic understanding of man, which is equated to scientific understanding of man, reduces humanity to sub-humanity for two reasons. First, it understands man in a framework that totally ignores man's immanent purposes, goals, or telos, thus isolating man from the completion of his humanity, from the whole of human phenomena. Second, what is thus ignored about the human phenomena by the mechanistic or scientific understanding of man happens to be the defining characteristic of humanity:

> The various human things which are by nature noble or admirable are essentially the parts of human nobility

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 38.

[2] As to the political science of Hobbes, Strauss states: "The mere fact that the only certain knowledge which was available is not concerned with ends but 'consists in comparing figures and motions only' created a prejudice against any teleological view or a prejudice in favor of a mechanistic view." Natural Right and History, p. 171.

> in its completion, or are related to it; they all point toward the well-ordered soul, incomparably the most admirable human phenomenon.[1]

The metaphysics of the classics and of Strauss thus assumes that the reality of human phenomena is ordered by immanent goals, ends, purposes--the telos of man--and that, consequently, there is a foundation in reality for the distinction between right and wrong in ethics and politics. And the Straussian man is endowed with a power of reason capable of discovering his telos, as well as capable of discovering what is right and what is wrong in ethics and politics. For the human soul, to Strauss, is born with true knowledge in it.[2]

Nature of Politics

In their teleological view of human nature, the classics postulated that the end of man is the perfection of his nature. At the same time, the classics maintained

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[1] Natural Right and History, p. 128.

[2] Ibid., p. 130. As Plato maintained, however, the human soul cannot easily recall the truths innately, due to the encrustation of bodily cares and interests. This belief is related to Plato's theory of education, which is based on a "drawing out"--educatio--of what is already dimly known to the learner. (Republic, II-VII). It may be noted, on the other hand, that the Platonic idea that human reason in its highest form includes the faculty of perceiving a priori truths, of direct insight into the eternal truth, is a transcendental view; this view must be distinguished from the revelationist view, which as the medieval churchmen held it, identifies natural law with the law of God: i.e., the source of natural law is divine revelation.

that man cannot reach the perfection of his nature except in and through civil society, because man is by nature intended to live in a polis: i.e., man is by nature a social or political animal.[1] To Morgenthau, the essential meaning of "political" is the universality of conflict and lust for power in all societies. His "political animal" thus is characterized, above all, by animus dominandi, an inborn and incessant will to power. On the other hand, Strauss' conception of "political animal" is in the tradition of the classic political thought:

> Man is by nature a social being. He is so constituted that he cannot live, or live well, except by living with others. Since it is reason or speech that distinguishes him from the other animals, and speech is communication, man is social in a radical sense than any other social animal: humanity itself is sociality. . . . It is man's natural sociality that is the basis of natural right in the narrow or strict sense of right. Because man is by nature social, the perfection of his nature includes the social virtue par excellence, justice; justice and right are natural.[2]

It is because of the natural "sociality" of man that man cannot reach the perfection of his nature except in and through civil society.[3] Human life is activity directed toward certain naturally given goals or purposes; social or political life is activity directed toward such a goal as

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[1]"Political animal" and "social animal" mean the same thing to Strauss, and he uses them interchangeably. Natural Right and History, p. 169.

[2]Ibid., p. 129.

[3]Hence, civil society is prior to the individual, duty prior to rights. Ibid., p. 183.

can be pursued only by society; but in order to pursue a specific goal, as its comprehensive goal, society must be organized or constituted in a manner conducive to, or in accordance with, that goal. Thus established, a polis is a teleological entity, as much as, and for the same reason that, man is a teleological entity. This is why "a society cannot be defined without reference to its purpose."[1] Since the morality of a polis is the same as the morality of the individual, a polis has ultimately no other end than the individual. Thus Strauss views moral and political matters in the light of man's perfection, as did the classics. And it is this particular way of looking at political matters that enables Strauss to distinguish a political society from a gang of bandits:

> The city is essentially different from a gang of robbers because it is not merely an organ, or an expression, of collective selfishness. Since the ultimate end of the city is the same as that of the individual, the end of the city is peaceful activity in accordance with the dignity of man, and not war and conquest.[2]

For Strauss, "political" designates in general those things that are "related in a relevant way to the polis, the

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 22.

[2] Natural Right and History, p. 134. For both Strauss and Morgenthau, society is man writ large, but with different implications. For Morgenthau, society is a projection of human nature onto the collective plane. For Strauss, on the other hand, society is a transference of the conception that assumes the fundamental unity of the human personality: society is a single personality, pervaded by reason. Similar reasoning led Rousseau to ascribe sovereignty to the general will of the whole personality.

'country' or the 'state.'"[1] In the words of Strauss:

> Political things are by their nature subject to approval and disapproval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame. It is of the essence not to be neutral but to raise a claim to men's obedience, allegiance, decision or judgment. One does not understand them as what they are, as political things, if one does not take seriously their explicit or implicit claim to be judged in terms of goodness or badness, of justice or injustice, i.e., if one does not measure them by some standard of goodness or justice.[2]

Political things are by their nature not neutral: they do not exist apart from a certain intrinsic quality that must be measured or judged sub specie aeternitatis.[3] A painting, or a piece of music, is "neutral," if it is understood as nothing but a heap of color spectra, or a succession of aerial vibrations. But a painting, or a symphony, is not "neutral"; it is of its essence not to be neutral but to raise a claim to be measured and judged by some standard of beauty, depth of insight, or perhaps, power of inspiration. As physics is not a proper way to understand artistic things, science is, according to Strauss, not a proper way to understand political things. For political things

> cannot be dealt with scientifically but only dialectically. And dialectical treatment necessarily begins from pre-scientific knowledge and takes it most seriously. Pre-scientific knowledge, or "common sense" knowledge, is thought to be discredited by Copernicus

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 22.

[2] Ibid., p. 12.

[3] Search for the "certain form of eternity"--i.e., "knowledge," as distinguished from "opinion"--was the hallmark of Plato's political philosophy.

> and the succeeding natural science. But the fact that what we may call telescopic-microscopic knowledge is very fruitful in certain areas does not entitle one to deny that there are things which can only be seen as what they are if they are seen with the unarmed eye; or, more precisely, if they are seen in the perspective of the citizen, as distinguished from the perspective of the scientific observer.[1]

Strauss' notions of the pre-scientific knowledge and the "perspective of the citizen" imply a significant antithesis to positivist political science: the nature of political things is such that the subject-object detachment--which is a necessary condition for natural science--is impossible and, when the impossible is done in practice, the end-result is irrelevant knowledge--knowledge irrelevant to things political. Strauss thus establishes an active participation in politics in a fundamental sense of involvement as requisite to the acquisition of genuine political knowledge. Participation in politics and search for political knowledge are inseparable: without one, the other cannot exist. It is this particular orientation, according to Strauss, which distinguishes classic political theory from present-day political science. The former did not try

> to bring order into that chaos of political "facts" which exists only for those who approach political life from a point of view of a science that is not itself essentially an element of political life. Instead, it followed carefully and even scrupulously the articulation which is inherent in, and natural to, political life and its objectives.[2]

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 25.

[2] Ibid., p. 80.

Positivist Treatment of Political Phenomena

Reduction of the Political to the Subpolitical

All studies in social science presuppose that the practitioners of social science can distinguish human beings from other beings. According to Strauss, however, this most fundamental knowledge was not acquired by the social scientists "in classrooms," and "this knowledge is not transformed by social science into scientific knowledge, but retains its initial status without any modification throughout."[1] The knowledge that human beings are different from robots and brutes, in other words, is not a "scientific" but a "prescientific" knowledge. For scientific "proof" of this fact is not only not necessary, but also impossible. Strauss argues:

> The preoccupation with scientific proof of things which everyone knows well enough, and better, without scientific proof, leads to the neglect of that thinking, or that reflection, which must precede all scientific studies if these studies are to be relevant.[2]

Why should it be so? Because, without the prescientific knowledge--and this means a knowledge not susceptible to scientific analysis and proof--that men are different from brutes, or a *polis* from a band of robbers, any "factual" description about human and political phenomena will be a

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[1] *What is Political Philosophy?* p. 23.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

description of these things isolated from the whole of the phenomena. In other words, whatever the value we impute to the studies of positivist political science, the ideas with which the positivist political scientists begin and the conceptions which lead them to scientific investigations must rest ultimately on overall insight, on prescientific knowledge, for the scientific knowledge to be relevant to things political.[1]

All knowledge, however limited or scientific, ultimately presupposes a horizon, a comprehensive vision within which knowledge is possible, for the meaning of the part depends on meaning of the whole.[2] It is in this sense that Strauss insists on the teleological nature of political "facts," and a corresponding mode of understanding political phenomena. In the words of Strauss:

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[1]Professor Walter Berns, among others, has cogently illustrated the ultimately prescientific nature of political knowledge, using "racial segregation" as an example, perhaps to make the point transparently clear: "Racial segregation is seen by the observer because he can see the injustice of the practice. . . . Through the 'eye of the mind' we are enabled to see the injustice and hence the political; with the eye alone we would see only men of dark skin sitting in the balconies of theaters marked 'colored,' or not sitting at Woolworth lunch counters. Out of the millions of so-called factual events that pass within the range of our vision, we would not single out these events except as they are seen by the eye of a mind that is not blinded by prejudice or a fallacious theoretical commitment." Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Science and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's The Structure of Freedom," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), p. 550.

[2]What is Political Philosophy? pp. 125, 126; Natural Right and History, p. 24.

> The thing itself, the completed thing, cannot be understood as a product of the process leading up to it, but, on the contrary, the process cannot be understood except in the light of the completed thing or the end of the process.[1]

Scientific study of political facts, relation of political facts, and determination of recurrent relations of political facts or "laws" of political behavior, require isolation of the phenomena being studied. Isolation of the specific phenomena under investigation is required in all scientific endeavor. Strauss accepts this but cautions that, if such isolation is not to lead to irrelevant or misleading results, one must see the phenomenon in question within the whole to which it belongs and at the same time clarify the whole. When scientific study of man and politics fails to clarify the whole, or to relate the isolated part to the whole of the phenomenon, the inevitable result is reduction of the whole to qualitatively different parts: reduction of human to subhuman, the political to the subpolitical. Hobbes' concept of "power" is a pertinent example. Strauss explains:

> "Power" stands for potentia, on the one hand, and for potestas (or jus or dominum), on the other. It means both "physical" power and "legal" power. . . . Potentia and potestas have this in common, that they are both intelligible only in contradistinction, and in relation, to the actus: the potentia of a man is what a man can do, and the potestas or, more generally expressed, the right of man, is what a man may do. The predominance of the concern with "power" is therefore only the reverse of a relative indifference to the actus, and this means to the purposes for which man's "physical" as well as his "legal" power is or ought to be used. . . . The sound use of "physical" power as well as the sound

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[1]Natural Right and History, p. 123.

> exercise of rights depends on *prudentia*, and whatever falls within the province of *prudentia* is not susceptible for exactness. . . . From the point of view of mathematical exactness, the study of the *actus* and therewith of the ends is replaced by the study of *potentia*. "Physical" power as distinguished from the purposes for which it is used is morally neutral and therefore more amenable to mathematical strictness than is its use: power can be measured. . . . From the point of view of legal exactness, the study of the ends is replaced by the study of *potestas*. The rights of the sovereign, as distinguished from the exercise of these rights, permit of an exact definition without any regard to any unforeseeable circumstances, and this kind of exactness is again inseparable from moral neutrality: right declares what is permitted, as distinguished from what is honorable. Power, as distinguished from the end for which power is used or ought to be used, becomes the central theme of political reflections by virtue of that limitation of horizon which is needed if there is to be a guaranty of the actualization of the right social order.[1]

Expressing his hope and expectation that the "search for a common unit of analysis" will eventually result in a comprehensive theory capable of explaining all social and political phenomena, Professor David Easton has enunciated his vision:

> Ideally, the units would be repetitious, ubiquitous, and uniform, molecular rather than molar. In this way they would constitute the particles, as it were, out of which all social behavior is formed and which manifest

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[1] *Natural Right and History*, pp. 194-196. We may instance the following studies as contemporary examples in which the study of "power" is reduced to the study of *potentia*: Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (November, 1953), 500-516; James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (June, 1955), pp. 431-451; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (July, 1957), pp. 201-215.

> themselves through different institutions, structures, and processes.[1]

But, of course, the entire argument of Strauss is precisely that man and politics cannot be understood in terms of such molecular units, because man is more than a pile of atoms, and politics more than a compilation of "processes." Man and politics, in other words, are sui generis:

> His dignity is then based on his awareness of what he ought to be or how he should live. Since there is a necessary connection between morality (how a man should live) and law, there is a necessary connection between the dignity of man and the dignity of the public order: the political is sui generis and cannot be understood as derivative from the sub-political.[2]

The presupposition of all this is that man is radically and qualitatively different from non-man, from brutes as well as from gods, and this presupposition is ratified by the common sense of the citizen, by prescientific knowledge. This presupposition, however, points to a more fundamental presupposition according to which the whole consists of essentially different parts. The positivist political science, on the other hand,

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[1]David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' in Political Science," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, October, 1962), p. 17. Strauss would be tempted to comment that Easton's preference of "molecular" over "molar" units is a further indication of the proclivity of the new political science to reduce quality to quantitative terms, even on the infra-microscopic level.

[2]Leo Strauss, "An Epilogue," in Herbert J. Storing (ed.), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 311.

> is based on the fundamental premise that there are no essential or irreducible differences: there are only differences of degrees; in particular there is only a difference of degree between men and brutes or between men and robots. In other words, according to the new political science, or the universal science of which the new political science is a part, to understand a thing means to understand it in terms of its genesis or its conditions and hence, humanly speaking, to understand the higher in terms of the lower; the human in terms of the sub-human, the rational in terms of the sub-rational, the political in terms of the sub-political.[1]

When the human is reduced to the subhuman, and the political to the subpolitical, the universality inherent in all human and political phenomena--the universality of telos--is lost. Consequently, when positivist political science, oblivious of its limited horizon, claims universal validity of its concepts, theories and findings, it commits the fallacy of universalizing what is merely factual in a

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[1]Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 331. This indictment would be applicable to the studies of opinion formation and electoral behavior in general, which tend to explain political belief and electoral behavior in terms of social and psychological conditions and geneses. Cf.: M. Brewster Smith, et al., Opinion and Personality (New York: Wiley, 1956); Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) and Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); Paul F. Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1948); Bernard Berelson, et al., Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in A Campaign (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); etc. Strauss' indictment would be literally applicable to some of the political personality studies. Cf.: Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: The Viking Press, 1960); T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950); Arthur H. L. Kornhauser, et al., When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers (New York: University Books, 1956); etc.

given place at a given historical moment: i.e., the fallacy of universalizing the provincial.

Absolutization of the Provincial

Since, according to Strauss, every knowledge presupposes a horizon--the breadth and depth within which the cognitive activities are performed--the reduction of the human to the subhuman, and the political to the subpolitical, is necessarily identical with reduction in the horizon of political science. If the object of inquiry for the positivist political science were the nuclei proper; if it could truly be held that the difference between man and robot is a matter of degree, the accomplishments of the positivist political science would indeed be tantamount to an expansion of the horizon, rather than the opposite, as nuclear physics has broadened the horizon of physics by superseding Newtonian physics. But, according to Strauss, there is a fundamental difference between the nucleus proper and the political nucleus, in that the former is universal, unbound by time and space, whereas the latter, as an empirical entity, is a relative entity, contingent to temporal and spatial conditions. In the words of Strauss:

> While the nuclei proper are simply prior to macrophysical phenomena, the "political" nuclei, which are meant to supply explanations for the political things proper, are already molded, nay constituted by the political order or the regime within which they occur.[1]

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[1]Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 312.

Political nuclei are not universal; they are, as it were, system-bound: the characteristics of the political nuclei are dependent upon the characteristics of a particular regime, order, or system. Hence, for example, "an American small group is not a Russian small group": the Norton Street Gang is not the "small group that Lenin gathered around himself in Switzerland during World War I."[1] At the same time, the universals which positivist political science seeks are the "laws of human behavior"; those laws are to be discovered by means of empirical research.[2] If, however, the laws sought are to be "laws of human behavior," they cannot be restricted to human behavior as it is affected by this or that regime, or system. But human behavior as studied by empirical research always occurs within a particular regime:

> More precisely, the most cherished techniques of "empirical" research in the social science can be applied only to human beings living now in countries in which the governments tolerate research of this kind. The new political science is therefore constantly tempted (and as a rule it does not resist that temptation) to absolutize the relative or peculiar, that is, to be parochial.[3]

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[1] Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 312.

[2] "There is an amazing disproportion between the apparent breadth of the goal (say, a general theory of social change) and the true pettiness of the researches undertaken to achieve that goal (say, a change in a hospital when head nurse is replaced by another). This is no accident. Since we lack objective criteria of relevance, we have no reason to be more interested in a world-shaking revolution that affects directly or indirectly all men than in the most trifling 'social change.'" Ibid., p. 320.

[3] Ibid.

However, the particularity of the political nucleus--as distinguished from the universality of the nucleus proper--is not the primary cause for the "temptation," or, more properly, not the force that compels positivist political science toward parochialism. In the words of Strauss:

> . . . social science is said to be a body of true propositions about social phenomena. The propositions are answers to questions. What valid answers, objectively valid answers, are, may be determined by the rules of principles of logic. But the questions depend on one's direction of interest, and hence on one's values, i.e., on subjective principles. Now it is the direction of interests, and not logic, which supplies the fundamental concepts. It is therefore not possible to divorce from each other the subjective and objective elements of social science: the objective answers receive their meaning from the subjective questions.[1]

In one respect, Strauss agrees with Morgenthau's argument that, ultimately, subjective interests are the motivation behind the academic activities of the positivist political scientists. But Strauss is saying more than that: i.e., insofar as the political nuclei--the object of inquiry for positivist political science--are system-bound, the subject of positivist political science, the scientists themselves, is area-centered and time-bound. Pushed to its logical conclusion, it is the thesis that:

> Since natural science talks of prediction and control, why should not social scientists be entitled to make the course of man predictable and controlled--for the better? A better world, yes: yet somehow a "value-free" method for attaining an order of society

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[1]What is Political Philosophy? pp. 25-26.

> presumably more valuable. By disavowing all "value judgment," the behavioralists are cast upon personal prejudices, popular slogans, and self-interests as models for a better society.[1]

The political nuclei, the object of the positivist inquiry, are not universal but particular: their characteristics are dependent upon the particular regime, order, or system to which they belong. To use the positivist's jargon, the political nuclei are the "dependent variable" of the system.[2] Positivist political science observes and analyzes the system-bound political nuclei in a detached, objective way, but, because of its deliberate exclusion of any system-transcending frame of reference whatsoever and because of its proneness to universalize the merely provincial, positivist political science itself becomes system-bound. We could without difficulty imagine ourselves members of a hypothetical society, exclusively composed of the mentally deformed. As positivist political scientists, we could subject the insane political nuclei to objective and detached investigation, thus ascertaining certain "laws" of behavior of the insane. However, insofar as we remain empirically objective within this system, oblivious, deliberately or otherwise, of sanity or insanity--the

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[1]Russell Kirk, "Segments of Political Science Not Amenable to Behavioralistic Treatment," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., pp. 53-54.

[2]This is not to say, of course, that the "system" may not be the "dependent variable" of the political nuclei.

transcendental quality of that system--we would be scientists studying particular political nuclei in a particular system. Should we insist, on the other hand, on universality for what is in truth merely particular; should we describe as transsubjective what in truth is system-bound, we would be universalizing the particular, the provincial: i.e., we would be absolutizing the particular system. Consequently, Strauss argues, we cannot arrive at a kind of knowledge of, for example, "group politics" which deserves to be called scientific knowledge if we do not reflect on what genus of political order is presupposed if there is to be "group politics" at all, and what kind of political order is presupposed by the specific "group politics" which we are studying. But, Strauss maintains:

> one cannot clarify the character of a specific democracy, e.g., or of democracy in general, without having a clear understanding of the alternatives to democracy. Scientific political scientists are inclined to leave it at the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism, i.e., they absolutize the given political order by remaining within a horizon which is defined by the given political order and its opposite. The scientific approach tends to lead to the neglect of the primary or fundamental questions and therewith to thoughtless acceptance of received opinion.[1]

Thus, positivist political science is itself system-bound. The system-boundness of positivist political science manifests itself, among other ways, in the language which it has

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 24. In other words, the alternative to "insanity" is viewed from the standpoint of insanity.

adopted. Strauss states:

> When one speaks of "conscience" one does not claim to have fathomed the phenomenon indicated by that term. But when the new political scientist speaks of the "Superego," he is certain that anything meant by "conscience" which is not covered by the "Superego" is a superstition. As a consequence he cannot distinguish between bad conscience which may induce a man to devote the rest of his life to compensating another man to the best of his power for an irreparable damage and "guilt feelings" which one ought to get rid of as fast and as cheaply as possible. Similarly he is certain to have understood the trust which induces people to vote for a candidate to high office by speaking of the "father image"; he does not have to inquire whether and to what extent the candidate in question deserves that trust--a trust different from the trust which children have in their father.[1]

Yet, the new language of positivist political science is only a partial manifestation of the system-boundness of the new political science. For it is in the very effort of positivist political science to dispel its parochialism that the true picture of its system-boundness emerges. "By virtue of its orientation by the model of natural science," Strauss states,

> social science is in danger of mistaking peculiarities of, say, mid-twentieth century United States, or more

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[1] Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, pp. 321-322. In a similar vein, Walter Berns has noted that there is a kind of reductionism implicit in some versions of behavioralism which assumes, for example, that men vote in ways which will gratify their repressed wishes or express individual "needs." "The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things," op. cit., pp. 550-559. It may be noted, incidentally, that most, if not all, psychological "explanations" are a form of petitio principii, known as a "disguised circle." To explain a type of behavior by asserting that there is a "need" for it, is to follow the pattern of Moliere's physician who accounted for the soporific power of opium by stating that the drug possesses "a dormative virtue."

> generally of modern western society, for the essential character of human society. To avoid this danger, it is compelled to engage in "cross-cultural research," in the study of other cultures, both present and past. But in making this effort, it misses the meaning of those other cultures, because it interprets them through a conceptual scheme which originates in modern western society, which reflects that particular society, and which fits at best only that particular society. To avoid this danger, social science must attempt to understand those cultures as they understand or understood themselves: the understanding primarily required of the social scientist is historical understanding.[1]

Thus, Strauss has argued that positivist political science is under two specific kinds of illusion. First, it

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 25. The cross-cultural validity of the interest-group approach--which Strauss has chosen to criticize in particular--even some devotees of the approach have been compelled to admit is limited, restricting its applicability in non-American field situations. Statements of skepticism as to the validity of the group approach are made by Joseph LaPalombara, after field experience in Italy: "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," Journal of Politics, Vol. 22 (February, 1960), pp. 29-49. Also, see Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (February, 1961), pp. 25-45. For a criticism of the approach's failure to account for institutional factors, see Samuel J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," in Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.), Interest Groups on Four Continents (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 173-196. For a criticism of the approach's inadequacy in accounting for the contexts of culture and political system, see Samuel H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Great Britain," American Political Science Review, Vol. 50 (March, 1956), pp. 1-23. For an assertion of its lack of explanatory power, see George I. Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 53 (March, 1959), pp. 106-127. For criticisms of its theoretical deficiencies, see R. E. Dowling, "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (December, 1960), pp. 944-954; W. J. M. McKenzie, "Pressure Groups: The 'Conceptual Framework,'" Political Studies, Vol. 3 (1955), pp. 247-255; Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (March, 1960), pp. 15-33; etc.

falsely believes that it deals with an object that is universal, while it is in truth only particular. Second, positivist political science is under the illusion that it is itself universal, while it is in truth system-bound. In these arguments, Strauss is propounding the thesis that positivist political science is impossible. There is a contradiction, Strauss maintains, between the aspiration of positivist political science--i.e., a political science a la natural science--and the achievement of that goal; and this contradiction is impossible to overcome, because, in attempting to fit political science to the Procrustean bed of natural science, positivist political science commits the fallacies of universalizing the particular, and of absolutizing the particular, fallacies a science proper can never commit. In view of the incongruity between the aspiration and what the positivist political scientists do in the name of that aspiration, one might say that the positivist political scientists are being inconsistent. But, clearly, there is more than incongruity between the aspiration and the activities geared to obtain that goal: there is not only incongruity but also stark contradiction between the goal and activity of the positivist political scientists.[1]

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[1]It must be pointed out that, throughout all these arguments, Strauss does not necessarily rely on his teleological view of political reality: the only assumption he makes is that political nuclei are different from nuclei proper. One can make the same assumption, without subscribing to a teleological view of reality.

This sort of logical fallacy is, however, not the last object of Strauss' indictment against positivist political science. For, in addition to--or, perhaps, despite--the incongruity and contradiction between its goal and the goal-defeating activities, positivist political science claims to be "value-free." What does the alleged value-freedom signify in positivist political science, which is a system-bound way of studying equally system-bound particulars? All values are supposedly buried in the name of--or, for the sake of--"value-freedom," but, Strauss will argue, it is in the name of "democratism"--which is a value commitment--that all values are falsely supposed buried by positivist political science.

Value-Freedom in Positivist Political Science

In assessing Strauss' arguments against the value-freedom in positivist political science, William T. Bluhm exclusively relates Strauss' assertion that the new political scientists "hide judgments of value beneath the surface of apparently scientific categories."[1] Although it is an important part of Strauss' arguments, the false claim of value-freedom is by no means the whole of Strauss' story on the subject.

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[1]William T. Bluhm, op. cit., p. 102.

The initial position which Strauss takes against the claim of value-freedom is that it is simply an impossible idea. And this assertion follows logically from his teleological view of political phenomena. Strauss states:

> It is impossible to study social phenomena, i.e., all important social phenomena, without making value judgments. A man who sees no reason for not despising people whose horizon is limited to their consumption of food and their digestion may be a tolerable econometrist; he cannot say anything relevant about the character of a human society. A man who refuses to distinguish between great statesmen, mediocrities, and insane imposters may be a good bibliographer; he cannot say anything relevant about politics and political history. A man who cannot distinguish between a profound religious thought and a languishing superstition may be a good statistician; he cannot say anything relevant about the sociology of religion. Generally speaking, it is impossible to understand thought or action or work without evaluating it. If we are unable to evaluate adequately, as we very frequently are, we have not yet succeeded in understanding adequately.[1]

The very act of understanding requires evaluation of things, and no meaningful evaluation of things can be done without making value judgments. Consequently, Strauss states:

> The attempt to replace the quest for the best political order by a purely descriptive or analytical political science which refrains from "value judgments" is . . . as absurd as the attempt to replace the art of making shoes, that is, good and well-fitting shoes, by a museum of shoes made by apprentices, or as the idea of a medicine which refuses to distinguish between health and sickness.[2]

The denial of the natural right--in the original sense of the term--presents itself today, according to

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[1] What is Political Philosophy? p. 21.

[2] Ibid., p. 89.

Strauss, as a direct consequence of the distinction between facts and values according to which only factual judgments, not value judgments, can be true or objective. The eschewing of value judgment is based on the assumption that conflicts between different values are essentially insoluble for human reason. Strauss believes that this assumption--which is generally taken to be sufficiently established--is not well founded. In the words of Strauss:

> The fact that someone desires something does not yet make that something his value; he may successfully fight his desire or if his desire overpowers him he may blame himself for this as for a failure on his part; only choice, in contradistinction to mere desire, makes something a man's value. The distinction between desire and choice is a distinction among facts. Choice does not mean here the choice of means to pre-given ends; choice here means the choice of ends, the positing of ends or, rather, of values. Man is then understood as a being which differs from all other known beings because it posits values; this positing is taken to be a fact.[1]

Consequently, the distinction between desire and choice leads to the view that the pertinent Is is our positing of values, in contradistinction to the yielding to mere desires; and this view in turn leads to Ought of a radically different character from the Ought corresponding to mere desires. Strauss thus concludes that

> the "relativism" accepted by the new political science according to which values are nothing but objects of desire is based on an insufficient analysis of Is, that is, of the pertinent Is; and, furthermore, that one's

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[1]Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 325.

> opinion regarding the character of the Is settles one's opinion regarding the character of the Ought.[1]

Stated differently, the insufficient analysis of Is by positivist social science signifies the failure of its relativism to admit that the pertinent Is is relevant to social and political inquiries. On account of this failure, the relativism takes a character of absolutism: it has defined the reality in an absolute way. And this is the ultimate ground for Strauss' assertion that the claim to "value-freedom" in positivist political science is false:

> The alleged value-free analysis of political phenomena is controlled by an unavowed commitment built into the new political science to that version of liberal democracy [i.e., "permissive egalitarian democracy"]. We call this characteristic of the new political science its democratism. The new political science looks for laws of human behavior to be discovered by means of data supplied through certain techniques of research which are believed to guarantee the maximum objectivity; it therefore puts a premium on the study of things which occur frequently now in democratic societies. . . . Democracy is then the tacit presupposition of the data; it does not have to become a theme; it can easily be forgotten: the wood is forgotten for the trees; the laws of human beings more or less molded by democracy; man is tacitly identified with democratic man.[2]

If, as the relativism of positivist political science maintains, human reason is unable to show, for example, the superiority of unselfish gratification to selfish gratification, this does not mean to Strauss that any concrete foundation for positivist political science is

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[1] Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 325.

[2] Ibid., p. 326.

established thereby. It signifies the very opposite: "the abandonment of reason or the flight from reason."[1] The alleged value-freedom--which is thus characterized by the flight from reason--is therefore a dangerous notion, and it is dangerous for a couple of specific reasons. First, by teaching neutrality in the conflict between good and evil, between the just and unjust; by teaching in effect the equality of desires, it contributes to moral insensitivity, to moral obtuseness:

> The habit of looking at social or human phenomena without making value judgments has a corroding influence on any preferences. The more serious we are as social scientists, the more completely we develop within ourselves a state of indifference to any goal, or of aimlessness and drifting, a state which may be called nihilism.[2]

While value-freedom fosters nihilism in the subject of political science--i.e., the positivist political scientist--its effects on the object of political science are no more beneficent. For, in the words of Strauss,

> The new political science puts a premium on observations which can be made with the utmost frequency, and therefore by people of the meanest capacities. Thus it frequently culminates in observations made by people who are not intelligent about people who are not intelligent.[3]

The alleged value-freedom in positivist political science is

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[1]Leo Strauss, "Relativism," in Helmut Schoeck, et al. (eds.), Relativism and the Study of Man (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961), p. 145.

[2]What is Political Philosophy? pp. 18-19.

[3]Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 326.

a dangerous notion for a still further reason. The new political science may make us very wise or clever as regards the means for any objectives we might choose; but it is admittedly unable to help us in discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate, between just and unjust, objectives. Consequently,

> Such a science is instrumental and nothing but instrumental: it is born to be the handmaid of any powers or any interests that be. What Machiavelli did apparently, our social science would do if it did not prefer--only God knows why--generous liberalism to consistency: namely, to give advice with equal competence and alacrity to tyrants as well as to free peoples.[1]

There are ample reasons for Strauss, then, to identify the contemporary positivist political scientists with the sophists of antiquity. Characteristic to the sophist is his "unconcern with the truth, i.e., with the truth about the whole." The sophist is a man who is unconcerned with the truth, or does not love wisdom, although he knows better than most others that wisdom is the highest excellence of man. He is concerned with wisdom, "not for its own sake, not because he hates the lie in the soul . . . but for the sake of the honor or the prestige that attends wisdom." However, there arises this fundamental difficulty for the sophist:

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[1]Natural Right and History, p. 4. A similar thesis is voiced by Reinhard Bendix, Social Science and the Distrust of Reason (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951); and by Gunnar Myrdal, "The Relation between Social Theory and Social Policy," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4 (September, 1953), pp. 210-242.

> The sophist's highest good is the prestige deriving from wisdom. To achieve his highest good, he must display his wisdom. Displaying his wisdom means teaching the view that the life according to nature or the life of the wise man consists in combining actual injustice with the appearance of justice. Yet admitting that one is, in fact, unjust is incompatible with successfully preserving the appearance of justice. It is incompatible with wisdom, and it therefore makes impossible the honor deriving from wisdom. Sooner or later the sophist is therefore forced to conceal his wisdom or to vow to views which he regards as merely conventional. He must become resigned to deriving his prestige from propagating more or less respectable views.[1]

But, if sophistry and positivist political science share common motivation, the sophists were blessed by the fact that they were born in the uncomplicated, technology-free days of antiquity. The exasperating coexistence of the modern sophists and the wisdom-depleted conditions of our daily existence compels Strauss to describe positivist political science in no less severe language than the following:

> Only a great fool would call the new political science diabolic: it has no attributes peculiar to fallen angels. It is not even Machiavellian, for Machiavelli's teaching was graceful, subtle, and colorful. Nor is it Neronian. Nevertheless one may say of it that it fiddles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it does not know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns.[2]

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[1] Natural Right and History, pp. 116-117.

[2] Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, p. 327.

CHAPTER V

AN EMPIRICIST'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST POSITIVIST POLITICAL SCIENCE: C. WRIGHT MILLS

Trans-Systemic Empiricism of Mills

Science is usually said to be "empirical." Science is "empirical" in that all its conclusions are subject to verification by sense experience. Thus, in its narrow connotation, the term "empirical" designates that part of the method of science in which the reference to actuality allows hypothesis to be considered changed into a law or general principle. In this sense, as the term is employed in scientific method, "empirical" is the opposite of "normative."[1] In its broader connotation, as the term is used in epistemology, "empirical" pertains to knowledge gained *a posteriori*, the opposite of *a priori* knowledge. Yet, it appears, one can subscribe to empirical method and *a posteriori* knowledge, and still stand opposed to empiricism that is practiced in a certain way. Professor C. Wright Mills is a case in point.

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[1]Ethics and aesthetics, for example, are "normative" in that such disciplines' subject-matters contain values setting up norms or rules of conduct.

When we assume the system-boundness of the object and subject of social science,[1] it becomes readily apparent that a distinction must be made between two different kinds of empiricism: empiricism within the system, and empiricism transgressing the system. The former corresponds to the empiricism practiced by the system-bound social science, and the latter to the version of empiricism that deliberately attempts to transcend the influences of the system-binding forces. It must be made clear that, in both cases, empiricism--both as an epistemological position and as a scientific method--is quite possible: both are concerned with the acquisition of a posteriori knowledge; both stand opposed to "normative" method as a valid scientific procedure for gaining scientific knowledge. Both attempt to be factual, thus meeting the primary requirement of science proper. The crucial difference, however, between the two kinds of empiricism lies in that the empiricism-within-system takes the system as constant--i.e., the system is taken as "given"--while the system-transgressing empiricism takes the system itself as a variable. In the words of Mills:

> What abstracted empiricists call empirical "data" represent a very abstracted view of everyday social worlds. They normally deal, for example, with an age-level of a sex-category of an income-bracket of middle-sized

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[1]Since the object of Mills' criticisms is positivism in social science in general, we shall refer to "social science" throughout this chapter.

> cities. . . . And of course, there is another "variable" in it too: These people live in the United States. But that is not, as a "datum," among the minute, precise, abstracted variables which make up the empirical world of abstracted empiricism. To get "The United States" in would require a conception of social structure, and as well, a less rigid idea of empiricism.[1]

Thus, "abstracted empiricism" is the name that Mills applies to empiricism-within-system, the version of empiricism which takes the system as constant. Mills' "less rigid" version of empiricism we shall call "trans-systemic" empiricism. Mills not only emphasizes the need for going outside the system; he also practices what he urges his professional colleagues to do.[2] And Mills argues the need for a trans-systemic orientation in the name of empiricism, i.e., in order to describe socio-political reality more accurately, more objectively. Thus, for example, Mills finds that the description of power structure in conventional American social science is from the inside, as if described by the "power elite";[3] that the description of social norms and

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[1]C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1961), p. 124.

[2]It may be maintained that Mills' trans-systemic orientation and his criticisms of the system-bound social science in terms of that trans-systemic empiricism constitute in effect a sociology of knowledge of American social science--the most valuable contribution that Mills made to sociology.

[3]Thus, Mills' The Power Elite (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956) differs in a fundamental way from, for example, Robert A. Dahl's Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961). Cf. also: Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, Vol. 52 (June, 1958), pp. 463-469.

mores is from the status quo viewpoint that stability, more than anything else, is desirable;[1] that the detached condemnation of ideology is from the standpoint of ideology-free America;[2] that "consensus" is described from the standpoint of conformity;[3] etc.

An important question must be raised at this point: what enables Mills to see the horizon beyond the system? What makes Mills--having, presumably, no frame of reference other than empiricism itself--aware of the system-boundness of the empiricism practiced by the positivist social scientists? This question does not seem to arise in the cases of Strauss or Morgenthau. For what enables Strauss to see things that cannot be perceived in the empirical phenomena is his teleological view of reality. What makes Morgenthau see beyond the system is his belief that certain fundamental attributes of the socio-political phenomena are eternal, unbound by time and space; i.e., unbound by a particular system. But what about Mills, who obviously subscribes neither to a teleological view of reality, nor to the notion

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[1]See, for example, C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," in Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 525-552.

[2]See, for example, C. Wright Mills, "The New Left," in ibid., pp. 247-259.

[3]See, for example, C. Wright Mills, "Mass Media and Public Opinion," in ibid., pp. 577-598.

of eternality of certain socio-political phenomena? The answer to this question seems to lie in Mills' empirical orientation itself: i.e., Mills detects in the conditions of the "Fourth Epoch"[1] certain specific forces that militate against a fully relevant empiricism. Mills detects that, in its abstraction from reality and in its aimless pursuit of minute facts and of trivial problems wholly alienated from reality, the empiricism of positivist social science in effect conspires with the system-binding forces against the practice of empiricism fully relevant to reality. The Fourth Epoch is described in terms of the collapse of the two main ideologies of the West, liberalism and socialism. These two ideologies, stemming from the Enlightenment, have in common many assumptions and values. The collapse of these ideologies signifies, on the one hand, conditions in the contemporary world that are radically different from those in which the ideologies took root. On the other hand, the ideological collapse signifies the breakdown, in the face of these changed conditions, of the fundamental assumption of the Enlightenment that there is an inherent harmony between reason and freedom--that increase in rationality is the prime condition of increase in

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[1]This is Mills' description of the contemporary times. "We are at the ending of what is called The Modern Age. Just as Antiquity was followed by . . . The Dark Age, so now the Modern Age is being succeeded by a post-modern period. Perhaps we may call it: The Fourth Epoch." The Sociological Imagination, pp. 165-166.

freedom. The ideological collapse signifies, in other words, the breakdown of the earlier orientation: that orientation no longer reveals to us the realities of the contemporary world in a relevant way. Hence,

> when we try to orient ourselves--if we do try--we find that too many of our old expectations and images are, after all, tied down historically: that too many of our standard categories of thought and of feeling as often disorient us as help to explain what is happening around us; that too many of our explanations are derived from the great historical transition from the medieval to the Modern Age; and that when they are generalized for us today, they become unwieldy, irrelevant, not convincing. . . . Now we confront new kinds of social structure which, in terms of "modern" ideals, resists analysis in the liberal and in the socialistic terms we have inherited. . . . The ideological mark of the Fourth Epoch--that which sets it off from the Modern Age--is that the ideas of freedom and of reason have become moot; that increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom.[1]

In fact, the world Mills confronts is one in which reason and freedom are at loggerheads with one another: it is a world in which reason has become bureaucratic, and freedom is gained at the expense of progress. "The underlying trends are well known," states Mills:

> Great and rational organizations--in brief, bureaucracies--have indeed increased, but the substantive reason of the individual at large has not. Caught in the limited milieux of their everyday lives, ordinary men often cannot reason about the great structures--rational and irrational--of which their milieux are subordinate parts. Accordingly, they often carry out series of apparently rational actions without any idea of the ends they serve, and there is the increasing suspicion that those at the top as well--like Tolstoy's generals--only pretend they know. That the techniques and the rationality of science are given a central place

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, pp. 166-167.

> in a society does not mean that men live reasonably and without myth, fraud and superstition. Science, it turns out, is not a technological Second Coming. Universal education may lead to technological idiocy and nationalistic provinciality, rather than to the informed and independent intelligence. Rationally organized social arrangements are not necessarily a means of increased freedom--for the individual or for the society. In fact, often they are a means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a free man.[1]

The increasing rationalization of society, the contradiction between such rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed harmony of reason and freedom--these developments, according to Mills, lie behind the emergence of the man who is rational without reason. These developments in the post-modern world also involve the abdication of many Western intellectuals. For, to Mills, the activities of the intellectuals, the scholars, the ministers, the scientists in the Fourth Epoch increasingly become integral to a functionally rational totality. Consequently, Mills' arguments against positivist social science must be understood within this broad framework: Mills finds the contemporary positivist social scientists performing functionally rational roles within the system, thus serving, knowingly or unknowingly, an ideological obligation to the "Establishment." The "professional establishment"--growing out

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[1]C. Wright Mills, "Culture and Politics," in Power, Politics and People, op. cit., pp. 237-238. Virtually identical statements are found in The Sociological Imagination, p. 168.

of bureaucratization--of social science necessarily signifies that social science is temporocentrical and parochial or ethnocentric.[1] To counter the forces of a rational social science that lacks reason and to restore the ability of social scientists to escape parochialism and partisan commitment, constitute Mills' urgent call to social scientists for a change of stance and activities, i.e., for the "sociological imagination":

> "Man's chief danger" today lies in the unruly forces of contemporary society itself, with its alienating methods of production, its enveloping techniques of political domination, its international anarchy--in a word, its pervasive transformations of the very "nature" of man and the conditions and aims of his life. It is now the social scientist's foremost political and intellectual task--for here the two coincide--to make clear the elements of contemporary uneasiness and indifference. It is the central demand made upon him by other cultural workmen--by physical scientists and artists, by the intellectual community in general. It is because of this task and these demands, I believe, that the social sciences are becoming the common denominator of our cultural period, and the sociological imagination our most needed quality of mind.[2]

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[1]The system-bound character of social science has been described in a variety of ways, including "parochialism," "ethnocentrism," "provincialism," etc. Irving Louis Horowitz, for example, would go so far as to use the phrase "sociological imperialism." Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), p. 35.

[2]The Sociological Imagination, p. 13.

Political Phenomena

Nature of Man: Malleability of Man

Behind any conception of the "nature of man" there is a basic assumption that man is not entirely or totally malleable by artificial manipulations. For, if human nature were indeed totally malleable, an idea of "human nature" would retain significance only in pointing out that malleability is the prime characteristic of the human being: an idea of "human nature" presupposes that certain human attributes are constant, regardless of environmental circumstances; i.e., man is not so malleable that all attributes are subject to change. Thus, Morgenthau holds the "lust for power" to be a constant human attribute, regardless of time and place; Strauss holds the "power of reason" to be a human characteristic, whether man's environment is the Hitlerian regime or the Athenian democracy. On the other hand, it is Mills' burden to argue that, because of the ascendance of the functionally rational totality in the Fourth Epoch, the idea of the "nature of man" has become problematic: i.e., the system-binding forces of the functionally rational totality are such that the "nature of man" in the system has become amenable to change by manipulation, in order to fit him functionally into the system.

The impact of the system-binding process of the rational totality upon the individual is clearly described by Mills. Given the effects of the ascendant trend of rationalization of the system, Mills states,

> the individual "does best he can." He gears his aspirations and his work to the situation he is in, and from which he can find no way out. In due course, he does not seek a way out: he adapts. . . . This adaptation of the individual and its effects upon his milieux and self results not only in the loss of his chance, and in due course, of his capacity and will to reason; it also affects his chances and his capacity to act as a free man. Indeed, neither the value of freedom nor of reason, it would seem, are known to him.[1]

Consequently, it appears to Mills, what is at issue in our time is the very "image we have of his limits and possibilities as man." We must, Mills contends, raise the question in an ultimate form: "Among contemporary men will there come to prevail, or even to flourish, what may be

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 170. Karl Mannheim made the identical point by speaking of "self-rationalization" of the individual within rational organization. Some of the recent personality studies are illustrative of the fact that "situation" is the most salient independent variable for individual personality formation. Cf.: Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers (New York: Harper, 1951); David Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954); William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Doubleday, 1956); Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of A Mexican Family (New York: Random House, 1961). Also, Cf.: William Henry, "The Business Executives: The Psychodynamics of A Social Role," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54 (January, 1949), pp. 286-291; Robert Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Social Forces, Vol. 18 (March, 1940), pp. 560-568; etc.

called The Cheerful Robot?"[1] Mills' answer to this question is only conditional:

> We know of course that man can be turned into a robot, by chemical and psychiatric means, by steady coercion and by controlled environment; but also by random pressures and unplanned sequences of circumstances. But can he be made to want to become a cheerful and willing robot? Can he be happy in this condition, and what are the qualities and the meanings of such happiness? It will no longer do merely to assume, as a metaphysics of human nature, that down deep in man-as-man there is an urge for freedom and a will to reason.[1]

Asserting the distinct possibility of, or even actual proclivity toward, reducing man to a "Cheerful Robot" is one thing; questioning whether there is a "human universal," inherent in all men at all times, is another. Mills recognizes the advocacy of asserting a universal nature of man:

> The idea of some "human nature" common to man as man is a violation of the social and historical specificity that careful work in the human studies requires; at the very least, it is an abstraction that social students have not earned the right to make. Surely we ought occasionally to remember that in truth we do not know much about man, and that all the knowledge we do have does not entirely remove the element of mystery that surrounds his variety as it is revealed in history and biography. Sometimes we do want to wallow in that mystery, to feel that we are, after all, a part of it, and perhaps we should; but being men of the West, we will inevitably also study the human variety, which for us means removing the mystery from our view of it. In doing so, let us not forget what it is we are studying, how little we know of man. . . .[2]

Here Mills clearly acknowledges that there is something in

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 171.

[2]Ibid., p. 164.

man not exhausted by the principle of historical specificity. But as a man of the West--i.e., as a man of reason--he would not define the human nature that is common to all men. As an empiricist, it seems, Mills rejects the notion of a "human universal." On the other hand, by recognizing man as both creature and creator of society, Mills asserts that human consciousness is not completely molded by the structure of society. Mills' whole work, his call for "sociological imagination," in fact, is oriented toward making man an active agent in society.[1] In the latter assertions

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[1]In the last analysis, Mills' stand on the "nature of man" is ambiguous, perhaps due to an empirical position that attempts, at the same time, to transcend certain aspects of empirical reality. As a trans-systemic empiricist, Mills is clearly opposed to the notion of a "human universal" based on the findings of system-bound empiricism. Yet, as an empiricist, Mills cannot seem to accept any trans-empirical notion of a "human universal." It appears that most "alienation" theses based on an empirical framework--whether the framework is system-bound or trans-systemic--have this difficulty in common: "alienation" requires, conceptually, something from which a man is alienated; specification of that "something" seems to require, in turn, a notion of an "original" or "natural" human nature, clearly a "metaphysical" notion which an empiricist will find difficult to accept. This is why the parallel between Rousseau and Mills is incomplete: Rousseau thought that his predecessors who had thought man evil failed to distinguish between what is original and what is artificial in the actual nature of man; Mills finds that man as described by the system-bound empiricist, the Cheerful Robot, cannot possibly be the "original" man. Rousseau developed a notion of the "Noble Savage" as the "natural man," in contradistinction to the corrupted man in civil society; Mills has no corresponding "original man" to compare with the Cheerful Robot. In Mills' statements on the nature of man, one may detect a vague hint at elitism: the eschatology of the Cheerful Robot seems to divide humanity into two camps, the alienation-prone masses, and the at least potentially alienation-free intellectual elite. Herbert Aptheker has made a case out of Mills' alleged

Mills relies on neither immanent historical necessity, nor the manifestation of an absolute value immanent in man or transcendent in God to realize new form and bring about the new age of truth, reason, and freedom. Instead, as any trans-systemic empiricist would, Mills calls for Promethean effort to achieve the transformation of society.

Socio-Political Phenomena

Mills' trans-systemic orientation is most manifest in his conception of socio-political phenomena that are properly the object of inquiry for social science. Mills suggests a primary distinction between "troubles" and "issues." "Troubles" occur, according to Mills,

> within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware. Accordingly, the statements and the resolution of troubles properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu--the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity.[1]

A "trouble" is a private matter, affecting the individual as a biographical entity within a society: values cherished by an individual are felt by him to be threatened. On the

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"contempt for the masses" in this regard. Incidentally, those who consider Mills a "Marxist" should examine Aptheker's volume to discover how, in the eyes of a real Marxist, Mills' works fall short of the Marxist expectations: Herbert Aptheker, The World of C. Wright Mills (New York: Marzani and Munsell, Inc., 1960).

[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 8.

other hand, "issues" have to do with matters that transcend local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life:

> They have to do with the organization of many such milieux into the institutions of an historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger structure of social and historical life.[1]

An "issue" is a public matter: some values cherished by the public are felt to be threatened. As such, an "issue" often involves a crisis in institutional arrangements within a society.[2] Thus, when only one man is unemployed in a city of 100,000, that is his personal "trouble," and "for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills and his immediate opportunities."[3] But when 15 million men are unemployed in a nation of 50 million potential employees, that is an "issue," for

> we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual. The very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals.[4]

As with unemployment, war, marriage, metropolis, etc., all have the bi-dimensional aspects of "the personal troubles

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 8.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

of milieux" and "the public issues of social structure." The personal problems of war, for instance, may be how to survive it or how to die in it with honor; how to contribute to the war's termination, or how to make money out of it, etc. But the structural issues of war have to do with its causes; "with the types of men it throws up into command; with its effects upon economic and political, family and religious institutions," etc.[1] Inside a marriage a man and a woman may experience personal troubles, but when the divorce rate in a society is unusually high, it indicates a structural issue having to do with the institutions of marriage and the family and other institutions that bear upon them. Personal "troubles" have to do with the individual as a biographical entity; public issues have to do with the entire society as an historical entity. Thus, "biography" and "history" are the substance of social phenomena. The crucial point to Mills is the inseparable relationship between the two:

> In so far as an economy is so arranged that slumps occur, the problem of unemployment becomes incapable of personal solution. In so far as war is inherent in the nation-state system and in the uneven industrialization of the world, the ordinary individual in his restricted milieu will be powerless . . . to solve the troubles this system or lack of system imposes upon him. In so far as the family as an institution turns women into darling little slaves and men into their chief providers and unweaned dependents, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable of purely

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 9.

> private solution. In so far as the overdeveloped megalopolis and the overdeveloped automobiles are built-in features of the overdeveloped society, the issues of urban living will not be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth.[1]

Mills' point is that social structure organically conjoins "biography" and "history." Consequently, Mills' description of a proper social science is that it is

> the study of biography, of history, and of the problems of their intersection within social structure. To study these problems, to realize the human variety, requires that our work be continuously and closely related to the level of historical reality--and to the meanings of this reality for individual men and women. Our aim is to define reality and to discern these meanings; it is in terms of them that the problems of classic social science are formulated, and thus the issues and troubles these problems incorporate are confronted.[2]

This orientation that biography, history, and social structure are the coordinate points of the proper study of man and society, is Mills' major platform in developing his arguments against positivist social science.

The "Sociological Imagination": Its Value Commitments

Mills finds that the prevailing social science does not conform to what he considers to be a proper study of man and society and, consequently, that a fundamental reorientation in social science is required for it to perform what he conceives to be proper intellectual functions.

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 10.

[2] Ibid., pp. 134, 143.

The called-for intellectual reorientation is the "sociological imagination," a quality of mind that

> enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social position.[1]

Or, in other words, it is a quality of mind that "enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society."[2]

As an empiricist, Machiavelli discovered that men are in fact largely malleable. As an empiricist, Mills also discovers that men are malleable in reality, even more so than Machiavelli could possibly have imagined them to be.[3] Yet, while the former produced, out of his

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 5.

[2]Ibid., p. 6. H. R. G. Greaves has made an appeal for political scientists to use their "imagination," using the term in the same way that Mills does: political scientists should deal more frankly and fully with great contemporary problems, and not seek safety in inconsequential exercises or in extended examinations of the insignificant. H. R. G. Greaves, "Political Theory Today," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 75 (March, 1960), pp. 1-16. Though Mills is not mentioned in it, this article, written by a professor at the London School of Economics, is almost a companion piece to The Sociological Imagination in its appeal to the trans-systemic intellectual capacities of political scientists.

[3]In Machiavelli, after all, there is the romanticism of "Dame Fortune," which is absent in the mechanistic, metallic "Cheerful Robot." It must be noted also that Machiavelli's man is a creature with likes and dislikes, habits and prejudices, of his own. If he is to be subjected to political control, therefore, the controlling agency must meet him at least partially on his own ground. He is, in

empirical observations, an enchiridion for the prince, the empirical findings of Mills prompt him to call urgently for a "sociological imagination," which, it must be noted, as a form of self-consciousness, purports to counteract the would-be forces that render men malleable. What are the factors that account for Mills' deviation from a Machiavellian employment of empiricism? It appears that at least three relevant factors must be pointed out. First, there is Mills' commitment to the values of reason and freedom. Second, there is Mills' picture of reality that perceives these values as threatened with annihilation.[1] Third, there is Mills' orientation towards a problem solving social science, "problem-solving" not in a technical sense, but in a fundamental meaning of the term. The last factor

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other words, all too human, compared to the "Cheerful Robot," whose very likes and dislikes, habits and prejudices, are amenable to conditioning. Mills' choice of the phrase, "Cheerful Robot"--a pile of bolts and nuts somehow made "cheerful"--indicates the total extent to which man can be alienated from himself. For a journalistic account of the "Cheerful Robot" with powerful insights, see Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (New York: Harper, 1962).

[1]Most of Mills' works are concerned, one way or another, with the empirical evidences pointing toward the allegedly frightening tendency, ranging from the trilogy of the largely statistical stratification studies--The New Man of Power: America's Labor Leaders (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948); White Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951); The Power Elite (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956)--to The Causes of World War Three (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), to the largely journalistic Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

points toward Mills' conception of the proper role of intellectuals within a society: the role of intellectuals, to say the least, cannot be considered apart from their "historical" and "political" roles in a society.[1] The prevailing social science subjected to Mills' criticisms therefore must be viewed as a part of the general intellectual default in an "overdeveloped" society of the Fourth Epoch.

In The Sociological Imagination, two prevailing "styles" of social science are subjected to criticisms:[2] the "grand theory" a la Talcott Parsons and "abstracted empiricism." Since the former does not seem to fall within the purview of the conception "positivism" employed throughout this study, we shall exclude his treatment of "grand theory" from our treatment of Mills.[3]

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[1]Generally, according to Mills, there are three alternative "political roles" open to a social scientist: a "philosopher-king"; an "advisor to the king"; and an independent who directs his work "at kings as well as to public." Mills finds the second type the most usual role among contemporary social scientists. The Sociological Imagination, p. 181.

[2]The Sociological Imagination appears to be an outgrowth of an earlier article: "Two Styles of Research in Current Social Studies," in Power, Politics and People, op. cit., pp. 553-567.

[3]Mills' view of the "grand theory" is that, as an activity of "associating and dissociating of concepts," it is nothing but a "fetishism of Concept," which serves more to obscure the truth--even when the truths are well-known text-book knowledge--than to reveal it. Sorokin's Judgment that The Social System reveals "verbal defects" of the author compares well with Mills' felt-need to "translate into English" all the statements contained in The Social

Positivist Treatment of Political Phenomena: Abstracted Empiricism

"Abstracted empiricism" is a pejorative phrase by which Mills characterizes the prevailing style of social science which, because of its system-boundness, is in orientation abstracted from historical and structural perspective: i.e., an empiricism that refuses to see the things beyond the system within which, and in terms of which, it operates; empiricism the intellectual outlook of which is confined within the historical and structural restrictions of a particular system. To Mills, the major defect of this kind of empiricism is that it is inadequate as a guiding principle.

The inadequacy of abstracted empiricism is manifest, first, in the abstracted details with which the abstracted empiricists deal. The "empirical data" represent an abstracted view of social reality in that its major "variables"--age, income, sex, education, occupation, etc.--are abstracted from historical and structural categories, and, more importantly, in that it fails to take into account the system itself as a relevant variable.[1] The abstracted empiricist's inability--or, perhaps, unwillingness--to

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System. Pitirim Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), pp. 21-30.

[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 124.

consider the system as a variable is a result of abstracted empiricism's system-boundness. The omission of this crucial variable in social studies results, in turn, in another critical inadequacy in some areas:

> Many problems with which its practitioners do try to deal--effects of the mass media, for example--cannot be adequately stated without some structural setting. Can one hope to understand the effects of these media--much less their combined meaning for the development of a mass society--if one studies, with whatever precision, only a population that has been "saturated" by these media for almost a generation? The attempt to sort out individuals "less exposed" from those "more exposed" to one or another medium may well be of great concern to advertising interests, but it is not an adequate basis for the development of a theory of the social meaning of the mass media.[1]

The same thing can be said of the prevailing studies of "public opinion," "voting behavior," "political opinion," "stratification,"[2] etc. In these studies of abstracted empiricism there is another inhibiting element in addition to the historical and structural confinements that tends to circumscribe the outlook of abstracted empiricism: there is, in abstracted empiricism, not only the tendency to confuse the object of inquiry with the set of methods suggested for its study, but also the tendency for the methods to determine the problems. This "methodological inhibition"

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 52. Mills here seems to hint at what Herbert Marcuse calls the "one-dimensional discourse": "Their universe of discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses which . . . become hypnotic definitions or dictations." Herbert Marcuse, op. cit., p. 14. Emphasis mine.

[2] The Sociological Imagination, pp. 51-55.

is a consequence of the philosophy of science held by the abstracted empiricists, "how they hold to it, and how they use it." In practice, Mills states,

> abstracted empiricists often seem more concerned with the philosophy of science than with social study itself. What they have done, in brief, is to embrace one philosophy of science which they now suppose to be The Scientific Method. This model of research is largely an epistemological construction; within the social sciences, its most decisive result has been a sort of methodological inhibition. . . . Methodology, in short, seems to determine the problem.[1]

Whereas the system-boundness of abstracted empiricism renders it oblivious of the equally system-bound character of the object of inquiry, the "methodological inhibition" makes the practitioners of abstracted empiricism define reality in a narrow way, excluding a priori many relevant realms of reality that ought not be excluded from the outset.[2] The combined effect of the system-boundness

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 57.

[2]Compare Barrington Moore's statements: "These scholars often tend to abstract from the reality of historical trends in order to concentrate on resemblances and differences in the hope of formulating scientific laws. For them, history, if it is used at all, becomes merely a storehouse of samples. . . . Historical and social facts are then drawn upon as if they were colored balls from an urn, and the results subjected to tests for statistical significance in order to disprove the hypothesis or derive additional support for it. The trouble with this procedure is that it starts with the assumption that the facts of history are separate and discrete units. This assumption is basic to statistical analysis. . . . It is in this conception, I think, that the modern social scientist goes astray." Barrington Moore, "Strategy in Social Science," in Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich (eds.), Sociology on Trial (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 78.

and the "methodological inhibition" is that

> in these studies the details are piled up with insufficient attention to form; indeed, often there is no form except that provided by typesetters and bookbinders. The details, no matter how numerous, do not convince us of anything worth having convictions about.[1]

As to the formlessness of statement of their trivial findings, there are, according to Mills, two current apologies for abstracted empiricists which, if accepted, would mean that the flimsiness of result is due less to the positivist method than to causes of an accidental nature, namely, to lack of money and time. The apology advanced in terms of money is that, since such studies are quite expensive, they have had to be shaped by some concern for the problems of the interests that have paid for them;[2] moreover, that the aggregate of these interests has had rather scattered problems. Accordingly, Mills states,

> the researchers have not been able to select problems in such a way as to allow a true accumulation of results--that is, one that would add up in a more significant way. They have done the best they could; they could not be concerned with a fruitful series of substantive problems, so they have had to specialize in developing methods that could be put to work regardless of the substantive issues. In brief, the economics of truth--the costs of research--seems to conflict with the politics of truth--the use of research to clarify significant issues and to bring political controversy closer to realities.[3]

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 55.

[2]This point is related to Mills' criticisms on the alleged "objectivity" and "value-freedom" of positivist social science, which will be presented in a proper context.

[3]The Sociological Imagination, p. 64.

Perhaps regarding this apology as an ad misericordiam argument, Mills does not concern himself with it at this point. On the other hand, he does consider the apology advanced in terms of time which maintains that such studies will in due course accumulate sufficiently to permit significant generalizations about society from them. This line of justification, Mills argues,

> assumes a view of the development of social science as a strange building-block endeavor. It assumes that such studies as these are by their nature capable of being "units" which at some point in the future can be "added up" or "fitted together" to "build up" a reliable and verified image of some whole. It is not merely an assumption; it is an explicit policy.[1]

Mills develops a substantial criticism of abstracted empiricism in explaining why the "building block" assumption is unwarranted: Mills goes beyond the extrinsic reasons for the thinness of result of abstracted empiricism, turning to reasons inherent in the abstracted empiricists' style of social study.

Mills' first point has to do with the relation between theory and research, i.e., with the "policy social scientists should adopt about the priority of larger conceptions and of areas for detailed exposition."[2] Mills' own view on the relation between "broader conceptions"--that is, theory--and "detailed exposition"--that is, research--is

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 65.

[2] Ibid., p. 66.

that:

> To check and to re-shape a broad conception, one must have detailed expositions, but the detailed expositions cannot necessarily be put together to constitute a broad conception. What should one select for detailed exposition? What are the criteria for selection? And what does "put together" mean? It is not so mechanical a task as the easy phrase makes it seem.[1]

On the other hand, Mills concludes, after examining some of Paul F. Lazarsfeld's statements in "What is Sociology?" the intended "bible" for beginning students of sociology:[2]

> In the more forthright statements, such as Lazarsfeld's, the working ideas of "theory" and of "empirical data" are made quite plain: "Theory" becomes the variables useful in interpreting statistical findings; "empirical data," it is strongly suggested and made evident in practice, are restricted to such statistically determined facts and relations as are numerous, repeatable, measurable.[3]

With both theory and data thus restricted, Mills argues, the alleged "interplay" between theory and data of the abstracted empiricists shrinks, in fact, to naught. There is, Mills contends, no principle or theory that guides the selection of what is to be the subject of these studies:

> It is merely assumed that if only The Method is used, such studies as result--scattered from Elmira to Zagreb

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 66. Compare Maurice Duverger's statements on the predicament of one launching a study on political parties: "We find ourselves in a vicious circle: a general theory of parties will eventually be constructed upon the preliminary work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of parties." Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley, 1953), p. xiii.

[2]The Sociological Imagination, p. 59 n.

[3]Ibid., p. 66.

> to Shanghai--will add up finally to a "full-fledged, organized" science of man and society.[1]

Any style of empiricism involves a metaphysical choice as to what is more real and Mills' next argument concerns the metaphysical choice required by abstracted empiricism. Mills maintains that a convincing case can be made for the contention that the studies of abstracted empiricism are often examples of "psychologism," the attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of fact and theories about the make-up of individuals. In the words of Mills:

> The questions asked in these studies are put in terms of the psychological reactions of individuals. Accordingly, the assumption is required that the institutional structure of society, in so far as it is to be studied in this way, can be understood by means of such data about individuals.[2]

"Psychologism" is the logical fallacy that larger conceptions of structure--the terms with which the researches have <u>not</u> been formulated and the data collected--are dragged into studies in the abstracted empirical style, with the result that

> Particular observations are explained by appealing <u>ad hoc</u> to general conceptions. General conceptions are used to formulate structural or psychological problems for the "front-end" of "the write-up" of a study.[3]

Mills elaborated this point in an earlier article,[4] in which

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[1] <u>The Sociological Imagination</u>, p. 67.

[2] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 68. [3] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 70.

[4] "Two Styles of Social Research," in <u>Power, Politics and People</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 553-567.

four "simplified" modes of social research are classified in terms of two variables, explanation and the statement to be explained:

	Observations to be explained	
Explanations	Macroscopic	Molecular
Macroscopic	I	II
Molecular	III	IV

"Psychologism" involves types II and III. When the problem is "molecular" and the explanation "macroscopic" (type II), there is an error of "falsely concretizing a concept":[1] i.e., in explaining some molecular observation by appealing to ad hoc, to a macroscopic concept, that tends to be handled in discussion as if the macroscopic concept were a definite variable statistically related to the molecular observation. When, on the other hand, the problem is macroscopic and the explanation molecular (type III), there is an error of "unduly stretching an index":[2] i.e., in explaining some macroscopic observation by appealing to a molecular variable, that molecular variable is unduly generalized and handled in discussion as if it were a carefully built index. The molecular explanation, in other words, is imputed to explain the macroscopic observation, not otherwise connected. "What all this amounts to," Mills

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[1] "Two Styles of Social Research," op. cit., p. 562.

[2] Ibid.

states,

> is the use of statistics to illustrate general points and the use of general points to illustrate statistics. The general points are neither tested nor made specific. They are adapted to the figures, as the arrangement of the figure is adapted to them.[1]

Finally, Mills answers the contention of the abstracted empiricists that what they produce is true even if unimportant. The contention is that the level of empirical verification is necessarily low, according to rigorous scientific requirement, and hence the inability to say anything "significant" about society as a whole. Mills' answer is that the findings of abstracted empiricism are not only unimportant; but the alleged "truth" of the findings is also open to serious doubt:

> More and more I wonder how true it is. I wonder how much exactitude, or even pseudo-precision, is here confused with "truth"; and how much abstracted empiricism is taken as the only "empirical" manner of work. If you have ever seriously studied, for a year or two, some thousand hour-long interviews, carefully coded and punched, you will have begun to see how very malleable the realm of "fact" may really be. . . . Much of such work, I am now convinced, has become the mere following

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 71. Mills' conception of a proper mode of social research is that there must be a "shuttle" between the macroscopic and molecular levels of abstraction inside each phase of the two-step act of research; inside the observation phase, and inside the explanation phase. In types II and III, there is a shuttle between the macroscopic and molecular levels, but it does not occur in the same phase of the total research act: there is no movement from macroscopic to molecular inside the observation phase, nor inside the explanation phase. The inadequacies of the purely macroscopic and the purely molecular (types I and IV) are tied with the fact that in both cases there is no shuttle between levels of abstraction.

> of a ritual . . . rather than, in the words of its spokesmen, a "commitment to the hard demands of science."[1]

It must be pointed out that Mills has no objections against the use of statistics per se. On the contrary, Mills insists that "one should always try to use them," if the problems at work are readily amenable to statistical procedures. No one, however,

> need accept such procedures, when generalized, as the only procedure available. Certainly no one need accept this model as a total canon. It is not the only empirical manner.[2]

Nor is Mills against detailed studies of minute problems per se, for the narrow focus they require "might be part of an admirable quest for precision and certainty; it might also be part of a division of intellectual labor, of a specialization to which, again, no one ought to object":

> But surely we are entitled to ask: If it is claimed that these studies are parts of some division of labor which as a whole constitutes the social science endeavor, where are the other divisions of which these studies are parts? And where is the "division" wherein just such studies as these are put into some larger picture?[3]

Nor, it would seem, is Mills against science per se. In the words of Anatol Rapoport:

> . . . for all his ranting against the Scientists, he was not, I believe, really anti-scientific. Mills' position was that the peculiarity of social science, which makes it inevitable that the world is described "from the inside" of some system should be accepted and turned to advantage. He believed that what we think

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 72.

[2] Ibid., p. 73. [3] Ibid., p. 74.

about society will change society; therefore, we should think about it in ways which change it for the better.[1]

Value-Freedom in Positivist Social Science

"Liberal Practicality": The Professional Ideology of Positivist Social Science

All students of men and society, according to Mills, assume and imply moral and political decision. Since their intellectual activities occur within a society and the objects of their inquiry also occur within a society, they are merely by working as social scientists to some extent enacting an ideological role, whether they are aware of it or not. For the ideological relevance of social science is inherent in its very existence as social fact. Every society holds images of its own nature; in particular, images and slogans that justify its system of power and the ways of the powerful:

> The images and ideas produced by social scientists may or may not be consistent with these prevailing images, but they always carry implications for them. In so far as these implications become known, they usually come to be argued over--and used: By justifying the arrangement

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[1]Anatol Rapoport, "The Scientific Relevance of C. Wright Mills," in The New Sociology, op. cit., p. 104. Incidentally, Rapoport admittedly belongs to the "class of investigators whom Mills labels, not without derision, as the 'Scientists.'" Rapoport, however, acknowledges Mills' intellectual influence upon himself: "Reading Mills has helped me reconcile my fundamental commitment to scientific method in the broadest sense with the realization that social science does not yield to scientific piety alone." Ibid., pp. 104, 95.

> of power and the ascendancy of the powerful, images and ideas transform power into authority; By criticizing or debunking prevailing arrangements and rules, they strip them of authority; By distracting attention from issues of power and authority, they distract attention from the structural realities of the society itself.[1]

Since values are inevitably involved in the selection of the problems they study, in certain key concepts they use in their formulation of these problems, and affect the course of the solution of these problems, social scientists are destined to play one of these three roles, whatever their intentions may be.[2] This is a description of the general condition of all social sciences--of whatever methodological or epistemological persuasions--that much Mills makes quite clear.

The abstracted empiricists who spend their intellectual force on the details of small-scale milieux are not, according to Mills, removing their works from the political conflicts and forces of their time. All their protestations notwithstanding, they are,

> at least indirectly, and in effect, "accepting" the framework of [their] society. But no one who accepts the full intellectual tasks of social science can merely assume that structure. In fact, it is his job to make that structure explicit and to study it as a whole.[3]

Since anyone who spends his life studying society and publishing the result is acting morally and usually acting

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 80.

[2]Ibid., pp. 78-84. [3]Ibid., pp. 78-79.

politically as well, the question is whether he consciously faces this condition or conceals it from himself and from others. Mills maintains, consequently, that the alleged "value-freedom" is truly less the objectivity required by science than the mannerism of the non-committed:

> Many, I should say most, social scientists in America today are easily or uneasily liberal. They conform to the prevailing fear of any passionate commitment. This, and not "scientific objectivity," is what is really wanted by such men when they complain about "making value judgments."[1]

Mills establishes a connection between the noncommittal attitude of the abstracted empiricists and the tradition of liberalism and in doing so maintains that the values of liberalism have pervaded the outlook of the social scientists, providing them with a "professional ideology."[2] Liberalism, Mills argues, has been the political common denominator of virtually all social study as well as the source of virtually all public ideology in the United States: liberalism has "informed" the social sciences in that it has provided an intellectual direction for the selection of problems and their solution that is definitely toward particular practical problems, the problems of "everyday life": i.e., the "liberal practicality." An orientation toward "practical problems" necessarily means

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 79.

[2]"The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," op. cit., pp. 76-99.

an unconcern with the system as a whole, and, as such, the "liberal practicality," as the professional ideology of the abstracted empiricists, has a couple of essential features. First is the "democratic theory of knowledge" that assumes the equality of facts and results in a strong tendency to "take up one empirical detail, one problem of milieux at a time."[1] Second is the "organic metaphysics" of liberal practicality, the emphasis upon the "processual" and "organic" character of society; the tendency to stress whatever tends to harmonious balance:

> In viewing everything as a "continuous process," sudden changes of pace and revolutionary dislocations . . . are missed, or, if not missed, merely taken as signs of the "pathological," the "maladjusted."[2]

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 85.

[2] Ibid., p. 86. It appears that the "organic metaphysics" is inherent in all the "systemic" approaches to the study of political systems: "structural-functionalism"; "political development"; "equilibrium models"; etc. As to "structural-functionalism," see, in particular: D. F. Aberle, et al., "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," Ethics, Vol. 60 (October, 1950), pp. 101-111; Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond, et al. (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 3-64; Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Some Aspects of 'Structural-Functional' Analysis and Political Science," in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 52-66; etc. As to "political development," see , the series on the "Studies in Political Development" published by Princeton University Press, 1963-1966. The emphasis upon "processual" and "organic" character of political systemsis particularly manifest in David Easton's "equilibrium model," although its utility is admittedly confined to serving as a heuristic "tool," rather than as a "verifiable" or "usable" theory. Cf.: David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political

This "organic metaphysics," according to Mills, is buttressed with the notion of "multiple-causation," which refers to the view that a given effect has a plurality of causes. Mills considers the notion a natural consequence of a social science that fragments society into "factors," into elemental bits: one will need "quite a few of them to account for something, and one can never be sure they are all in."[1] All these features of the liberal practicality work in unison to obviate an analytic view of structure and a view of causation which would permit points of entry for broader types of action, especially of political action. The liberal practicality, as the professional ideology of a system-bound empiricism, is a-political: "The political order itself is seldom examined; it is merely assumed as a quite fixed and distant framework."[2]

However, according to Mills, a new kind of "practicality has arisen alongside the older kind, and the meaning

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Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), Chap. II; David Easton, "Limits of the Equilibrium Model in Social Research," in Heinz Eulau, et al. (eds.), Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 397-404; David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. 9 (April, 1957), pp. 383-400; etc. For a scheme similar to Easton's model, see Herbert A. Simon's "The Equilibrium of the Organization," in Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), Chap. 6.

[1]"The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," op. cit., p. 537.

[2]The Sociological Imagination, p. 88.

of "practicality" itself is now undergoing a fundamental change, such that the tendencies of positivist social science

> toward fragmentary problems and scattered causation have been conservatively turned to the use of corporation, army, and state. As such bureaucracies have become more dominant in the economic, the political, the military orders, the meaning of "practical" has shifted: that which is thought to serve the purposes of these great institutions is held to be "practical."[1]

These new developments have effected new images of social science and the social scientists. For the first time in the history of their disciplines, Mills maintains, "social scientists have come into professional relations with private and public powers well above the level of the welfare agency and the county agent."[2] Consequently, the positions, problems and the clients of the social scientists have been changed:

> Their positions change--from the academic to the bureaucratic; their publics change--from movements of reforms to circles of decision-makers; and their problems change--from those of their own choice to those of their new clients. The scholars themselves tend to become less intellectually insurgent and more administratively practical. Generally accepting the status quo, they tend to formulate problems out of the troubles and issues that administrators believe they face.[3]

In short, there has occurred a "bureaucratization of social science."

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 92.

[2] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

[3] Ibid., p. 96.

"Illiberal Practicality": Bureaucratization of Social Science

During the last quarter of a century, according to Mills, there has been a decisive shift in the administrative uses and political meanings of social science in the United States. The older "liberal practicality" of social problems has been overshadowed by new uses of a managerial and manipulative sort: the "liberal practicality" has been largely replaced by "illiberal practicality." This phrase refers to both the method and use of abstracted empiricism, for, Mills argues, the techniques of abstracted empiricism and its bureaucratic use are now regularly joined. So joined, they result in the development of a bureaucratic social science.

There is an inherent connection between abstracted empiricism and the bureaucratic development in social science. Since work in the abstracted empirical manner is quite expensive, Mills states,

> only large institutions can readily afford it. Among these are corporation, army, state, and also their adjuncts, especially advertising, promotion, and public relations. There are also the foundations, but the personnel in charge of these often tend to act under the new canons of the practical, that is to say, the bureaucratically relevant. As a result, the style has become embodied in definite institutional centers.[1]

To practice abstracted empiricism requires a research

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 102.

institution and a large amount of funds. As the cost of research increases, as the research team comes into being, and as the style of work itself becomes expensive, there comes about a corporate control and a division of labor. And it appears, to Mills, that there develops a kind of symbiotic relationship between the positivist social science and its new clients:

> The formalism of these costly techniques makes them especially serviceable in providing the very kind of information needed by those capable and willing to pay for it. The new applied focus has typically been specific problems, designed to clarify the alternatives for practical--which is to say, pecuniary and administrative--action. . . . Since the practitioners of abstracted empiricism are often little concerned to set their substantive problems, they are all the more ready to abdicate the choice of their specific problems to others.[1]

The most critical aspect of the bureaucratic development in social science is therefore that the new social science has come to "serve whatever ends its bureaucratic clients may have in view." And the political meaning of this bureaucratic development is that those who practice and promote this style of research "readily assume the political perspective of their bureaucratic clients and chieftains."[2]

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[1] The Sociological Imagination, p. 102.

[2] Ibid., p. 101. Loren Baritz has made a well-documented study on this very point, the conclusions of which tend to support Mills' arguments here. See Loren Baritz, The Servants of Power: A History of the Use of Social Science in American Industry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

There are, however, other aspects of the bureaucratic development in social science. First, among the practitioners of abstracted empiricism, the mode of intellectual operations itself has become bureaucratized. In the words of Mills:

> In an attempt to standardize and rationalize each phase of social inquiry, the intellectual operations themselves of the abstracted empirical style are becoming "bureaucratic." These operations are such as to make studies of man usually collective and systematized: in the kind of research institutions, agencies, and bureaus in which abstracted empiricism is properly installed, there is a development, for efficiency's sake if for no other, of routines as rationalized as those of any corporation's accounting department.[1]

Second, according to Mills, these developments in turn have much to do with the selection and the shaping of new qualities of mind among the personnel of the school, qualities both intellectual and political. The research institution is also a training center, and, as such, it selects certain types of mind, and by virtue of the rewards it offers it places a premium on the development of certain mental qualities. Two types of men, according to Mills, have arisen in these institutions:

> There are, first, the intellectual administrators and research promoters. . . . Their academic reputations rest upon their academic power: they are the members of The Committee; they are on The Board of Directors; they can get you the job, the trip, the research grant. They are a strange new kind of bureaucrat.[2]

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, p. 101.

[2]Ibid., p. 103.

However, Mills draws a far grimmer picture of the second generation of the new species, the young recruits who, being research technicians rather than social scientists, have taken up social research as a career. In the words of Mills,

> They have come early to an extreme specialization, and they have acquired an indifference or a contempt for "social philosophy" or "merely speculating." Listening to their conversations, trying to gauge the quality of their curiosity, one finds a deadly limitation of mind. . . . [Once] a young man has spent three or four years at this sort of thing, you cannot really talk to him about the problems of studying modern society. His position and career, his ambition and his very self-esteem, are based in large part upon this one perspective [of abstracted empiricism], this one vocabulary, this one set of techniques. In truth, he does not know anything else.[1]

Finally, the most significant aspect of the bureaucratic development in social science lies, according to Mills, in its effects upon the general cultural, moral, and intellectual life of men in the United States. Mills states that,

> In so far as such research efforts are effective in their declared practical aims, they serve to increase the efficiency and the reputation--and to that extent, the prevalence--of bureaucratic forms of domination in modern society. But whether or not effective in these explicit aims (the question is open), they do serve to spread the ethos of bureaucracy into other spheres of cultural, moral, and intellectual life.[2]

In advancing his arguments on the bureaucratization of social science, Mills not only is asserting that the

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[1]The Sociological Imagination, pp. 105-106.

[2]Ibid., p. 101.

abstracted empiricist's claim of "value-freedom" is a false allegation; but also, and more importantly, is presenting the social science of the style of abstracted empiricism as a public issue. The autonomy of social science, in other words, is equally at issue. If social science is not autonomous but becomes the "servant of power," it cannot be a publicly responsible enterprise. The abstracted empirical manner, the methodological inhibition it sustains, the focus of its practicality, the qualities of mind its institutions tend to select and to train--these developments in social science, to Mills, pose urgent questions about the social policies of the social sciences. Insofar as the individual social scientist is dependent in his work upon bureaucracies, he tends to lose his individual autonomy; insofar as social science consists of bureaucratic work, it tends to lose its social and political autonomy. And Mills sees that politically the "bureaucratic ethos" clearly points in a non-democratic or illiberal direction, a direction diametrically opposed to the values of reason and freedom. Should the positivist style of social science come to enjoy an intellectual monopoly, or even become the predominant style of work, Mills foresees that it will constitute

> a grievous threat to the intellectual promise of social science and as well to the political promise of the role of reason in human affairs--as that role has been

classically conceived in the civilization of the Western societies.[1]

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[1]*The Sociological Imagination*, p. 118.

CHAPTER VI

DIFFICULTIES IN POSITIVIST POLITICAL SCIENCE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE ANTI-POSITIVIST THESES

While the positivist approach to the study of politics has its ultimate roots in Auguste Comte and, perhaps, John Stuart Mill, the attempt to introduce both the methods and the attitudes of science into the study of politics is much more recent. It has more concrete connection with Walter Bagehot's Physics and Politics, published in 1875, and certainly the appearance in 1908 of both Graham Wallas' Human Nature in Politics and Arthur F. Bentley's Process of Government seem to have brought the movement into the stage of rapid growth. In American political science, its geneology goes back to Charles E. Merriam, as Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus have stated:

> If behavioralism has a father, paternity belongs to Charles E. Merriam, who "staked out" much of the ground now claimed by it. And if Merriam was the sire, Burgess, Lowell, and Bentley were godfathers to the enterprise.[1]

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[1]Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 183-184.

As is now widely acknowledged, however, the emergence of a full-fledged behavioralism in political science as the positivist political science was a post-World War II phenomenon. As the major behavioral or behaviorally-oriented works of recent times have evidenced,[1] positivist political science seems to rest essentially on the following eight assumptions:

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[1]Without attempting to be exhaustive, one may instance the following, inter alia, as the significant works in the positivist political science of America: Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947); Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950); Herbert A. Simon, et al., Public Administration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956); Heinz Eulau, et al. (eds.), Political Behavior: A Reader in the Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956); Seymour Martin Lipset, et al., Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographers Union (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957); James Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957); Glendon A. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959); Gabriel A. Almond, et al. (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960); Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961); Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962); William N. McPhee, et al. (eds.), Public Opinion and Congressional Elections (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962); Gabriel A. Almond, et al., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations

1. Political inquiry is properly based upon individual or group behavior, rather than institutions, ideas, historical influences, etc.;

2. Such inquiry will reveal behavioral principles--laws or general theories of human political behavior--having approximately the same rigor as physical or biological laws or theories;

3. The discovery of these principles will permit scientific prediction about human political behavior;

4. There exists a causal order both in nature and in human behavior, and, assuming the identification of all relevant variables, this causal order is constant;

5. The constants in political behavior being similar to physical or biological laws can be arrived at fundamentally by the same means as those of physics and biology;

6. Values are relative cultural artifacts the importance of which lies in the fact that, as human attitudes, they affect human behavior;

7. Political scientists can be, and must be, value-free in conducting scientific political inquiry; and

8. The function of political inquiry is the description of political behavior and the construction of an explanatory system.[1]

(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963); Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (New York: Rand McNally, 1964); David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

[1]There have been many and various formulations of the behavioral "tenets," "creed," "hallmarks," etc., most of which, however, do not attempt to discern or spell out the implicit assumptions of behavioralism in political science. See, for example: Nelson W. Polsby, et al., "A Brief Introduction to the Scientific Study of Political

As is clear from the anti-positivist arguments, the general position of positivist political science is not so unassailable as it might seem from a superficial reading of the behavioral literature. Core difficulties appear to be those related to the fundamental problems of fact-judgments and value-judgments. As a science, positivist political science is ultimately concerned with the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Yet, the basic problem of judging what are relevant empirical facts and other associated problems constitute core difficulties in positivist political science. It will be shown in the following pages that the problems of fact-judgment are prior to--and hence, more fundamental than--the problems of value-judgment, although much of the criticism and counter-criticism of positivism in political science tends to leave one with the impression that the problems of value-judgment are the primary cause of dissension. The three authors whose views

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Behavior," in Nelson W. Polsby, et al. (eds.), Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 4-8; Cyril Roseman, et al., Dimensions of Political Analysis: An Introduction to the Contemporary Study of Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 12-16; Albert Somit, et al., op. cit., pp. 177-179; Frank J. Sorauf, Perspectives on Political Science (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 15-16; Vernon Van Dyke, op. cit., pp. 158-160. See also David Easton, "Introduction: The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' in Political Science," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., pp. 7-8 and the bibliographical references from which he "distills" the behavioral characteristics, p. 7 n.

were examined in preceding chapters dwelt on problems of both fact-judgment and value-judgment. Some of their anti-science theses are "logical," and some are "ideological."[1] And there are certain aspects of positivist political science about which the three authors are silent. In the following pages, "logical" arguments against positivist political science are developed, in an attempt both to synthesize and to extend the antitheses to positivist political science.

The Problems of Fact-Judgment in Positivist Political Science

Description of Political Phenomena: The Problems of Cognition

It was indicated in Chapter II that political science is deprived of "empirical justice," that impartial arbiter of the empirical world which renders it indubitable for the physicists or the biologists that the magnetic field is a physical phenomenon, and osmosis a biological phenomenon. The devastatingly negative effect of the absence of that "empirical justice" on a would-be science readily can be demonstrated by a simple hypothetical example. Suppose a physiologist has arrived at an inductive conclusion that every crow he observed in the world

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[1]For the stipulative definitions of these two terms, see above, p. 30.

is black; and suppose further that another physiologist has discovered a crow in the empirical world that is not black but white. Challenged by the second physiologist to disclaim the "all-crows-are-black" generalization, the first physiologist has, conceivably, two alternative ways to meet the challenge and save his generalization: appeal to "empirical justice"--which we assumed absent in this example--or pronounce that the white crow is not a crow on the ground that it is not black. This ad hoc explanation is possible--i.e., imaginable--in physiology because we assumed the nonexistence of "empirical justice" in physiology, or, to speak more precisely, because we assumed there were no empirical meaning-criteria for the term "crow." Without empirical meaning-criteria of "crow," our first physiologist commits the fallacy of an ad hoc explanation in that "blackness" is used as the defining characteristic of "crow," independently of, and prior to, defining characteristics of "crow" that empirically exist. Since, in physiology, there are empirical meaning-criteria of "crow," disputes arising from the discovery of a bleached crow would be immediately settled. Disagreement among the physiologists would be over terminology, not over the content of the defining characteristics of "crow," which are independent of the physiologists. Substitute "politics" for "crow," and we seem to have located the fons et origo of all the difficulties in positivist political science.

The very fact that there are arguments about the "nature of man" and the "nature of politics" and the very fact that these arguments are dissonant are eloquent testimony that empirical meaning-criteria for "political phenomena" do not exist. To be sure, Strauss' teleological conception of political phenomena, or Mills' trans-systemic view of political phenomena, cannot be proved on empirical grounds. The point is, however, that neither can the fallacy of their assertions be demonstrated on empirical grounds. In other words, in order successfully to controvert these "ideological" assertions, positivist political scientists must refer to the empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena," rather than argue ad hoc that the "telos" or the "system" do not fall within the purview of "political phenomena" because the "telos" and the "system" are not "political phenomena." In the absence of empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena," there is no way to prove on empirical grounds that such and such, and only such and such, constitute political phenomena. Consequently, the positivist political scientists' determination to concern themselves only with "empirical actualities" does not result from an inexorable demand of empirical meaning-criteria, but, rather, from a subjective defining of political reality in accord with what they believe to be "science" and "scientific methods." We must examine the meaning and consequences of this subjective definition of reality.

Insofar as positivist political science aspires to be a scientific discipline, it confronts the fundamental problem of determining its object of inquiry on empirical grounds. The satisfactory solution of this problem requires as a prerequisite condition the existence of empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena." In the absence of such criteria, however, the content of the empirical meaning-criteria have to be established somehow. The alternative to empirical determination, it would seem, is axiomatically--i.e., a priori--to determine the empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena." That is to say, since the empirical meaning-criteria are not forthcoming from the empirical world, such and such are consensually established as the yardsticks of "political phenomena" and superimposed upon the world of empirical political phenomena. The end-result of this resolution of the difficulty is that the empirically cognizables, measurables, and verifiables are retroactively established as the empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena."[1] To argue, as our three authors have done, that the retroactive determination of the empirical meaning-criteria in effect "reduces"

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[1]Reinhard Bendix's indictment of the "fallacy of retrospective determinism" against the political psychologists must be regarded as having its roots ultimately in the retroactive determination of the empirical meaning-criteria of "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism." See Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," American Political Science Review, Vol. 46 (June, 1952), pp. 357-375.

the political to the "subpolitical" or "non-political" is to assume an "ideological" position. A "logical" argument must assert at least that the retroactive determination of the empirical meaning-criteria of political phenomena is not scientifically warranted to the same degree that the argumenta contra are not scientifically warranted. The retroactive determination of the empirical meaning-criteria is, however, followed logically by a multitude of difficulties. The most critical difficulty is what may be called the "analytic-synthetic confusion."

As a science of politics molded after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences, positivist political science is admittedly and self-consciously concerned with the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Empirical knowledge has to do with "synthetic" statements, as distinguished from "analytic" statements. An analytic statement[1] is of the form:

"AB is A," or
"A is A."

Thus, "black cats are black" and "black is black" are examples. The defining characteristic of an analytic statement is that the predicate of the sentence merely repeats what is already contained in the subject of the sentence. To know the truth of the statement that "black cats are

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[1]The use of the adjective "analytic" originates from the fact that one has only to analyze a statement of this kind to know whether or not it is true.

black," no reference to the empirical world is necessary: in fact, it is not even necessary to know what the terms "cat" and "black" mean. On the other hand, a synthetic statement is of the form:

"AB is C," or

"A is B."

Thus, for examples, "black cats are fierce" and "cats are mammals" are synthetic statements. In a synthetic statement, there is in the predicate of the sentence something other than what is contained in the subject of the sentence: i.e., the predicate supplies genuine information about the subject. Consequently, to know the truth of the statement that "black cats are fierce" one must make references to the empirical world: he must observe in the empirical world whether black cats are in fact of ferocious disposition.

Now consider the statement that "politics is the authoritative allocation of values for a society." Is it synthetic or analytic? The answer depends upon whether the speaker--David Easton in this case--is stating a defining characteristic of "politics," or stating a fact about politics which he judges to be "political" on grounds other than "authoritative allocation of values for a society." In the former case--i.e., if Easton is stating a defining characteristic of "politics"--he has no preconceived idea of what "politics" is, for he is indeed in the process of

conceiving "politics": he is giving a definition, and, hence, the statement is analytic. As an analytic statement, the statement cannot be proved or disproved empirically: it is a priori true. If, on the other hand, Easton is stating an empirical fact about politics--i.e., if the statement is intended as synthetic--Easton must have a preconceived idea of what "politics" is, for he is supplying empirical information about "politics," the conception of which must have preceded the empirical finding. We cannot possibly make a statement, "cats are mammals," without knowing what "cats" means in the first place. As a synthetic statement, the statement is subject to empirical proof or disproof: the truth of the statement depends on the correspondence between the assertion and empirical actualities.

It is maintained here that the definition of "political phenomena" and the determination that a phenomenon x ("voting behavior," "political modernization," "polyarchy," etc.) is a political phenomenon must be analytic statements. This assertion is made on the following grounds: in stating an empirical fact about a political phenomenon x ("voting behavior," "political modernization," "polyarchy," etc.), there must be a preconception of the political phenomenon that is judged to be "political" on grounds other than those evident in "voting behavior," "political modernization," "polyarchy," etc. If it is asserted that "voting behavior"

is a political phenomenon on the ground that "political phenomenon" is, or includes, "voting behavior," the assertion is a tautology, a special type of analytic statement. The existence of the preconception of "political phenomena" is rendered impossible, however, by the absence of empirical meaning-criteria. In brief, the retroactive determination of the empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena" is necessarily analytic.

That "voting behavior" is a political phenomenon because political phenomenon is "voting behavior" is not usually asserted by positivist political scientists. Starting from the retroactively determined empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena" that are necessarily analytic statements, positivist political scientists instead furnish the analytic statements with empirical contents. It must be pointed out that this analytic-to-synthetic transgression is not in itself a logically fallacious step. The transgression is not fallacious, however, if, and only if, the components of the empirical referent possess universal attributes--as nucleus in physics does. If the empirical referent of the analytic statements does possess universal attributes, the relation between the analytic statements--the retroactively determined empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena"--and the political phenomena in the empirical world would be similar to that between mathematics and the empirical phenomena of the

natural sciences. But, as the three authors have arduously argued, trans-systemic, trans-temporal, trans-spatial human attributes are not available to positivist political science: it must be maintained at least that the positivist assumption of universal human attributes is scientifically unwarranted. In the manner in which physicists have shown the identity between the "Russian" magnetic field and the "American" magnetic field, positivist political scientists have yet to demonstrate the identity between the "Russian small groups" and the "American small groups," to use Strauss' example.[1]

On the unwarranted assumption of the universality of the "political nucleus" (individual and group behavior), the analytic-to-synthetic transgression is made, in which the original analytic statements are given empirical contents. After this scientifically unwarranted conjunction of

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[1]The indictment of the findings of positivist political science as "trivial" is somewhat misdirected. Most, if not all, findings of positivist political science are trivial not because of the trifling size of the variables selected for investigation, but because of the absence of universal attributes in the object of its inquiry. Mendel is known to have counted his red, pink and white garden peas--seemingly trivial research--to discover the Mendelian laws; Galileo rolled cannon balls down inclined planes to discover the law of free-falling bodies; Galvani poked wires at dead frogs, which led to the discovery of the voltaic cell; Gilbert played with magnets; Franklin flew kites. In the apple falling upon Newton's head was embodied the attribute of gravity universal to all matter. The absence of universality of attributes in the object of positivist political inquiry, rather than the meager size or scope of its investigation, constitutes the triviality of the findings of positivist political science.

analytic statements with empirical objects, there is a third step in which the originally analytic statements are treated as synthetic, as if they had been empirically verified, or, as if they were empirically verifiable. Reiterated step by step, what may be called the "cognitive fallacies" in positivist political science are the following:

1. Retroactive determination of the empirical meaning-criteria of "political phenomena." The statements are analytic, and hence are a priori true; they are not subject to empirical proof or disproof;

2. The analytic-to-synthetic transgression, in which analytic statements are given empirical contents, on the scientifically unwarranted assumption of the universality of human political attributes; and

3. The "empiricization"[1] of the analytic statements, in which the a priori truth of the original analytic statements is unwarrantedly conceived to be empirical truth of synthetic statements.

It is now obvious that, without resorting to the "animus dominandi," "telos," or the values of "reason and freedom"--i.e., without assuming an "ideological" position--the "reduction" of the political to the non-political, sub-political, or to the psychological variables, can be logically imputed to positivist political science. Similarly, by the second cognitive fallacy the "universalization" of the political particulars logically can be maintained. The third cognitive fallacy serves as a basis for logically maintaining "absolutizing" what in fact remain political particulars.

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[1]In the absence of a suitable vocabulary, this terminology is coined out of necessity.

These three cognitive and epistemological fallacies have far-reaching methodological consequences for the positivists' efforts to be "scientific" in the study of politics. An examination of some of the more significant aspects of the positivists' predicament follows.

The Problems of the Positivist Generalization

The laws of the natural sciences are empirical. Such ordinary, every-day statements as "the Third Reich lasted from 1933 to 1945" and "buffaloes are gregarious but wolves are not" are also empirical statements. The laws of natural sciences differ from ordinary empirical statements in that they are universal: the laws apply to all instances without exception. As universal empirical statements, the laws of natural sciences are stated in different forms, such as

> "All A's are B's," or
> "If (certain conditions are fulfilled), then (this or that occurs)," or
> "Whenever this happens, then that happens."

But whatever their form, the laws have in common the quality of universality; without this quality, they are not laws. Universality is the defining characteristic of a law. Furthermore, not only must the statement hold without exception in the empirical world; it must also be true, i.e., it must state uniformities that really do occur in the universe. The laws of the natural sciences are, in short, true universal empirical statements.

The laws of the natural sciences--or, scientific laws--are generalizations. From observing particular examples of nature's uniformities we generalize and assert that these uniformities hold in all cases: what the laws describe is something unlimited in extent, extending indefinitely both into the past and into the future. As generalizations, all scientific laws go beyond the evidence which is available for them at any given time in what they assert. This is what makes them generalizations. If one examines all of 100 marbles in a bag and says, "all of them are black," his statement is not a generalization, because he is not going beyond the evidence: the statement is mere description of what he has already observed. But if he states: "All crows are black" (not using blackness as a defining characteristic of being a crow), his statement is a generalization, because, no matter how many crows he has observed, his statement goes beyond the evidence: he is generalizing from observed to unobserved instances. As generalizations, the scientific laws are arrived at by means of induction. The process involved is, for example:

Crow #1 is black;
Crow #2 is black;
etc. ;
Therefore, all crows are black.

The premises only make the conclusion probable on the basis of the evidence; they do not make it certain. We can speak of laws of nature as relatively well established, but never as fully established in the sense that the conclusion of a

valid deductive argument is established if its premises are true.

The difficulties of positivist political science in formulating scientific laws in the world of political phenomena begin to manifest themselves at the very first step of the inductive process: i.e., selection of the object of description confronts the researcher with difficulties identical with those involved in the process of cognition. Other difficulties follow. Once the object of description is somehow determined, it is obvious that there must be a certain arena within which the accumulation of the evidences can proceed. The arena may be a particular subsystem within a political system, such as "political parties of Great Britain," or a particular political system, such as "the United States," or a particular cultural sphere, such as "Western democracies." To be scientific laws, however, the inductively derived conclusions have to be generalizations: i.e., the arena must be universal. In order for the arena to be universal, the systems on various levels must be universal. That is to say, the systems must be constants, rather than variables. Even that the system must be universal is empirically a dubious position. Consider, for example, Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," one of the few examples of a blatantly claimed "law" in political phenomena. After extended study of continental social democratic parties, Michels discovered that oligarchy is

endemic in all large-scale organizations; it is the inevitable product of the very principle of organization.[1] Some forty years after Michels, Seymour Martin Lipset, et al., concluded, after an examination of the internal politics of the International Typographers Union, that Michels' "iron law" is not a law because their findings about union politics contradicted the "law."[2] Our concern here is not whether Michels or Lipset is right: our concern is rather that such contradiction is inevitable, since the arenas of the induction processes for Michels and Lipset are not universal. In view of the apparently non-universal arenas for inductive study, it seems that the usual modus operandi of the positivist political science consists, as Mills has argued, in taking a particular system as constant: i.e., an inductive generalization that is verified within a limited arena is extrapolated to other arenas, the scientists thus asserting the universal validity of the system-bound generalization. The trouble with this procedure is that it makes any "evidence" malleable. Such procedure not only makes the claimed "universality" spurious, but also makes the "truth" of the generalization self-validating.

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[1]Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). The first English translation was published in 1915.

[2]Seymour Martin Lipset, et al., Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographers Union (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

The positivist formulations of "hypotheses" inherit all the difficulties inherent in formulations of the "laws." The defining characteristic of a hypothesis is that it is not known to be true. If it is known to be true, it is called fact, or generalization if it is a universal statement. Hypotheses can be either particular or universal statements; either descriptive or causative statements. We may classify the four types of hypotheses as follows:[1]

	Descriptive	Causative
Particular	S is P	If C, then E
Universal	All S is P	If C, then always E

In addition to the general difficulties involved in cognition and in formulating laws, the specific difficulty here concerns the causative-universal type of hypotheses, which is in general form: "In all cases, if conditions a, b, c, etc., are fulfilled (C), then phenomenon E occurs." In order validly to formulate this type of hypothesis, at least two conditions are prerequisite: the universality of the conditions (C); and the discreteness of each individual

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[1]Hypotheses also can be classified in terms of observability: hypotheses about the observable but not at the moment observed; hypotheses about the observable in principle but not thus far observable in fact; and hypotheses about the unobservable in principle. The existence of neutrinos in physics, or the existence of enzyme systems in chemistry, are examples of the last kind. Many microbial entities, such as bacteriophages, were unobservable, but observable in principle, prior to the invention of the electronic microscope. "There is a cat outside" is an example of the first kind, as long as we remain inside the room.

condition. The difficulties associated with the first prerequisite condition have already been stated, and, hence, we shall examine the second.

Consider the simplest form of a variable relation: "S is P," which relates two variables. The Erie County study,[1] for example, informs us, among other things, that reasonably staunch Erie County Republicans become confirmed in their attachment to their candidate as a result of listening to the campaign materials of the rival party. "This bare and interesting finding," states a critical sociologist,

> gives us no picture of them as human beings in their particular world. We do not know the run of their experiences which induced an organization of their sentiments and views, nor do we know what this organization is; we do not know the social atmosphere or codes in their social circles; we do not know the social reinforcements and rationalizations that come from their fellows; we do not know the defining process in their circles; we do not know the pressures, the incitants, and the models that came from their niches in the social structure; we do not know how their ethical sensitivities are organized and so what they would tolerate in the way of shocking behavior on the part of their candidate. In short, we do not have the picture to size up and understand what their confirmed attachment to a political candidate means in terms of their experience and their social context. This fuller picture of the "here and now" context is not given by variable relations.[2]

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[1]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944).

[2]Herbert Blumer, "Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable,'" in Jerome G. Manis, et al. (eds.), Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 87.

In short, we must say, the two variables are not discrete entities that can be described in isolation from the total context. Our points here are that formulation of a scientific hypothesis requires the assumption of the discreteness of the individual variables; that most, if not all, positivist formulations of hypotheses unwarrantedly make this assumption; and that, by doing so, the positivists falsely impute all the relevant variables to the "system"--the total context that is taken as a constant. The combined effect of these tactics, as with the positivist formulation of "laws" and "generalizations," is that one can formulate a hypothesis that is in principle unfalsifiable.

The Problems of the Positivist "Explanation"

One of the chief functions of scientific laws or generalizations is to serve as explanations, i.e., to answer questions about why events occur as they do. But the difficulties inherent in the positivist formulations of "laws" and "generalizations" are inherited *in toto* by the positivist "explanations" of political events.

Although some authors conceive "explanation" as a process of elucidation or annotation *via* analogy,[1]

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[1]For example, see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1963), p. 8.

scientific explanation is not merely an expatiatory process. There are certain conditions or requirements for an explanation to be scientific. An event is explained when it has been brought under a law or generalization. Scientific explanation consists of subsuming an event under an empirical regularity.[1] An explanation, to be scientific, must satisfy the following conditions. First, the statements of the phenomenon to be explained must be logically deducible from the explanatory statement:

All S is P (statement giving the explanation)
x is S
x is P (event to be explained)

In every case, at least one universal statement--a law or a generalization--is required to make explanation of a given event. And, consequently, acceptance of the explanation depends upon explicit or implicit acceptance of the universal statement. Second, a scientific explanation must have predictive value: it must explain phenomena besides the one it is invoked to explain. Why is this second condition required? Suppose we are asked to explain the event: "Why did the engine stop working just now?" We may construct an explanation in the following way, fulfilling only the first requirement:

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[1]Cf.: Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 117-152; Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," in Herbert Feigle, et al. (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), pp. 319-352. See also: Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 59-62.

Whenever a gremlin gets into the engine it will not work.
The engine is not working.
There is a gremlin in the engine.

The event to be explained is perfectly deducible from the universal statement. Yet as explanation it is unsatisfactory, for we can predict nothing by means of it. Our sole test for the presence of the gremlin is simply that the engine does not work. But it is not the case that the sole test for the broken pistons of the engine is that the engine does not work. The scientific explanation covers more grounds than the fact to be explained; the fictitious explanation above in effect is no more than a restatement of the fact which needs to be explained. It is an ad hoc explanation, predicting nothing; nothing could falsify it.

The difficulties of positivist political science in providing scientific explanations of political events result from the difficulties of establishing genuine generalizations which we discussed in the preceding pages. Further difficulties emerge when positivist political scientists attempt to ignore, either knowingly or unknowingly, the fundamental difficulties involved in the formulation of universal statements. Consider, for example, Lasswell's well-known formula of "political man": The political man equals

Private Motives
Displaced on Public Objects
Rationalized in Terms of Public Interests.[1]

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[1]Harold D. Lasswell, "Psychopathology and Politics," reprinted in The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell

According to Lasswell, man seeks political power as a means of compensation against deprivation--particularly the psychological deprivations one has undergone in his infantile days. This in turn is supposed as the cause for an adult's low self-esteem. Consequently, "Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions."[1] Let us formulate an explanation, in Lasswellian terms, to the question, "why was Hitler power-mad?"

> One's political power compensates his low self-esteem.
> Hitler had low self-esteem (result of infantile traumas).
> Hitler sought political power.

Let us grant that the event to be explained is logically deducible from the universal statement. Let us also grant the validity of the Freudian theory of personality. The question we wish to pose is whether the explanation meets the second requirement of scientific explanation: i.e., whether the explanation can explain phenomena besides Hitler's power-madness. Our sole test for Hitler's seeking power, within the Lasswellian framework, is simply that he had low self-esteem. Is this assertion warranted? Confucius also sought power, but with the intention to realize his elaborate theory of "benevolent government."[2]

(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 75-76; "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How" in ibid., p. 305; and Power and Personality (New York: Norton and Co., 1948), p. 38.

[1]Power and Personality, p. 39.

[2]Confucius' infantile experiences were also quite

Undoubtedly, others in history have sought political power, not out of low self-esteem, but for other reasons and motivations. In the light of this application, the Lasswellian "explanation" must read: "Hitler sought power, because a force inducing one to seek power caused him to seek power," i.e., "he sought power because he sought power." There is no difference between this and our previous gremlin example.[1]

The Problem of Value-Judgment: "Objectivity" in Positivist Political Science

Conditions of "Objectivity"

Scientific observation and scientific knowledge are said to require "objectivity," the capacity of a scientific observer to see the empirical world as it "actually" is, and the resultant quality of the body of scientific knowledge. As was indicated in Chapter II, "objectivity" in the social sciences has been challenged as impossible in light of the ultimate value commitments of social scientists. We must

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different from those of Hitler, who, according to Lasswell, had early learned "to gauge the slightest emotional undercurrent of those around him, doubtless as a means of playing off his mother against his father in the tense emotional atmosphere of his home." Confucius was a "posthumous child," so, obviously, he had no means to play off his mother against his already-dead father, even if the circumstances demanded it. Power and Personality, p. 89.

[1]It must be noted that most, if not all, studies of political personality, of political participation, produce "explanations" similar to the example of Lasswell's.

return, however, to the problem and examine what is meant by "seeing the world as it actually is."

Consider the following analogy. Imagine that one is aboard a train moving at a constant speed. He may observe "objectively" that the flower vase on the dining table is "standing still"; i.e., it is motionless. He may be informed that he and the object of his observation are moving in the same direction at an identical speed, and, consequently, that his "objective" observation about the motionlessness of the vase is not true. The observer, if oblivious of the total situation, or merely not wishing to admit his error, has a means of "validating" his "objectivity": he may argue that he has <u>defined</u> "motionlessness" as the constancy of distance between himself and the object of observation. Imagine further that the wayward observer recruits like-minded eyes to repeat the act of measuring the distance between the subject and the object of observation, thereupon claiming that his statement has been "verified." Our hypothetical observer now has accomplished two things as to the statement "the flower vase is motionless": he believes the statement to be true; and he has complete evidence--let us suppose--that the statement is true. The statement falls short of being genuine scientific knowledge, however, because it does not fulfill the third requirement: the statement must be <u>true</u> in the empirical world.[1]

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[1]The three conditions for "knowing p" were spelled

The analogy is serviceable for illustrating the "analytic-synthetic confusion" as well, but the point we wish to make at the moment is that "verification" itself is not sufficient for objectivity. Assuming the possibility of attaining objectivity, we must take into account not only the quality and the condition of the observing eyes, but also the conditions and context of the object of observation and the kind of relationship between the subject and the object of observation. Consequently, it may be maintained that there are at least three conditions necessary for attaining "objectivity": autonomy of the object of investigation; autonomy of the subject of investigation; and detachment between the object and the subject. The first condition points toward the absolute discreteness, independence, or isolability of the object of observation from the rest of the universe. The second condition similarly points toward the absolute discreteness, independence, or isolability of the subject of observation from the rest of the universe. The third condition points toward the independence of the two autonomous entities from one another. Employing these three variables, it is conceptually possible to classify the following eight types of

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out in an earlier chapter. See above, pp. 18-19. If the hypothetical observer claims satisfaction of the third condition as well--i.e., if he asserts that it is not the train but the rest of the world that is moving--his argument becomes "one-dimensional." As nothing can prove such an assertion, so nothing can disprove it.

empirical observations:

	Object	Subject	Subject-Object Relationship
(1)	Autonomous	Autonomous	Detached
(2)	Autonomous	Autonomous	Non-Detached
(3)	Autonomous	Non-Autonomous	Detached
(4)	Autonomous	Non-Autonomous	Non-Detached
(5)	Non-Autonomous	Autonomous	Detached
(6)	Non-Autonomous	Autonomous	Non-Detached
(7)	Non-Autonomous	Non-Autonomous	Detached
(8)	Non-Autonomous	Non-Autonomous	Non-Detached

By arguing that the object and the subject of positivist political science are both non-autonomous, and that the relationship established between the object and the subject is one of non-detachedness, Morgenthau, Strauss and Mills have advanced "logical" arguments that positivist political science is a type belonging to the eighth category, rather than to the first, to which its objects of emulation--physics and biology--properly belong.

The Non-Objectivity of Positivist Political Science

Asserting the invalidity of the "method of the single cause" in the social sciences, Morgenthau has argued that the positivists' assumption of the autonomy of the object is false.[1] The object of the social sciences,

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[1]It may be noted here that causation involves temporal precedence: a cause never occurs after its effect. As to what distinguishes events that precede others and cause them from events that precede but do not cause, there are two views. The traditional metaphysical view--which is sometimes called the doctrine of "necessary connection"--is that there is some kind of necessary connection between C and E when C causes E: it is not enough to say that E

Morgenthau has maintained, is characterized by "individuality," whereas the object of the natural sciences is characteristically "typical." The meaning of the "individuality of events" in social and political phenomena is that nothing can be separated out as an independent variable, or as a dependent variable. The impossibility of isolating a social event as either an independent or a dependent variable is due to the fact that no social event exists in isolation from other social events: the social variables are mutually interrelated in the stream of social events. Morgenthau's example of "propaganda" as an independent variable is an attempt to show the non-discreteness of the object of the social sciences.[1]

Water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. Heat is the independent variable, and boiling water the dependent variable. Whereas Morgenthau has attempted to show the impossibility of separating out social correspondences to "heat" and "boiling water," Strauss has asserted the non-autonomous nature of the object of the social sciences by arguing that a social "variable" is never a genuine variable if it is taken out of the context within which it occurs.

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follows C in a certain way, but C must be followed by E. The opposing view of "constant conjunction"--originated by David Hume--is that C is merely regularly followed by E: events are only constantly conjoined, and, hence, there are no grounds for asserting that C must be followed by E.

[1]See above, p. 47.

Water boils at 212 degrees, but within a certain context: i.e., at sea level, where the atmospheric pressure equals 1013.2 millibars, provided also that a pressure cooker is not used. To be sure, for Strauss, the political context transcends the merely empirical, but even if it is reduced to the empirical level, as in his example of "group politics,"[1] it is clear that a political event cannot be understood properly in separation from the total context within which it occurs and that there are no sufficient grounds for asserting that political contexts are uniform everywhere.

The system-boundness of the object of the social sciences is somewhat differently approached by Mills. By indicating the "abstracted" nature of the positivists' object of inquiry, Mills has maintained--in addition to the impossibility of an isolated social variable and the inseparability of a social event from the context within which it occurs--that the object itself is unfit, as it were, for scientific observation: i.e., the object is not in a "normal" state. The "boiling water," to use the example above as a simile, not only is not isolable from the total context within which it occurs, but also contains impurity, as a result of its malleability to system-contaminating forces. Mills has attempted to show this

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[1]See above, p. 94.

effect by analysis of examples from the positivists' studies of "mass communication."[1] Mills has shown through other examples the non-normality of the object of the positivist social observations, as well as the invalidity of the positivists' tacit assumption that the object is in a normal state. The "impurity" of the water itself is a relevant variable, which in turn is related to the system in a directly relevant way. Consequently, the positivists' unspoken assumption that the system is a constant is scientifically unwarranted.

It may be pointed out here that assumption of the autonomy of the object of social inquiry is indispensable in the search for causal order in social phenomena. The critical difficulties involved in this assumption, however, are manifest in the recent attempt to escape from the whole concept of causation by way of the idea of "function" in the social sciences. The "structural-functional" analysis, currently a fashionable approach in positivist political science, seems to involve essentially the following four steps:

1. Definition of the unit in terms of which processes can or do take place;
2. Discovery of the factors setting the general limits of variation for the unit chosen;

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[1]See above, p. 125.

3. Determination of the conditions that must be met if the unit is to persist within these limits ("functional requisites"); and

4. Determination of the patterns of action that must be present if operation is to result in the production of the functional requisites ("Structural requisites").[1]

The difficulties involved in the structural-functional approach are rather well analyzed by William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, who have reformulated the "structural-functional argument" in the following two syllogisms:

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[1]For an indication of the shift of theoretical focus from the group approach to functionalism, see Joseph LaPalombara's report: "The Comparative Roles of Groups in Political Systems," Items (Social Science Research Council, June, 1961), pp. 18-21. For a brief presentation of functionalism, see Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond, et al. (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 3-64. For a functionalist approach to "political culture," see Gabriel A. Almond, et al., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963). For the theoretical underpinnings of functionalism in the studies of "political development," see Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); Robert E. Ward, et al. (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964); James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965); Lucian W. Pye, et al. (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965); etc. For general introduction to the functional approach, see: D. F. Aberle, et al., "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," Ethics, Vol. 60 (January, 1950), pp. 100-111; David E. Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64 (November, 1958), pp. 221-237; Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Some Aspects of 'Structural-Functional' Analysis and Political Science," in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1958), pp. 52-66; etc.

I. (1) If system s is to be maintained adequately under conditions c, then requisite functions f_1, $f_2 \ldots f_n$ must be performed.

(2) System s is being maintained adequately.

Requisite functions f_1, $f_2 \ldots f_n$ are being performed.

II. (1) If requisite functions f_1, $f_2 \ldots f_n$ are being performed, this will be accomplished by existing structures.

(2) Requisite functions f_1, $f_2 \ldots f_n$ are being performed.

Requisite functions are being performed by existing structures.[1]

The fundamental difficulty in this argument is that there are no grounds for asserting that any particular system does in fact perform specified functions, and that there are no grounds for asserting that one set and only one set of functions is requisite. Consequently, in the words of Flanigan, et al.,

> . . . the analyst can define his "requisite function" as he pleases, and he can be equally imaginative in locating which structures perform what functions. There is nothing illogical about his quest: the difficulty is rather that his findings may consist of many discrete observations which do no more than illustrate again and again that structures perform functions.[2]

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[1]William Flanigan, et al., "Functionalism in Political Science," in Don Martindale (ed.), Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strength and Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, Political Science, and Sociology (American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, February, 1965), p. 120.

[2]Ibid., p. 121. It must be pointed out, consequently, that the functional approach leaves unsolved the basic difficulties inherent in all comparative methods: the

Morgenthau, Strauss and Mills also have argued against the positivists' assumption of autonomy of the subject of political investigations. Morgenthau has indicated the existence of a dual tension that militates against autonomy of the subject: a tension between the truth and the "limitations of origin"; and a tension between the truth and the "limitations of purpose." While the "limitations of origin" determine, as system-binding forces, the perspectives of the subject, the "limitations of purpose," in the form of earthly indulgences and deprivations, come into conflict with the subject's exclusive and autonomous commitment to the truth. Morgenthau's exemplification of the three kinds of political science--"persecuted," "respected," and "neither hated nor respected"--are indications of the interplay between "irrationality of social personality" in the subject and "irrationality of social forces" in a given society.[1] These

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problems of defining units of study; of allowing for the different degrees of complexity and variability within such units; of establishing adequate criteria of comparability; and of establishing that units selected for study have been selected on non-arbitrary grounds. After all, serious social scientists are well aware that philosophers of science like Ernest Nagel, Richard B. Braithwaite, Carl G. Hempel, Mario Bunge, etc., have thoroughly discredited the whole notion of functionalism, and revealed it to be at best a heuristic device and at worst a series of tautologies. The functional approach is mentioned here, because it does not yet seem a dead-horse-beating activity, in view of the current recourse to the approach by some political scientists.

[1]See above, pp. 61-64.

inherent limitations on the subject's autonomy are operative, presumably, not only in the social sciences but also in the natural sciences.

In arguing that objective answers receive their meaning from the subjective questions raised in the fields of the social sciences, Strauss has maintained not only the impossibility of divorcing subjective elements from the objective elements of the social sciences, but also the impossibility of denying the value-oriented subjective interests and motivations behind the subject's academic activities. For Mills, on the other hand, autonomy of the subject in the social sciences is impossible chiefly because the ideological relevance of social science is inherent in its very existence. Since both the intellectual activities and the object of inquiry occur within a society, the social scientists are bound to play one of three roles: "justifying," "criticizing," and evading the issues of the system of power and the ways of the powerful. The last role, that of "non-commitment"--which Mills identifies as the true meaning of the positivists' alleged refrain from "value judgments"--is not "value-freedom," because it occurs within a context that is value-laden, and a person is not being "value-free" by remaining non-committal in the face of an ~~act~~ of injustice, however the term "injustice" may be defined.

Morgenthau and Mills have specifically repudiated the positivists' assumption of the detached relationship between the object and the subject in the social sciences. Morgenthau in particular has maintained, supported by modern scientific thought, that nature itself cannot be explored in a detached way: we can explore it only by tramping over it and thus disturbing it. The "creative influence" of the subject upon the object of inquiry is far more manifest in the social sciences. Social scientists stand in the stream of social causation as acting and reacting agents. Forecasting an election result, therefore, a Mr. Gallup transcends the function of theoretical analysis and becomes an active agent intervening in the actual processes which determine the election result. Mills has argued that, in the positivist social sciences, the "creative influence" operates in a more far-fetched way, to the extent of determining the nature of the object itself. According to Mills, the "methodological inhibition" actually tends to determine the problems for the positivist social scientists, whereas, in the natural sciences, this methodological inversion is simply unthinkable.

A necessary consequence of the "non-committal" within a value-laden context is the manipulative employment of the social sciences by "interested patronage," which Mills has illustrated to a considerable extent. It is perhaps true that any science is amenable to "administrative

uses" and manipulations. With respect to the servitude resultant from interested patronage, there is no basic difference between the biochemists producing more effective neural-toxic gases for military use under a contract with the Army and Stouffer's research, under an Army contract, on how to turn frightened draftees into tough soldiers who will fight a war whose purposes they do not understand.[1] With respect to "value-neutrality," however, there are fundamental differences between the biochemists and Stouffer, et al. The differences originate from the fact that, while the value-laden context is external to the biochemical entities themselves, the object of the social investigations is not extraneous to the value-laden context. Insofar as research findings are manipulatively employed, genuinely scientific discoveries do not bear causative relevance to the object of inquiry, affecting and altering the existential attributes of the object itself in a way extraneous to the object's own purposes. This is the true

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[1]Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. I (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949) and The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. II (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949). For similar examples, see: Morton Grodzins, "Public Administration and the Science of Human Relations," Public Administration Review, Vol. 11 (Spring, 1951), pp. 88-102; Reinhard Bendix, Social Science and the Distrust of Reason (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951), passim; William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 25 ff.; etc.

meaning of the "manipulative uses" of the findings of social science.

There is, after all, a contradiction in the term "value-neutrality." If one is truly "value-neutral" as to the context within which he lives, all of his activities must be guided by a lack of concern, in which case the value of academic activities itself becomes a non-value.[1] Also, if one is "value-neutral" in the sense of being a-valuational, he must be so only by accepting, implicitly or explicitly, the total context within which he lives. Since the positivist political scientists cannot be said to be either value-less or a-valuational, the logical conclusion appears either that they are in a blessed state of docta ignorantia (Strauss' identification of the positivists as sub-Neronians is a contention that they are in such a state), or that their pretended "value-neutrality" means only an orientation toward a particular value that happens to be near and convenient, e.g., the value of self-aggrandizement having to do with prestige, status, power, wealth, etc.

If the orientation toward the value of self-aggrandizement constituted the only valuational relevance of the positivist social sciences, the anti-positivist

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[1]For an insightful analysis of the "disaffected" youth who are "value-neutral" in this sense of the term, see Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized Society (New York: Random House, 1956).

pronouncements as to the dire consequences of positivism in social sciences would be uncalled for. Positivist social sciences assume an ideological character when the distinction between fact-determination and truth determination is obscured by an implicit or explicit assumption that the absolute moment in history has been reached in a particular system here and now. This assumption has epistemological as well as ideological consequences. Validation of an empirical belief has two dimensions: determination of truth and determination of rational credibility. Cognitive evaluation of an assertion--or an assertive state of mind--looks to the warrant or ground of what is asserted; but also it looks to the truth of the assertion. These two dimensions are distinct in any empirical judgment: a judgment may be true without being justified; and it may be justified without being true. The determination of its truth includes reference to the future and looks to its ultimate verification, but the determination of its justification looks only to the grounds of its credibility which lie in the present and past.[1] In short, the epistemological consequence of a system-bound social science is an obscuration

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[1]In the words of C. I. Lewis, "the necessity of this distinction in the case of empirical beliefs follows from two simple and obvious considerations: first that the vital function of empirical cognition concerns future eventualities; and second that, at the moment of judgment, such eventualities are incapable of being assured with complete certainty." C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 255.

of the two dimensions of empirical beliefs through universalizing and absolutizing the particular and the present. The epistemological obscuration of the fact-truth distinction--which frequently amounts to an ossification of truth--has an ideological consequence as well, which Herbert Marcuse has, perhaps, best described:

> The operational and behavioral point of view, practiced as "habit of thought" at large, becomes the view of the established universe of discourse and action, needs and aspirations. The "cunning of Reason" works, as it often did, in the interest of the powers that be. The insistence on operational and behavioral concepts turns against the efforts to free thought and behavior from the reality and for the suppressed alternatives.[1]

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[1]Herbert Marcuse, op. cit., pp. 15-16. The misplaced conclusion of Thomas Landon Thorson's The Logic of Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962) is illuminative--whatever Thorson's intention might be--of the ideological consequence of a system-bound, temporocentric political science. After promising an alternative to the methods of induction and deduction, Thorson "concludes"--in what is in effect a plea for a policy--that we must abide by the imperative: "Do not block the possibility of change with respect to social goals." That such "blocking" of future eventualities is quite possible in social phenomena reveals the implication of the positivists' absolutizing the truth of the present.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: IS A SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS IMPOSSIBLE?

The issue of positivist political science, or of positivist social sciences in general, is both epistemological and valuational. The epistemological relevance of the issue has been made evident by recent literature on the philosophy of the social sciences.[1] The valuational relevance of the issue also has been made clear by proliferation of the literature on the subject.[2] What has not been made

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[1]Cf.: Maurice Natanson (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1963); David Braybrooke (ed.), Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1965); Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). For a most recent work, see May Brodbeck (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968). Among the numerous articles on the subject, see, in particular: Lewis W. Beck, "The 'Natural Science Ideal' in the Social Sciences," Scientific Monthly, Vol. 68 (June, 1949), pp. 386-394; Paul Diesing, "Objectivism vs. Subjectivism in the Social Sciences," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 33 (April, 1966), pp. 124-133; Charles Frank, "Philosophy and the Social Sciences," in C. E. Boewe, et al. (eds.), Both Human and Humane (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 94-117; Richard S. Rudner, "Philosophy of Social Science," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21 (April, 1954), pp. 164-168; etc.

[2]This point, insofar as political science is concerned, scarcely requires further corroboration. Concerning the social sciences in general, however, see, in particular:

clear with equal intensity or verbosity is the Janus-like nature of these two facets of the issue: i.e., there is an inherent connection between the epistemological and the valuational problems of positivist political science. One may suggest two reasons for the relative silence on this crucial relationship. First, the epistemological-minded critics of positivist political science have tended to attack only the rather simplistic epistemological and methodological assumptions of the positivists. Second, critics of the valuational stance of positivist political science have frequently advanced their arguments in terms of their own valuational assumptions, thus producing mostly "ideological" arguments. These two tendencies obscure the inherent relationship between the epistemological and valuational problems of positivist political science.

To demonstrate the connection between the epistemological and the valuational problems of positivist political science, we must once again raise the question: "Is a

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Reinhard Bendix, Social Science and the Distrust of Reason (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951); Gunnar Myrdal, Value in Social Theory: A Selection of Essays on Methodology (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); A. I. Melden, Civilization (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959); W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963). See, also: Nicholas Rescher, "Values and the Explanation of Behavior," The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 17 (April, 1967), pp. 130-136; Paul W. Taylor, "Social Science and Ethical Relativism," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 55 (January, 1958), pp. 32-44; and M. Roshwald, "Value-Judgments in the Social Sciences," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6 (November, 1955), pp. 186-208.

scientific study of politics possible?" If the analyses in Chapter VI are valid, the eight assumptions of positivist political science[1] are open to serious doubts, and, consequently, the conclusion must be that the possibility of positivist political science is dubious also. There is sufficient merit in the critics' case for its impossibility to warrant such assertion. But, exactly what is meant by "impossible" when critics assert that positivist political science is impossible? The positivist political scientists themselves admit the "impossibility" of immediately achieving their goal, acknowledging that scientific study of politics is still in the "embryonic stage" of development. By admitting its technical impossibility, the positivists do not mean that scientific study of politics is impossible in principle: the contrary assertion is indeed theirs'. As, for example, landing a man-made object on the moon used to be a technical impossibility, but was never an empirical impossibility, so the positivists appear to believe that the scientific study of politics is not, though technically impossible at present, an empirical impossibility.[2] Consequently, the relevant question is

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[1]See above, p. 148.

[2]It may be noted here that there are at least three different meanings of "possibility" or "impossibility." A state-of-affairs is empirically possible when it is not contrary to laws of nature. Technical possibility requires not only empirical possibility, but also the ability to make use of the laws of nature to produce conditions that

whether the scientific study of politics is empirically possible.

To speak of the empirical possibility (or impossibility) of a scientific study of politics presupposes the attainability (or unattainability) in principle of laws of human political behavior. Since, however, such presupposition--either positive or negative--has to do with the empirical possibility in political behavior of "empirical possibility" itself--i.e., in the absence of laws of human political behavior comparable to the laws of nature, the very notion of "empirical possibility" becomes subject to question in this area--both parties to the issue of positivist political science lose, at this point, empirical grounds for their respective assertions. Empirical evidence, however numerous, supporting or negating the regularity of human political behavior becomes irrelevant to the question of whether laws of human political behavior are <u>in principle</u>, rather than in fact, attainable. In short, the issue of positivist political science loses

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could not be produced before. Third, a state-of-affairs is <u>logically</u> possible when the statement that this state-of-affairs exists is not self-contradictory. Thus, for example, it is empirically impossible--hence, technically impossible, but logically possible--for a discharged cannon ball to travel in a zigzag path. If a state-of-affairs is logically impossible--e.g., a "circular triangle"--it is empirically and technically impossible also; but what is technically impossible at any given moment need not be empirically impossible; and what is empirically impossible need not be logically impossible.

epistemological relevance and assumes ideological or normative relevance. Why?

It must be made clear that assertions as to both the attainability and the unattainability of laws of human political behavior are logically possible. It must be made clear also that both types of assertions are empirically possible, if, and only if, empirical actualities are externally and artificially made to conform to the respective assertions. Laws of human political behavior will be an empirical possibility--and, consequently, the scientific study of politics will be an empirical possibility--if laws of human political behavior are externally and artificially created by forces extraneous to the nature of man,[1] or, in

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[1]Lasswell's "policy science" is the clearest example of this. Floyd W. Matson has stated: "Since he is not concerned to know the heritage and character of his ultimate goal-value, there is no evident uneasiness in Lasswell's persistent conjunction of 'human dignity' with 'manipulation,' as carried out by the techno-sciences of political prevention and behavioral reform. . . . The assumption which alone would seem to justify this linkage of contrarities is that the 'dignity of man' is not (as others have supposed) an inherent attribute of his humanity, nor the civilized expression of a categorical imperative, but a strategic objective to be achieved in some rational future. . . . Once human dignity is regarded not as a future by-product of social engineering but as an inherent quality of man gua man--more to be safeguarded from external encroachment than 'implemented' by external fiat--the perspect of a manipulated dignity becomes less attractive. The unwitting inversion of values to which the policy science of democracy points is concretely illustrated by many of the concepts and programs of present-day public welfare. . . . As in [Lasswell's] case, the encroachment of human dignity and personal freedom is an avowed objective of social welfare; nevertheless, all too often, it is the dignity and freedom of the person as client which are oppressed and jeopardized

what appears to be an inversion of the foregoing, if all contingencies of possible changes in human political behavior are artificially arrested--i.e., if the temporal and spatial particulars are absolutized so as to have eternal and universal attributes like those of natural objects. Similarly, laws of human political behavior will be an empirical impossibility--and hence, the scientific study of politics will be an empirical impossibility--if, and only if, such efforts at artificially standardizing and absolutizing men are to no avail. In brief, the issue of a scientific study of politics ultimately boils down to a tension between different conceptions of man and of the capacity of human reason--i.e., how we wish to live and how we think we ought to live as men.

In the final analysis, then, the answer to the question, "Is a scientific study of politics possible?" must be conditional. It will be possible if the following conditions are fulfilled:

1. Man is artificially made to behave in a uniform way, as inorganic particles, or the "here and now" political objects are absolutized as eternal universals, such that they can be treated in the way in which natural scientists treat their objects of inquiry; and

2. There are systematic efforts at the transformation, or ossification, of human nature.

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by the manipulative propensities of welfare programs and programmers." Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image: Man, Science and Society (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 96, 97.

There arises an interesting question about what sort of science it would be if the above conditions actually were fulfilled in a Huxleyan "Brave New World." Would positivist political science then be like physics or biology in producing scientific laws, explanations and hypotheses? Or, dealing with man-made objects having more or less predetermined attributes, would it be more like a reverse Euclidean geometry? One can only conjecture upon it, for it would be a new experience in human history. One thing is certain, however: before political science can produce scientific laws, explanations and hypotheses about human political behavior, there must be some supra-scientific means of making man "behave." To be sure, neither the positivist political scientists nor the positivist social scientists in general sponsor such a development: they are more like actors on stage performing a libretto written by others. We may have to impute the authorship of the libretto ultimately to a sort of Hegelian "philosophy of history," for the libretto has been read in a remarkably "Hegelian" way. We may briefly review how the "libretto" has been read, using one of the most value-laden concepts in the social sciences, "rationality." In its classical meaning, rationality was the defining characteristic of man as homo sapiens.[1] But the phenomenal

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[1]This, we have seen, is Leo Strauss' "ideological" frame of reference in his polemics against positivist political science.

triumph of the modern natural sciences purified the idea of "reason," first through the doctrine of rationalism and later through that of empiricism. The more radical rationalists of the Enlightenment, confronted by the little "rationality" that was in fact to be found in the run of everyday human life, redefined the concept on the model of the natural sciences, receding progressively from its original human reference until it took up residence in the machine.[1] This displacement of rationality from man to the machine is not, however, the end of the story. The final step was the contemporary empiricists' attempt to import rationality back into the deflated image of man by defining his behavior strictly in terms of the reigning mechanical model.[2] It is remarkable that, among the system-bound empiricists, the failure of the rational-mechanical model to account for the fact of human behavior has been taken to mean, not that the model is unreasonable, but that human behavior is irrational. Something has, or will be, broken down in the entire process of defining and redefining the concept of human rationality: it is either the positivist theory of human behavior or man himself. It must be known

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[1]The argumenta contra this position have been Hans J. Morgenthau's ultimate frame of reference, as has been demonstrated in the preceding pages.

[2]The end-result of this process, as we have noted, is what C. Wright Mills has called the "Cheerful Robot."

unequivocally what is at stake when political scientists insist on "value-neutrality" or emphasize its impossibility.

The pure and simple assertion that a scientific study of politics is impossible is as naive as the simplistic counter-conviction that it is only a matter of time--and money, perhaps--until political science will mature into a fully accredited science of politics, comparable to physics or biology. The naivete originates as much from philosophical illiteracy as from the nearsightedness that fails to see the issue in its ultimate ideological and normative form. Since it concerns ultimately the questions of how we wish to live and how we ought to live, the issue of positivism is a matter with which all thinking men must be concerned. As students of politics, political scientists at least should be aware of the nature of their subject-matter in its ultimate form.

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